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ABSTRACT 
 
Hoop Streams:  
The Rise of the NBA, Multiplatform Television, and Sports as Media Content, 1982 to 2015 
 
by 
 
Steven J. Secular 
 
 
Hoop Streams seeks to examine the mediatization and marketization of sport since the 
1980s, by charting the evolution of the National Basketball Association from a small-time 
administrative organization into a multi-faceted global media empire. The NBA illuminates 
the transformation of sport into multiplatform media content and sports leagues into modern 
media conglomerates. In order to obtain the fullest possible accounting of the NBA’s history 
and decision-making, Hoop Streams draws on archival news sources and original interviews. 
Where possible, the dissertation also uses telecasts and promotional materials to illustrate the 
application of the league’s various media strategies. Ultimately, the NBA’s evolution reflects 
the ongoing commercialization of culture, as reciprocal cross-cultural flows are increasingly 
leveraged in service of greater profits. The transnational expansion and vertical integration of 
the NBA thus reflects historical shifts within the media industries, as the league capitalizes 
on the media strategies of larger conglomerates in Disney and Time Warner. Eventually, the 
NBA comes to privilege an inclusive internationalism over its status as an American pastime. 
This strategy is encouraged by the emergence of a streaming media environment, which 
allows for a more global and simultaneous address than ever before. Similarly to Netflix and 
HBO, the NBA demonstrates the drive for media content that can reach a maximum number 
of countries within a single platform. Hoop Streams thus helps to establish and survey a 
global and integrated sports-media industry. 
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Introduction: The NBA as Media Institution 
 
On November 29, 2012, the San Antonio Spurs of the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) gave four of the team’s top stars the night off. After playing five games 
in eight nights, the decision was not unusual for head coach Gregg Popovich or for the league 
more widely. The problem was that this game, against LeBron James and the Miami Heat, 
was to be nationally televised on TNT. The NBA’s commissioner David Stern, fined the 
team $250,000, arguing that the Spurs had rested their players “in manner contrary to the best 
interests of the NBA…Under these circumstances, I have concluded that the Spurs did a 
disservice to the league and our fans.”1 One week later, as pundits took opposing sides across 
ESPN and national news networks, cultural critic Chuck Klosterman drew a broader question 
from the controversy: “What is the central purpose of pro sports, and how much of that 
purpose is solely tied to entertainment?”2 Stern’s actions highlighted the extent to which the 
NBA privileged its media value above and beyond its investment in competitive and 
meaningful play. The lesson that television came first for the NBA, if not for all American 
pro sports, was an uncomfortable truth for many sports fans. The sanctity of the game 
seemed to disappear. But the fines against the Spurs were not the first time this was clear, nor 
would they be the last. Since at least 1984, when David Stern became the NBA’s 
commissioner, pro basketball has prioritized television. Since then, the NBA has acted as a 
media company first and a basketball league second. 
Formed in 1946, when the Basketball Association of America (BAA) merged with 
																																																								
1 Sam Borden, “Basketball Players’ Night Off Makes a Stand for Sitting Out,” The New York Times, November 
30, 2012, A1. 
2 Chuck Klosterman, X: A Highly Specific, Defiantly Incomplete History of the Early 21st Century (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2017), 178.	
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the National Basketball League (NBL), the NBA comes of age in the mid to late 1980s, 
having transformed from a professional sports organization into a media industrial entity 
under the direction of David Stern, who served as the league’s commissioner from 1984 to 
2014. Hoop Streams chronicles the causes and consequences of this evolution of the NBA, 
beginning with the inception of NBA Entertainment (NBAE) in 1982, a dual production 
house and archive for game footage, to the NBA’s status as a global media empire in 2015, 
with the aid of a unique and robust digital media infrastructure.  
Ahead of the 2014-15 season, the National Basketball Association signed a nine-year 
extension with its television and streaming partners, Turner and ABC/ESPN, to the tune of 
$24 billion. ESPN agreed to pay $1.4 billion per year, while Turner pays out $1.2 billion.3  
At last, the NBA’s TV revenue has begun to close in on that of the National Football League, 
whose most recent TV contract in 2011 netted them $27 billion.4 In the post-network, multi-
platform era of television, the business of sports has served to propel the business of 
television proper. In 2016, U.S. viewers collectively watched 31 billion hours of live sports, 
leading to higher and higher prices for sports channels on cable and satellite distributors. In 
2016, pay TV customers paid $18.37 per month for sports programming alone, forty-percent 
of the total bill, up from only $2.85 in 2001.5 This dissertation project will chart the 
trajectory between these points, as the NBA and its peers transform from primarily 
administrative organizations into multi-billion-dollar media enterprises. 
The production of NBA games, across media platforms and across national borders, 
now requires the coordination of thousands of employees within a variety of departments, 																																																								
3 Mike Prada, “NBA to Announce 9-Year, $24 Billion TV Deal with ESPN, Turner,” SB Nation, October 5, 
2014. 
4 Kurt Badenhausen, “The NFL Signs TV Deals Worth $27 Billion,” Forbes, December 14, 2011. 
5 Meg James, “The Rise of Sports TV Costs and Why Your Cable Bill Keeps Going Up,” Los Angeles Times, 
December 5, 2016. 
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sub-departments, and development groups. Some work in New Jersey, some in the 
Manhattan office, some travel between them, and some are stationed as far away as England, 
Mexico, China, and South Africa. The NBA operates as a genuinely global conglomerate, 
every bit as robust and integrated as its partners in Turner and Disney. This becomes 
especially clear by the close of the 2014-2015 season, the subject of Chapter Four, as the 
NBA advances its international streaming platform and local franchises like the Milwaukee 
Bucks and Sacramento Kings become global distributors in their own right. 
In a report prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers, on the “Global Entertainment and 
Media” outlook for 2018 to 2022, PwC cited the NBA alongside Netflix and Amazon, as 
comparable “giants” that are “converging on global markets.” In addition to Netflix and 
Amazon, the report also included the NBA’s League Pass OTT service in the same 
conversation as HBO Now, Hulu, and CBS All Access.6 Victoria E. Johnson has similarly 
described sports leagues and conferences as “fully-fledged media institutions of the post-
network era.”7 This introduction establishes the NBA as one such media institution of the 
contemporary media economy. Subsequent chapters will trace the history of this industrial 
evolution, beginning in 1982, before returning to the post-network era to examine how the 
NBA’s current status as a global media empire. 
This dissertation thus highlights the integrated “marketization” and “mediatization” 
of sport. These interrelated processes, exemplified and driven by the NBA since the 1980s, 
leads to the current global state of the sports media industry, wherein leagues function as 
media conglomerates and sport itself functions as media content first and foremost. The case 																																																								
6 Ennel van Eeden and Wilson Chow, “Perspectives from the Global Entertainment & Media Outlook, 2018-
2022,” PricewaterhouseCoopers, June 2018, 10, 16. 
7 Victoria E. Johnson, “Everything New is Old Again: Sport Television, Innovation, and Tradition for a Multi-
Platform Era,” in Beyond Prime Time: Television Programming in the Post-Network Era, ed. Amanda D. Lotz 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 133. 
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of the NBA explains how and why such a shift has occurred. I follow from David 
Hesmondalgh’s definition of “marketization,” which he prefers to terms like deregulation or 
liberalization, as marketization reflects “the process by which market exchange increasingly 
came to permeate the cultural industries and related sectors.”8 Marketization best describes 
the transition of sports leagues from public and primarily administrative bodies into multi-
national, multi-department integrated media institutions, while addressing both the regulatory 
and cultural dimensions of the process. 
“Mediatization” has been used in various capacities, but emerges from political 
communication scholarship. The “mediatization of politics” thesis, as succinctly defined by 
Terry Flew, proposes that “the changing structural relations between media and politics has 
developed to a point where political institutions, leaders and practices are increasingly 
dependent upon media and conform to the logics of media production, distribution and 
reception.”9 This term most appropriately describes the NBA’s similar efforts to manipulate 
basketball as media programming and its tendency to cater primarily to media interests in its 
directives, as demonstrated in Commissioner Stern’s fines against the San Antonio Spurs. I 
argue that the mediatization of sport begins in earnest in the 1980s, concurrent with the rise 
of cable and satellite television, as NBA Entertainment begins to package basketball in 
qualitatively different ways than had been done before, such as by NFL Films and ABC’s 
Monday Night Football. As other leagues follow in the NBA’s footsteps, the NBA thus 
carries sports television into the cable era, and later, the multi-platform era. With the advent 
of internet distribution, the process of mediatization has only intensified and accelerated, as 
will be charted through the dissertation. 																																																								
8 David Hesmondalgh, The Cultural Industries, 3rd Ed (Los Angeles and London: Sage Publications, 2013), 
128. 
9 Terry Flew, “The ‘Theory’ in Media Theory: The ‘Media-Centrism’ Debate,” Media Theory 1.1 (2017): 51.	
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The mediatization argument is reminiscent of a great deal of sports media scholarship 
from the mid-to-late 1980s, which came to see media’s influence as corrupting of sport, or at 
its most neutral, as a mutually beneficial commercial partnership. Writing about ‘new’ media 
in the late 1980s, Bernard Miège argued that “some sporting events are now not only 
produced for television but in function of television re-transmission,” citing major tennis 
tournaments, the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, and the FIFA World Cup as examples that 
“are as much audiovisual entertainment as they are live sporting events.”10 Around the same 
time, John Goldlust also argues of sport’s relationship with media that “television must 
produce a form of entertainment that ensures a maximization of the sale of commercial time 
and therefore the staging of the sports event is increasingly susceptible to changes in 
structure and form that television professionals assess will be most favorable to this end.”11 
The interests of sports and media executives are aligned in their pursuit of profit. In this 
capacity, Robert McChesney is perhaps most fundamental in outlining what he terms the 
“symbiosis” of sport and the mass media, in which “media attention fans the flames of 
interest in sport and increased interest in sport warrants further media attention.”12 Sut Jhally 
terms this process the “sports/media complex,” though he is skeptical of the idea that “before 
the influence of the media there was something that was pure sports.”13  
This “complex” is profoundly reflected in the concept of mediatization, which 
captures the increasing tendency of sport to prioritize to media interests. Sports and media 
move beyond symbiosis, as sports league become media companies in their own right. The 
																																																								
10 Bernard Miège, The Capitalization of Cultural Production (New York: International General, 1989), 144. 
11 John Goldlust, Playing for Keeps: Sport, the Media, and Society (Melbourne: Longman Chesire, 1987), 145. 
12 Robert McChesney, “Media Made Sport: A History of Sports Coverage in the United States,” in Media, 
Sports, and Society, ed. Lawrence Wenner (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), 49. 
13 Sut Jhally, “Cultural Studies and the Sports/Media Complex.” In Media, Sports, and Society, ed. Lawrence 
Wenner (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), 80. 
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commercial ambitions of both entities, which were formerly separate but aligned, have 
become even more deeply integrated and even synonymous in some respects. While the 
media industry might surpass sport in its interests, sport now is media. This dissertation 
advances and updates this scholarship, placing it in conversation with the subsequent years of 
media industry research. The mutual forces of marketization and mediatization will be 
charted through the dissertation, which chronicles the NBA as both the driver and exemplar 
of this process. 
 Previous scholars have highlighted the NBA as exemplary in these respects. Douglas 
Kellner has described the NBA as the “ideal TV sport,” perfectly suited to “the era of MTV 
and ESPN,” given its pace, action, and attention to spectacle. “Professional basketball,” 
Kellner argues, “has emerged during the [Michael] Jordan era as the game that best 
symbolizes the contemporary sports/entertainment colossus.”14 David L. Andrews has also 
proposed the NBA as a similarly exemplary global colossus, which has “seamlessly blurred 
the boundaries between sport, media, and entertainment sectors,” as a result of the “the 
league's ability to create multi-platform popular media spectacles.”15 As early as the 1980s, 
the NBA was well on its way to functioning as a media entity first and foremost, with 
basketball as but a secondary concern. Years later, by the start of the 2017-18 season, internal 
research on TV viewer behavior had even resulted in the NBA cutting the number of 
timeouts per game, as the league found that viewers often changed channels and never 
returned. While the execution of the mandate had to be worked out in collaboration with the 
“Basketball Operations” department, the decision followed from the demands of its media 																																																								
14 Douglas Kellner, “The Sports Spectacle, Michael Jordan, and Nike: Unholy Alliance?” in Michael Jordan, 
Inc.: Corporate Sport, Media Culture, and Late Modern America, ed. David L. Andrews (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2001), 66-67. 
15 David L. Andrews, Sport-Commerce-Culture: Essays on Sport in Late-Capitalist America (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2006), 9.	
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presentation.16 The NBA thus highlights the extent to which sport today primarily functions 
as media content. 
 In this capacity, the NBA offers a case study of much like Ramon Lobato’s recent 
comprehensive study of Netflix in the global media landscape, Netflix Nations (2019). In the 
book, Lobato describes his goal as examining “how Netflix morphed from a national media 
company to an international one,” and subsequently, “what this case means for existing 
debates about global television on the one hand and digital distribution on the other.”17 My 
own undertaking is quite similar, examining instead the NBA, the sports media component of 
the same industrial transformation, and the inherent tensions between U.S.-originated content 
and the global marketplace. In articulating the NBA as a successful media producer-
distributor in its own right, I hope to contribute to our further understanding of American 
sports leagues as comparable to such global producer-distributors as Netflix. 
The NBA, like Netflix, provides a globally available media property. Ultimately, 
Lobato highlights how Netflix’s international rollout and catalog system allows its content to 
remain simultaneously local and global. Netflix shifts our conception of cross-border media 
flows, he explains, in “the fact that it can effortlessly combine the local and the global within 
the one platform and constitute itself as many different products simultaneously.”18 The 
NBA, in the simultaneity of its own international platform and the purposeful transformation 
of the sport to accommodate new global audiences, offers further evidence of this 
phenomenon beyond the case of Netflix. Framed by the mutual processes of marketization 
and mediatization, this dissertation examines the historical motives and mechanics that 
encourage and enable this contemporary media ecosystem.  																																																								
16 Danny Meiseles (President of Content, NBA), in discussion with the author, September 22, 2017. 
17 Ramon Lobato, Netflix Nations: The Geography of Digital Distribution (New York: NYU Press, 2019), x. 
18 Ibid., 160.	
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The NBA, as I will demonstrate, was a crucial driver of the global multiplatform 
possibilities of sports media. While the NFL first exploited the possibilities of broadcast 
television in the 1960s and 1970s, the fledgling NBA was better positioned to capitalize on 
new opportunities in cable and satellite in the 1980s, given the league’s lower overhead costs 
and revenue. The NBA had little to lose by experimenting with emergent media. During the 
1980s, the creation of NBA Entertainment and NBA International thus accelerates the 
transformation of sport into multi-platform media content. Concurrent with a period of global 
deregulation, the 1990s sees the NBA consolidating control over its various properties, 
launching new divisions, and opening overseas offices. This centralization allowed the 
league to take fuller advantage of new direct-to-consumer distribution opportunities and 
become a more global institution. In 1994, the NBA launched League Pass, a subscription-
based satellite service via DirecTV; in 1999, the league became the first to own and operate 
their own cable channel, NBA TV; and in 2007, they were the first to see the opportunity in 
packaging together their broadcast and digital streaming rights, as part of their contract 
extension with Turner and ESPN. Mark Lazarus, who worked with the NBA in his capacity 
as president of the Turner Entertainment Group, notes that more than any other sports league, 
the NBA has understood their product as media content.19 Not only is this significant in 
understanding the large-scale influence of the NBA on the sports media industry, but it 
allows us to consider NBA programming alongside scholarship of TV programming and 
digital distribution. 
Through this dissertation, I hope to more fully integrate sports into our accounting 
and understanding of the media industries. As sport is transformed into media content, the 
NBA hastens and exemplifies the subsequent transformation of sports leagues from solely 																																																								
19 Mark Lazarus, in discussion with the author, April 18, 2017. 
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administrative organizations into vertically integrated media conglomerates. As internet 
distribution advances and allows for more reliable direct-to-consumer distribution on a global 
scale, the 2000s sees the NBA prioritize a global audience over its domestic one, laying the 
groundwork for the programming strategies of the next decade, as reflected in Netflix 
especially. Finally, the 2014-15 season serves as the pinnacle of the NBA’s status as a global 
media empire, given the developments over the previous thirty years, and demonstrates the 
ongoing ascendance of streaming media distribution over cable. The NBA is a fully 
functional global media institution for the post-network era of television. The history 
presented here thus helps to explain our global multiplatform media economy, the 
internationalization of media content, and the role of sports in this evolution.  
 
Global Television: History and Theory 
In Timothy Havens’s periodization of the globalization of television, he differentiates 
between the widespread international exchange of programming from 1957 to 1972, “as 
nation after nation introduced television broadcasting,” and a second wave from 1985 to the 
present (as of 2006), which grew from the worldwide explosion of commercial broadcasters 
and “the spread of cable and satellite channels around the world.”20 As the demand for 
television programming increased in the 1980s, the major Hollywood distributors were 
ideally positioned to succeed, given their vast programming libraries. Havens describes how 
the dream of U.S. producers in the 1960s had been “a world in which domestically tailored 
programming would find general entertainment audiences both at home and abroad,” a fully 
efficient global ecosystem that could overcome national differences.21 Through an 																																																								
20 Timothy Havens, Global Television Marketplace (London: BFI Publishing, 2006), 17, 27. 
21 Ibid., 37.	
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examination of the NBA and sports television, I demonstrate how this global vision was 
fulfilled with the aid of a privatized media environment and increasingly advanced 
distribution technologies, from satellite and cable to streaming. 
Various scholars have examined the deregulatory atmosphere that gave rise to the 
globalized commercial television industry. David Hesmondalgh’s choice of “marketization,” 
as noted earlier, highlights “the process by which market exchange increasingly came to 
permeate the cultural industries and related sectors.” In contrast to Havens’s two distinct 
periods, Hesmondalgh describes various overlapping waves, including the marketization of 
television in  “advanced industrial states” from 1985 through 1995, which saw “the pulling 
apart of public service television,” and another wave from 1992 that sees the “convergence of 
the cultural industries with telecommunications and information technology.”22 Jennifer Holt, 
who further explores these trends in her examination of the construction of transnational 
entertainment empires in the 1980s through the 1990s, argues that a combination of 
neoliberal policy and new communications technology resulted in “a great acceleration of 
global commerce.”23 These trends overlap with the rise of the NBA, which took advantage of 
these opportunities for self-distribution during the 1980s and 1990s to become a true media 
conglomerate in and of itself. 
Jeremy Bourdon and Michael Curtin, moreover, both highlight the historical 
specificity of the global television paradigm that benefitted the NBA. Bourdon reconciles the 
national and international significance of the medium by charting the commercialization of 
public broadcasters and the influence of the U.S. model. Bourdon’s key intervention is that 
commercial interests have surpassed the earlier nation-building aspirations of television. 																																																								
22 David Hesmondalgh, The Cultural Industries, 128, 137, 151. 
23 Jennifer Holt, Empires of Entertainment: Media Industries and the Politics of Deregulation, 1980-1996 (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 10. 
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“Commercial television is less busy building the nation than formatting it to the needs of the 
market,” he notes.24 Michael Curtin, too, examines the ways in which networks of television 
distribution have expanded beyond national borders. For Curtin, various “media capitals” 
around the world operate as “switching points.” Defined as “particular cities that have 
become centers for the finance, production, and distribution of television programs,” these 
capitals “do not necessarily correspond to the geography, interests, or policies of particular 
nation-states.” 25 Bourdon and Curtin offer a fundamental framework for understanding the 
NBA, which maintains a global network of satellite offices that serve the commercial 
interests of the league first and foremost, irrespective of their geography. An emphasis on 
media capitals, therefore, allows us to see the “web of relations” that exists across local, 
regional, and global levels – to grasp the “temporal dynamism and spatial complexity of a 
global media environment.”26 These overlapping relations are useful for conceiving of the 
NBA’s global-local programming choices and institutional dynamics. 
These cultural and media flows are made manifest within the television format trade. 
Tasha Oren and Sharan Shahaf perhaps most neatly capture the importance of television 
formats in seeking to study globalization: “Global television formats, embedded as they are 
in local and global industrial, economical, textual, cultural and regulatory practices and 
constraints emerge as an extremely compelling focal point for the highly contextualized 
study of television as a global system.”27 Formats offer a viewpoint that is simultaneously 
historical, industrial, and theoretical. The format, as conceptualized by Albert Moran, offers 																																																								
24 Jeremy Bourdon, “Is TV a Global Medium? A Historical View,” in Global Currents: Media and Technology 
Now, eds. Tasha Oren and Patrice Petro (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 106. 
25 Michael Curtin, “Media Capitals: Cultural Geographies of Global TV,” in Television After TV: Essays on a 
Medium in Transition, eds. Lynn Spigel and Jan Olsson (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 272. 
26 Ibid., 272. 
27 Tasha Oren and Sharan Shahaf. “Television Formats—A Global Framework for TV Studies,” in Global 
Television Formats: Understanding Television Across Borders, eds. Oran and Shahaf. (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 4. 
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insight into the various loci of control and power – between the format ‘devisor,’ the 
producer, and the broadcaster across national and international lines. While the format 
functions as “a core or a structuring center,” it is also an ongoing and never-complete 
process, in which knowledge from subsequent iterations are absorbed into the “format 
package” to the benefit of the copyright holder.28 This also offers a productive frame for 
approaching the NBA television format and the multi-directionality of influences as the sport 
globalizes over time. The reciprocal ‘absorption’ of knowledge is reflected in the NBA’s 
changing style of play, such as the growing popularity of the “Euro-step,” and in its greater 
incorporation of signifiers from soccer, which have helped the sport to better address 
international audiences.29  
Especially pertinent, then, is Paul S.N. Lee’s concept of “amoebic” media, a process 
of cultural adaptation that is reminiscent of the TV format, yet is both broader and more 
specific. Lee’s work, which focuses on the case of Hong Kong, proposes four useful models 
for understanding the adaptation of foreign cultures: the parrot, the amoeba, the coral, and the 
butterfly. The amoeba, specifically, describes programs that retain the same basic content 
across localities, but change in their outward packaging, “like an amoeba which appears 
different in form but remains the same in substance.”30 These are often superficial changes, 
such as a game show or talk show that becomes localized through its hosts. It is thus a 
concept that offers a meaningful foundation to explain the nature of sports television. When 
Michael Keane, Anthony Y.H. Fung, and Albert Moran specifically categorized sports as a 
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globally distributed TV format, they cited Lee’s conception of the amoeba in order to 
describe its particular method of “repackaging” content.31 Similarly, Tony Schirato has 
explored the interrelationship between formats and televised sport, arguing that “formats 
invariably mold sport” by the “logics, imperatives, narratives, and technologies of 
television.”32 This project demonstrates how NBA programming ultimately abides the 
amoebic logic proposed by Lee, in service of a more inclusive international address during 
the 2000s. The concept of the “amoeba” is a useful framework for comprehending the 
nuances of sports television as format, which speaks beyond TV formats to a broader process 
of cultural adaptation. 
In many ways, the internationalism of amoebic formats is reflected and further 
explored in Marwan Kraidy’s concept of hybridity. For Kraidy, hybridity refers primarily to 
culture, but usefully “retains residual meanings related to the three interconnected realms of 
race, language, and ethnicity.”33 Proposing an alternative framework of “transculturalism,” 
Kraidy draws attention to the difference between the “corporate transculturalism” that seeks 
to use hybridity as a corporate marketing tool and the “critical transculturalism” that retains a 
more progressive political potential. Hoop Streams charts the development of NBA media 
content as a particularly “amoebic” and flexible format, which engages cultural hybridity for 
primarily commercial pursuits. This is not to claim a complete absence of more authentic 
expression, but it is certainly not the central objective. Kraidy’s conceptualization is useful in 
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integrating intentionality into cultural globalization without slipping into straightforward 
imperialism. 
This tension, between local cultural expression and transnational corporate cultures, 
has been further explored in the work of Silvio Waisbord and Michele Hilmes. Waisbord 
recognizes a multiplicity of local voices in the television format trade, but he warns that such 
instances may not be diverse in any meaningful sense and are moreover shaped by profit-
driven motivations. While formats “cannot be seen simply as transmission belts for Western 
values,” as they remain “essentially open,” Waisbord notes that “formats are not entirely 
malleable,” since “copyright holders ultimately determine what changes can be 
incorporated.”34 Like others, he characterizes the TV format at the center of a relationship 
between national belonging and international corporate interests, characterizing cultural 
flows as more multidirectional and complex than straightforward cultural domination. 
Similarly, Michele Hilmes emphasizes the productive aspects of these global flows, arguing 
that “sweeping invocations of ‘Americanization’ or globalization tend to obscure the ways 
that cultural influence works, and always has worked, across lines of many different 
kinds…”35 The case of the NBA demonstrates, however, that while flows may be more 
reciprocal, they may continue to serve the interests of the more dominant party.  
The concept of imperialism, then, is crucial to the examination that follows. For John 
Tomlinson, imperialism is necessarily a “purposeful project,” which is “the intended spread 
of a social system from one center of power across the global.”36 Others, like Daya Kishan 
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Thussu, offer more flexible conceptualizations. While Thussu acknowledges the productive 
potential of “contra-flows” from the global South to the North, he argues that “the American 
hegemony of global media cultures” is ultimately strengthened by the paradigm, since the 
localization of media content can “effectively legitimize the ideological imperatives of a free-
market capitalism.”37 This conception leaves room for both a clear-cut intentionality and the 
lack thereof, emphasizing instead a more systemic imperialism. For Thomas Lamarre, the 
television format trade, as one such system, “discovers compatibility, convertibility, or 
equivalency between national culture,” and seeks to transform the local into the regional.38  
I will demonstrate, through the case of the NBA and its relationship with overseas basketball 
leagues and talent, that the local has been made increasingly global.  
As part of this shift towards global-ization, in lieu of local-ization, Tanner Mirrlees 
has argued that U.S. transnational media companies “are de-Americanizing the content of TV 
shows and films so that they may more easily capture and control global, national, and trans-
local lifestyle markets,” rather than those that explicitly “promote one-dimensional or 
homogeneous images of ‘the American Way of Life’ to the U.S. and to the wider world.”39 
The NBA’s arc of globalization reflects this process, as the league’s programming has taken 
a more international address in order to be distributed or adapted more easily in multiple 
markets.  
Ramon Lobato, in his examination of Netflix, suggests that scholars use “both/and 
rather than either/or thinking” to conceive of global-local media dynamics, as “audiences do 
																																																								
37 Daya Kishan Thussu, “Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow,” in Media on the Move: Global Flow 
and Contra-Flow, ed. Daya Kishan Thussu (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 23, 28. 
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not choose between the local and the global but combine both in their everyday lives.”40 As I 
will demonstrate, however, the NBA seeks to convert and absorb national basketball cultures 
into the mediatized American iteration of basketball, much like a TV format evolves with 
each successive version of itself, to the benefit of the copyright holder. The NBA, as a 
globally present institution, seeks to minimize the difference between itself and local 
offerings, through similar actions of self-modification and institutional control. This will 
become more evident in Chapter Four, in the NBA’s equity investment in the Brazilian 
professional league, Liga Nacional de Basquete. Hoop Streams thus interrogates the 
relationship between American media and imperialism, as basketball transforms from a 
leading American cultural export into an international import, thus obscuring the influence of 
commercialism behind a veil of inclusion and social progress. I argue that this transition, 
which is enabled and encouraged by the integrated forces of marketization and mediatization, 
ultimately serves the wider distribution of American media and the further capitalization of 
overseas markets. 
 
Sports Television: History and Theory 
As a commercial media institution, sport occupies a unique position. Sports media 
involves the convergence of a live performed event, its mediation and the representational 
strategies thereof, and the perceptions of both in-person spectators and home viewers. While 
sports television may be shaped by decisions at the executive level, the contest’s producers 
remain dependent on the improvisational nature of the game action and on the programming 
decisions of the live event personnel. Understanding this relationship, as well as its 
transformation over time, is thus essential to the study of sports media.  																																																								
40 Lobato, Netflix Nations, 160.	
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Margaret Morse outlines perhaps the most central questions to sports media 
scholarship. She is interested in “the formal differences” between live sport and mediated 
sport, “the significant features of sport as a genre on television,” whether the disparity 
between the live event and media event has “brought any significance changes in the 
spectator’s psychic experiences of sport,” and if “the ideological or social function of sport 
changed through the convergence of two cultural models—sport and television.”41 Her 
inquiry effectively highlights the tension between performance, production, and reception.  
Morse argues that the performance of sport becomes significantly modified by its 
mediation. She describes how “the constant use of extremely long lenses both narrows the 
angle of view and flattens space” and “the convention of instant replay shows the same play 
two or three times from different angles and points of view.” The TV mediation of sport, 
then, exists in a realm unto itself, with a distinct spatiality and temporality that is no longer 
purely representational. Instead, television emphasized “only points of action and body 
contact, to the detriment of the ‘overall geometry of the game.’”42 While television 
encourages a greater disparity between what the in-person audience and the home audience 
experience, the home viewer gains something in the trade-off. They are bestowed a closer 
eye to the action, to the nuances of the performance, even though they lose a sense of the 
total picture. This tension is fundamental to conceiving of the ongoing mediatization of sport, 
as the NBA comes to function primarily a media company and increasingly programs and 
manipulates basketball as media content. 
Morse is less interested than others, however, in the industrial context of sports 
television that gives rise to these tensions. Robert McChesney is perhaps most fundamental 																																																								
41 Margaret Morse, “Sport on Television: Replay and Display.” In Regarding Television: Critical Approaches - 
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in outlining what he terms the “symbiosis” of sport and the mass media, in which “media 
attention fans the flames of interest in sport and increased interest in sport warrants further 
media attention.” He argues, moreover, that this relationship “has been distinctly shaped by 
the emerging contours of American capitalism since the 1830s” and that, ultimately, “the 
shapes of both sport and the mass media have been permanently changed.”43 This symbiosis 
is also supported by sports sociologist John Goldlust, who further notes that the U.S. was 
especially fertile for a larger-scale commercialization of sport, given “a strong ethic 
supporting economic development through free entrepreneurial activity” and the process of 
rapid industrial expansion, mass migration, and urban growth that followed the Civil War.44 
 Goldlust is concerned primarily with how and why sport obeys the logics of “good 
television.”45 While there is a degree of independence for sports leagues, since the conclusion 
of events remains open-ended, power ultimately lies with the interests of television. He 
compares the production of sports to an independently produced TV series: “For as long as 
particular shows maintain their rating power, they establish a sound bargaining position for 
contractual renewal and increased remuneration for all concerned with the production.”46 
Though there exists a push-pull of power between the sports and TV industries, the situation 
encourages both parties to accommodate the interests of  ‘good television,’ which is inclined 
to extract as much profit as possible from the performers and from the audience. Encouraged 
by new media technologies and the commercial possibilities of sports on TV, the sports and 
television industries become ever more interrelated. As noted earlier, this is reflected also in 
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Sut Jhally’s conception of the “sports/media complex.”47 In the intervening years, this 
relationship has only intensified. 
In Victoria E. Johnson’s work on the state of sports media in the multi-platform era, 
she argues that sport “epitomizes a paradox,” in that it remains “the most quintessential 
network-era programming” in its mass appeal and resonance, yet it is also “particularly well 
suited to new business practices, media outlets, and modes of viewer involvement that are 
enabled by the distribution flexibility and technologies characteristic of the post-network 
era.” Johnson also argues, history, that the NFL has been “foundational” in “shaping the 
business of televised sport.”48 Travis Vogan notes the same in his study of NFL Films, 
arguing that the division helped the league to “manufacture an image that sets the gridiron 
game apart from other sports and…[distinguish] itself from other sports organizations.”49 
While the NFL’s impact on sports television is indisputable, as a result of both NFL Films 
and its work with ABC on Monday Night Football beginning in 1970, the NFL continues to 
most profoundly exemplify the practices of the network era of television. The NBA, which 
ascended during the period of cable television, direct-broadcast satellite, and internet 
distribution, more powerfully exhibits the paradox at the heart of the global multi-platform 
era, in the league’s ability to “engage both a broad(cast) audience and increasingly narrower 
niches within that audience.”50 The NBA has more effectively demonstrated and perpetuated 
the sports industry’s investment in flexible distribution on a global scale, as the league grows 
at a far faster rate than its contemporaries. In 2017, NFL revenue sat at $17 billion, a seven-																																																								
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percent increase over the previous year. The NBA’s revenue, while admittedly smaller at 
$7.4 billion, was a staggering 25-percent increase from 2016.51 The NBA, as I will 
demonstrate, is a media conglomerate for a multi-platform, post-network era. 
Despite these advancements, for many years, the sporting event itself remained the 
primary source of profit for pro sports organizations. Like Margaret Morse’s interest in the 
tension between the live and mediated event, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz offer a deeper 
inquiry into the production of what they term the “media event,” the “high holidays of mass 
communication” that “demand and receive focused attention.”52 Crucially, Dayan and Katz 
describe the production of the media event as involving three particular ‘partners,’ whose 
interests may or may not coincide: “the organizers of the event who bring its elements 
together and propose its historicity; the broadcasters who re-produce the events by 
recombining its elements; and the audience, on the spot and at home, who take the event to 
heart.” Dayan and Katz describe these collaborations as a “contract,” in which “each side 
undertakes to give something to the others in order to get something in return.”53 The 
audience, which is included in the “frame” of the TV event and observed by the at-home 
viewer, thus has a large degree of leverage in this relationship. For this reason, sports 
organizations like the NBA seek to capitalize on audience participation and the event’s 
framing to more effectively reach international audiences. The color coordination of fan 
“costuming,” via T-shirts handed out pre-game, for example, is designed to create a cohesive 
‘look’ for the event and is in keeping with the arena/event as a mechanism of control. 
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The relationship between spectator and the stadium space, and the convergence of at-
home and in-person viewing modes, is further taken up by Greg Siegel. Delving more 
specifically into the modern sports stadium, Siegel traces the genealogy of the late 1990s 
“stadium boom,” which found an increasing number of cities either renovating old sports 
venues or building entirely new ones. These new venues were designed as “complete 
entertainment environments,” responding to a supposed “crisis” that “the sporting event in 
itself is thought to be insufficiently entertaining in an era of richly diversified, highly 
mediatized leisure consumption.”54 This modern “Disneyfied” stadium shifts the experience 
of in-person spectatorship, aligning it with home viewing and even shopping. This 
proliferation of screens functions as an “incentive to programmed participation,” which 
ultimately offers the event organizers a way to better guarantee the audience’s adherence to 
the script of the event narrative – through commands to cheer, make noise, or direct one’s 
attention to a particular area.55 This is an important framework for understanding the NBA’s 
strategies for globalization, many of which focus on the arena space, given its increasingly 
global and simultaneous distribution via DBS packages and later streaming platforms.  
Scholars have most frequently approached this globalization of sport in the context of 
cultural flows, which often reflect the integrated forces of marketization and mediatization, in 
essence if not in name. Toby Miller, Geoffrey Lawrence, Jim McKay, and David Rowe are 
interested in the effects of corporatized sport and what the process of commercialization 
means for culture as it grows transnationally. “The move towards a global sports complex is 
as much about commodification and alienation as it is to do with a utopian internationalism,” 
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they argue.56 Their ambivalence is also reflected in the work of Raymond Boyle and Richard 
Haynes, who discuss the influence of corporate sponsorships and note how “the lexicon of 
sports language has been transformed by the discourse of advertising and marketing.” In 
combination with sports’ “visibility and focus on symbols, winning, competition, partisan 
fans,” they argue, few other cultural forms are as “representative of a national identity.”57      
I would argue, additionally, that such universals are precisely what make sports programming 
so flexible and easily adaptable across national boundaries. 
Sohail Daulatzai argues as much in his article on the NBA, Islam, and global popular 
culture. Most broadly, he examines how sport’s position in the global cultural landscape 
emerges from the synergistic relationships between multinational corporations and 
international marketing conglomerates, which seek to reach diasporic publics. This speaks 
especially to the NBA’s global success, as “a cultural expression of the marginalized in 
American society—namely, African Americans” that has moreover been commodified 
through “systems of production and distribution firmly rooted in Western capitalism.”58 
While the global status of sport can indeed demonstrate a kind of utopian internationalism, as 
Miller et al. note, sport still remains bound up in capitalism and the commodification process. 
“Like literature, film, or any other cultural form, the NBA must be viewed as a mediated 
expression that can, and often does, reproduce dominant Western discourses,” Daulatzai 
argues.59 Similarly to Marwan Kraidy’s differentiation between corporate and critical 
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transculturalism, basketball’s Western values are increasingly downplayed in favor of a 
multicultural and utopian discourse that can be more easily sold on an international scale. 
An understanding of global television formats can thus help us to better explain the 
internationalization of sport, which is often packaged and distributed according to the tenets 
of the format trade. A greater understanding of sport, moreover, can help us to explain the 
globalization of television proper, as sport remains one of the most significant and widely 
consumed forms of entertainment around the world. The case of the NBA offers vital 
information for a more dynamic understanding of the relationship between sports, media, and 
globalization on both a cultural and industrial level.  
 
Methodology 
Following Victoria E. Johnson’s call for greater attention to the media operations of 
sports leagues, this project follows the models of industry sociology exhibited by Todd 
Gitlin’s Inside Prime Time (1983) and John Thornton Caldwell’s Production Culture (2008). 
Jennifer Holt’s Empires of Entertainment (2011) and Michael Curtin’s Playing to the 
World’s Biggest Audience (2007), moreover, serve as models for integrating industrial 
accounts with their historiographical context, both of which engage executive testimony in 
order to reframe and enrich historical work on media conglomeration and globalization. 
While sports media, too, is deeply involved in these processes, as I will demonstrate, no 
comparable project exists that combines testimonies from its executives and producers with 
historical accounts. This study of the NBA intends to correct this absence in order to 
illuminate the global aspirations and machinations of the sports media industry. 
	 24 
As a methodological framework, therefore, the field of media industry studies is most 
crucial. Though the field is expansive and features multiple approaches, I follow from 
Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren’s conception in Media Industry Studies: History, Theory, and 
Method. While acknowledging the flexibility of the field, they understand it as an integration 
of “political economy’s interest in ownership, regulation, and production with cultural 
studies’ interest in texts, discourses, audiences, and consumption.” The “challenge,” 
moreover, is to provide a sophisticated-enough interdisciplinary model that can 
“acknowledge the complexities and contradictions of media texts” and the consumption of 
those texts.60 It is not enough to combine political economy and cultural studies frameworks; 
one must remain attentive to the nuances and complexities of the medium. 
In their call for a “critical media industry studies,” Timothy Havens, Amanda Lotz, 
and Serra Tinic address the same concern as Holt and Perren by arguing for an examination 
of “the micropolitics of institutional operation and production practices.” The crucial 
“missing link” between political economy and cultural studies, they argue, is “the way in 
which institutional discourses are internalized and acted upon by cultural workers.” In other 
words, they seek to parse out the tensions between creative workers and corporate 
institutions, and to unpack how artistic, social, and financial forces work through the text and 
through labor “within actual practice.”61 This approach to media industry studies thus 
incorporates the larger forces of ownership and regulation, while remaining attentive to the 
complexities, contradictions, and discourses of specific media, per Holt and Perren’s 
provocation. 																																																								
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This speaks to a “production culture” approach to the media industries, following 
John Thornton Caldwell’s work, as well as Timothy Havens’s interest in what he terms 
“media industry sociology.” Caldwell suggests an approach that can incorporate “the cooked, 
skewed, or unreliable” industry trades.” One must properly balance these sources against 
“local production work-worlds”, which Caldwell defines as “the material and human 
conditions of production work itself.”62 Havens’s approach to sociology similarly takes a 
material, bottom-up perspective of cultural production, yet “seeks to connect these 
descriptions to broader historical and social trends and theoretical concerns.”63 This speaks to 
a tradition of media industry ethnography, following from Todd Gitlin’s Inside Prime Time 
(1983) and Horace Newcomb and Robert S. Alley’s The Producer’s Medium: Conversation 
with Creators of American TV (1983), and including more recent work in Caldwell’s own 
Production Culture: Industrial Reflexivity and Critical Practice in Film and Television 
(2008) and Miranda Banks’s The Writers: A History of American Screenwriters and Their 
Guild (2015).  
These works, and their extensive use of interviews and site research, serve as models 
for my own efforts to better grasp and more effectively interrogate industrial practices, power 
hierarchies, and day-to-day operations. In Inside Prime Time, Gitlin explains of his method, 
“I tried to make sense of…discrepancies, evasions, and blind-spots,” as “many special 
pleadings add up to an industry’s view of itself.”64 I intend to offer the same for the sports 
media industry, as exemplified by the National Basketball Association. The NBA, as a media 
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industrial entity, has its own producers, writers, editors, and actors that operate in much the 
same way as the media workers explored by industry sociologists and ethnographers. Sports 
media scholars, like John Goldlust and Sut Jhally, make such a comparison. Jhally highlights 
how the “directors, producers, camera operators, editors, and commentators are inserted 
between the live event and the home audience.”65 The NBA, with the help of its TV partners, 
has been especially adept at developing its star players as TV stars proper. The league’s 
many producers, directors, writers, marketers, and players (as actors) all work to contribute 
to the form of basketball’s mediation. Thus the interrogation of media industrial practices, 
and the examination of how “institutional discourses are internalized and acted upon by 
cultural workers,” offers a particularly appropriate framework for approaching both the NBA 
and sports media more widely.  
This undertaking is thus deeply aligned with the approach taken by Michael Curtin, 
Jennifer Holt, and Kevin Sanson in Distribution Revolution: Conversations about the Digital 
Future of Film and Television (2014), which utilizes interviews to contribute “big-picture 
strategic thinking” from studio executives, perspectives from “innovative enterprises” that 
are “operating outside of the global conglomerate,” and “insights from creative talent.”66 My 
own use of ethnographic research encompasses both interviews and site visits. Interviews 
included people from various backgrounds and occupations, at various levels of 
management, with the intention of offering a wide range of perspectives on the NBA’s 
history and its operations. These interviews can be grouped as follows: current and former 
NBA executives, NBA event and production personnel, team executives and personnel, 
executives from NBA partners (including Turner, ESPN, and Starwave), and the 																																																								
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sportswriters that covered the NBA’s ascent. The lengths of these interviews ranged from 
fifteen minutes to two hours and were conducted both in person and over the telephone, as 
noted in the appendix. There are 28 in total that contributed to this dissertation. 
 The site visits included the NBA’s production and distribution headquarters in 
Secaucus, New Jersey. Here, the league houses its digitized archival material, dated as far 
back as 1982, with films and physical media dated considerably earlier. It serves as one of 
two colocation centers (or “colos”) through which all of the NBA’s video passes, along a 
nationwide fiber-optic cable system purchased from Zayo Group.67 Site visits also included 
the facilities of two of the NBA’s partners in distribution and technology – NeuLion, which 
oversees the NBA’s international streaming platform from their Technical Operations Center 
in Plainview, New York, and longtime cable partner ESPN, which oversees many of the 
league’s most significant games, including the NBA Finals, from their Bristol, Connecticut 
headquarters. Additionally, I visited Golden 1 Center, home of the Sacramento Kings 
franchise, to better understand the league’s integration of national and international media 
distribution from the perspective of an exemplary team in that area. 
Following Caldwell’s call for “cross-checking” industry “disclosures,” I situated such 
ethnographic information alongside historical trade publications and news sources.68 These 
materials helped build a chronology of events that could be further interrogated by alternative 
ethnographic sources. Among the historical materials useful to my own project were articles 
and features from Variety, Broadcasting, Broadcasting & Cable, Back Stage, The New York 
																																																								
67 The other colo is Turner’s “Techwood” campus in Atlanta, Georgia, from which Turner operates the NBA’s 
domestic League Pass streaming service. 
68 John Thornton Caldwell, Production Culture: Industrial Reflexivity and Critical Practice in Film and 
Television (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 4. 
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Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, USA Today, and Sports Illustrated, in addition 
to more contemporary news sources from ESPN, Vice, Wired, and Forbes. 
I also tracked the historical transformation of the sport’s media strategies, where 
possible, through NBA archival footage and promotional materials. Game telecasts are 
available officially through their League Pass streaming package as “Hardwood Classics,” 
and more unofficially through user uploads on YouTube, where I was also able to gather 
various NBA promotional spots. The text itself offers primary insight into the 
representational strategies of the league, which includes their invocation of international 
cultures in order to more effectively market the league on a global scale. As part of the text, 
one can observe changes in fan practices and fan costuming, such as the popularity of color 
coordination, in order to make basketball spectatorship more reminiscent of soccer fandom. 
In his book Ball Don’t Lie!, Yago Colás describes his own methodology as first employing 
“literary analysis to identify the key elements of the myth in question” and then drawing on 
“existing historical and sociological research to situate this myth in and against the 
overlapping contexts, in basketball and society, in which it emerged.”69 This project is, 
essentially, the inverse – I undertake new industrial, sociological, and historical research, in 
combination with preexisting critical approaches to sports and media texts, such as those 
employed by Colás, in order to stage a full account of the NBA as a global (and globalizing) 
media institution. 
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Chapter Breakdown 
This introduction has sought to establish the NBA as a global media institution. This 
historical evolution is explained by the integrated process of mediatization and marketization, 
which reflects the NBA’s transformation of basketball into media content and itself into a 
media conglomerate. The NBA, an exemplar and driver of this transition through its global 
ambitions, helps to facilitate the global multiplatform state of the sports media industry. A 
survey of prior scholarship on the historical development of global television thus helps stage 
this inquiry, as the NBA benefits from the international deregulation of the TV industry and 
the localization strategies of the TV format trade. Scholarship on sports television, moreover, 
has historically expressed ambivalence about the sports-television relationship, wherein the 
interests of TV are seen as dominating the interests of sports alone. This provides a 
fundamental framework for charting the NBA’s particular relationship with television, as it 
evolves from 1982 through the 2014-15 season. The dissertation begins with the NBA’s 1982 
creation of its in-house production division, NBA Entertainment, which is reminiscent of 
NFL Films but sought to be broader in its media ambitions. The dissertation closes with the 
2014-15 season, a culmination of the league’s media efforts, in which the NBA signs its most 
massive media rights contract yet and opens the Replay Center at its Secaucus, New Jersey 
headquarters, the new home of an international in-house video exchange. 
Chapter One charts the transformation of sport into media content, from 1982 to 
1990, which is initiated by the creation of NBA Entertainment and culminates in the league’s 
unique agreement with NBC, which allowed NBAE to produce programs and promotional 
materials for the network and collaborate on ad sales. During this period, the NBA’s actions 
reflect their increasing willingness to manipulate and market the sport in ways that 
	 30 
emphasized its status as TV programming first and foremost. Following a new arrangement 
with broadcast partner CBS in 1986, which allowed the NBA to reacquire its own 
international media rights, the NBA began to self-produce its own international game edits 
for overseas distribution. This opportunity substantially boosted the league’s confidence in its 
ability to maintain control over its own media, culminating the NBA’s leaving CBS for NBC, 
who had promised NBA Entertainment greater responsibilities in network production and 
promotion. At NBC, the NBA is promoted on the “Must See TV” programming block 
alongside Seinfeld and Friends, reflecting the new status of basketball as commensurate 
media content. This strategy was later reflected in FOX’s programming strategy for the NFL 
beginning in 1993, which similarly framed sport within the “larger world of entertainment.”70 
As sport comes to function more like a TV program, Chapter Two charts the 
transformation of sports league from primarily administrative bodies into vertically 
integrated media conglomerates. The NBA, as a result of the in-house production and 
distribution efforts of the previous decade, is especially well positioned for this moment. The 
period from 1990 to 2002 sees the NBA opening a number of regional satellite offices to 
assist in media localization efforts and help coordinate the international media rollout of the 
league. While these decisions began before the 1992 Summer Olympics and the gold medal 
win by the “Dream Team,” which was comprised of Michael Jordan and various NBA greats, 
the success in Barcelona accelerates the NBA’s global plans. As the league expands its 
institutional reach, the advent of direct-to-consumer media distribution opens new 
opportunities for the self-distribution of NBA products. NBA.com is launched in 1995 and 
NBA.com TV, the first league-owned cable channel, is launched in 1999. This chapter 																																																								
70 Bryan Curtis, “The Great NFL Heist: How Fox Paid for and Changed Football Forever,” The Ringer, 
December 13, 2018. 
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examines the NBA’s increasing conglomeration, alongside the deregulation of the media 
industry, and how this further motivates the league to invest in home satellite and internet 
distribution. By the close of this era, the NBA has established itself as a full-fledged media 
institution. 
 Chapter Three reflects a newfound attention to the global sports audience over the 
domestic audience, following the advancement of digital communications technologies and 
the newfound conglomeration of sports leagues. During this period, from 2002 to 2007, the 
NBA increasingly imports and emphasizes international stars, creating a media product that 
can be effectively received in the maximum number of nations. In following the logic of the 
TV format, which seeks compatibility and efficiency between markets, the sport of basketball 
functions more than ever before as a television program. This is afforded by the continued 
expansion of NBA.com and the creation of a League Pass streaming platform, both of which 
allow for a more simultaneous global address. In 2007, the NBA decided to shift its domestic 
streaming operations to Turner Entertainment, which allowed the league to more fully focus 
on its global expansion efforts. This chapter thus interrogates the nature of internationalism 
and reciprocal cultural flows in a multiplatform media economy. Just as television formats 
often absorb subsequent iterations into their system of knowledge, so too has the NBA 
absorbed international cultures into its telecasts in order to offer a more seamless global 
product.  
 Chapter Four surveys the state of the NBA during the 2014-15 season, which offers 
the culmination of the league as a global media empire for the “post-network” era of 
television. Following the transformation of sport into media content and sports leagues into 
media conglomerates, and the privileging of a global address over the domestic audience, the 
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more widespread adoption of digital platforms has allowed the self-sufficiency of emergent 
media companies, such as the NBA, Netflix, and Amazon, to succeed beyond the scope of 
the legacy media conglomerates. At the start of the 2014 season, the NBA extended its 
domestic arrangement with Turner and ABC/ESPN for $24 billion over nine years, triple the 
previous annual rate and reflective of the media value that the NBA had cultivated and 
leveraged.71 While the NBA benefits from the spending power of its media partners, the 
expansion of direct-to-consumer distribution technologies has also enabled the league to 
become a successful global media institution in its own right.  This is evident in the 2014 
opening of the Replay Center in Secaucus, New Jersey, which is connected by fiber-optic 
cables to all twenty-nine of the NBA’s arenas, providing a more robust distribution 
infrastructure under the league’s control. The NBA is assisted in its international efforts by 
NeuLion, a streaming intermediary firm, which offers further insight into the infrastructures 
of streaming television beyond sport. The case of Brazil, moreover, where both the NBA and 
Netflix have heavily invested as a potentially major media market, affirms the NBA’s status 
and capabilities as a genuine global media empire. This chapter concludes with the 
Sacramento Kings, who demonstrate how ever-smaller institutions can operate as global 
media companies in the post-network era, through the strategic use of streaming and social 
media platforms.  
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I. America’s Game:  
NBA Entertainment and the Rise of Sports as Media Content, 1982 – 1990 
 
A man hustles down 32nd Street in Manhattan. A lean figure at 6 foot, 6 inches, he 
stands above the passersby that surround him. He ducks into a nondescript office building. 
Recently retired, the job is a different one than usual. The man is Walter Szczerbiak, former 
EuroLeague, Spanish League, and FIBA International champion. He is here, at the offices of 
NBA Entertainment, to record Spanish-language commentary for a handful of NBA 
broadcasts that have been condensed for foreign distribution. From an announcers’ suite the 
size of a phone booth, the voiceover recorded by Szczberiak will be heard on the NBA’s 
weekly games throughout Latin America. The work conducted here at the NBA 
Entertainment offices would next pass into the hands of the newly created NBA International 
division, which was tasked with securing the league’s media distribution outside of the 
United States.  
------------ 
The creation of NBA Entertainment (NBAE) in 1982 accelerates the widespread 
mediatization of basketball and sets the league on a path towards its contemporary status as a 
global media institution. While inspired by the success of NFL Films, NBAE was conceived 
by future commissioner David Stern as being “something bigger and broader” in its 
responsibilities, including film, television, and promotional materials. “Entertainment 
sounded right, if a little too pretentious,” Stern explained in 2015, “but when you don’t have 
much, you might as well flaunt what you want to have.”1 Beginning in 1982, NBA 
Entertainment became the league’s production outfit and video archive, a crucial storehouse 																																																								
1 Sports Video Group, “SVG Summit: Keynote Conversation with Dick Ebersol and David Stern.” YouTube, 
41:34. Post June 1, 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X6zAFPu74sU> 
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for all game materials that would enable the NBA’s foray into international satellite 
distribution during this period. While the NFL created a framework for sports on television in 
the broadcast era, the NBA’s aggressive and in-house approach to media production and 
distribution built the foundation for sports as media content in an eventual multi-platform 
ecosystem. This chapter thus proposes NBA Entertainment, and later NBA International, as 
drivers in the ongoing mediatization of sport. When the NBA leaves CBS for NBC in 1990, 
the network offers the league greater control over NBA programming, a unique arrangement 
and one that results from the success of NBAE. 
During this period, Bernard Miège and other scholars began to reflect on the sports 
and media relationship as one in which sport increasingly operated in service of media 
interests. “Some sporting events are now not only produced for television but in function of 
television re-transmission,” Miège argued.2 A decade later, Douglas Kellner pinpointed 
basketball as the “ideal TV sport,” due to its fast pace and emphasis on action and spectacle. 
As demonstrated in the chapter that follows, NBA Entertainment played a major role in 
cultivating basketball’s status as media content, a process best described as “mediatization.” 
While the term emerges from the field of political communication, mediatization most 
accurately captures the ways in which sport and its institutions become “increasingly 
dependent upon media and conform to the logics of media production, distribution and 
reception.”3 This chapter examines the NBA as both an exemplar and driver of sport’s 
mediatization from 1982 to 1990. 
The NBA and NBAE, admittedly, were following the lead of other sports media 
pioneers, including NFL Films, ABC Sports, and Ted Turner, who is especially significant 																																																								
2 Bernard Miège, The Capitalization of Cultural Production (New York: International General, 1989), 144. 
3 Terry Flew, “The ‘Theory’ in Media Theory: The ‘Media-Centrism’ Debate,” Media Theory 1.1 (2017): 51.	
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here given his ownership of the Atlanta Hawks basketball team. As Jennifer Holt has noted, 
Turner played a fundamental role in foreseeing media ownership in terms of content, as he 
had “envisioned the Atlanta Braves and Atlanta Hawks as programming inventory for 
WTBS” when he purchased both in 1976.4 While CBS had earlier owned the New York 
Yankees, from 1964 to 1973, Ted Turner was “the first network owner to maintain all of the 
broadcast rights for his own team,” which served as a blueprint “for how to successfully 
cultivate corporate synergy.”5 While the roots of sport’s mediatization may pre-date the 
creation of NBA Entertainment in 1982, the division plays a significant role in advancing the 
media potential of sport above and beyond its status as cultural pastime. By the end of this 
period, sport comes to function primarily as media content, as the league evolves from a 
primarily administration entity into “a far-flung entertainment and media conglomerate,” per 
commissioner David Stern.6 
This chapter relies on a range of interviews with key individuals who were at the 
NBA during this time, as well as archival news materials to help craft a chronology of events. 
Press sources include The New York Times, The Washington Post, Sports Illustrated, Variety, 
Adweek, and Advertising Age, among others. In combination, these offer a comprehensive 
look at the National Basketball Association at a transformative moment for itself and for the 
state of sports media more broadly. After examining the NBA’s media history leading up to 
and including the foundation of NBA Entertainment, the league reaches a pivotal moment 
when it renegotiates with incumbent broadcast partner CBS in December 1985, in a deal that 
allowed the NBA to take back control over its international media distribution. In the short 
																																																								
4 Jennifer Holt, Empires of Entertainment: Media Industries and the Politics of Deregulation, 1980-1996 (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 76. 
5 Ibid., 76. 
6 David Stern, in discussion with the author, February 12, 2018. 
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term, the move created additional responsibilities for NBAE, eventually resulting in the 
establishment of a partner division in NBA International. The league’s newfound 
international freedom results in its increasing tendency to function as a media company 
selling a television program called “basketball.” This narrative concludes with the NBA’s 
leaving CBS for NBC in 1990, which offered the league the greatest continued freedom in 
the production, promotion, and distribution of basketball as media content. Ultimately, this 
period establishes the mediatization of sport, which subsequently enables the transformation 
of sports leagues from administration bodies into media conglomerates during the 1990s. 
 
Putting Out Fires: The Birth of NBA Entertainment 
The NFL’s historical trajectory served as an important model for the NBA’s own 
media ambitions. By the late 1960s, with the help of CBS and NBC, the NFL had become a 
“major spectacle” on television and begun to overtake the popularity of baseball.7 Due to 
both networks’ reluctance, however, to disrupt their Monday night sitcom and variety 
programming, ABC was able to win the Monday Night Football in 1970, at $8 million for 13 
games. ABC eventually parlayed their NFL rights and Wide World of Sports into total 
network success by the mid-1970s, finally supplanting CBS and NBC and sparking a major 
sports-rights bidding war, primarily over the baseball, pro football, and college football 
rights. In 1977, the NFL negotiated a four-year, $656 million deal (between the three 
networks), six times the value of their 1964 deal with NBC/CBS. According to sports 
historian Benjamin Rader, “for the first time in NFL history, television income exceeded gate 
receipts as a source of team income.” This gap only intensified in 1982, when the NFL netted 																																																								
7 Benjamin Rader, In Its Own Image: How Television Has Transformed Sports (New York: Free Press, 1984), 
94. 
	 37 
a 5-year, $2 billion deal.8 The NBA had its sights set on the same outcome, parlaying the 
game’s media value into overall success. 
To this point, the NBA’s path had been quite different. After the 1946 merger 
between the Basketball Association of America and the National Basketball League, forming 
the NBA as it is known today, the league received its first major television deal in 1965, 
when a still-desperate ABC sports department took a flier on the league.9 By 1969, after 
steady increases in attendance and TV viewership, Tom Tolnay of Back Stage speculated that 
the NBA could be on the verge of “big-time money,” given the mutual benefit to the league 
and ABC. Sunday afternoon games during the 1967-68 season averaged an 8.2 rating and 27 
percent share.10 In 1969, Broadcasting ran a feature on the “sport TV pie,” with a great deal 
dedicated to the rise of basketball under their contract with ABC – ratings growth, attendance 
growth, and sold-out advertising.11 An unnamed network official speculated their contract 
could rise by millions the following year, and it did: in 1970, the NBA signed a three-year, 
$16 million contract with the network.12 
In 1973, however, the NBA left for CBS, infuriating ABC Sports president Roone 
Arledge, with whom the league had made a handshake agreement to stay. In March 1973, 
ABC took legal action against the league, alleging that they acted in bad faith.13 By August, 
the network had lost, allowing the NBA to stay with CBS and affirming their three-year, $27 
million agreement. In his decision, New York county Supreme Court Justice Hyman Korn 
framed the issue as one of control: “the provisions for greater NBA control…though 
																																																								
8 Ibid., 113, 101, 121-122. 
9 Ibid., 125. 
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unfavorable from a network’s standpoint are certainly beneficial to the teams. Surely, a party 
may not be faulted for obtaining for itself every contractual advantage it can.”14 The NBA’s 
desire to maximize control over its own media production and distribution would dictate its 
actions for decades to come, including the creation of NBAE and the league’s eventual 
departure for NBC. 
In 1982, then executive vice president David Stern devised and officially launched 
NBA Entertainment. The league had been looking for a way to take back some control of 
their own promotion and imaging from CBS, a relationship that had grown somewhat tense. 
Following CBS’s infamously tape-delayed 1980 Finals between the Philadelphia 76ers and 
Los Angeles Lakers, led by rookie Magic Johnson, Newsweek called the league “the sorriest 
mess in sports.”15 The deciding sixth game of the series aired on a delay at 11:30 pm eastern 
time in every major city but Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle, as CBS 
affiliates opted instead to air reruns of The Incredible Hulk, Dukes of Hazzard, and Dallas 
during May sweeps, given the lack of interest in the NBA at the time.16 In a June 1981 
feature in the Washington Post on the future of sports television, multiple network executives 
put the blame squarely on CBS for their mishandling of pro basketball. Arthur Watson, 
president of NBC Sports, criticized the network for “not giving exposure to the balance of the 
league” and instead “on a few select teams.” Taking a more defensive posture, CBS Sports’ 
own president Van Gordan Sauter admitted that while professional basketball “is a very 
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15 Qtd. in Walter LaFeber, Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 
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16 Bill Simmons, The Book of Basketball (New York: Ballantine Books), 138. 
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viable television sport,” the “sport itself has some identity problems that need to be 
corrected.”17 
The NBA felt that its partner had done much to exacerbate these issues, which had 
worsened after an exposé in the Los Angeles Times. The report had proposed that up to 75 
percent of NBA players were using cocaine, tying the drug’s popularity to the “sudden 
wealth” of its “young players, many from unstable families in inner-city ghettos.”18 The 
league at the time, sportswriters Harvey Araton and Filip Bondy note, “just happened to be 
roughly 75 percent black.”19 As controversy continued to swell over the racial makeup of the 
league, CBS stoked the flames. As late as April 1983, after a fight between Sonny “Tree” 
Rollins and Danny Ainge, CBS kept replaying close ups of the fight and depicting Rollins as 
the unprovoked aggressor. Rollins explained later, “CBS made it look like the big black guy 
jumped on the little white guys… We [the Hawks] sent [CBS] the tape showing what 
happened, and they didn’t use it. Nobody saw him with a clenched fist, taking a swing.”20 
The similarities to Kermit Washington’s infamous punch to Rudy Tomjanovich in 1977, in 
which Tomjanovich was almost killed, were not lost on viewers.21 CBS’s lack of confidence 
and their problematic use of the NBA broadcast rights, by criticizing the NBA’s imaging 
while reinforcing those stereotypes, was not lost on the league itself. 22 
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While made worse by CBS’s approach to NBA telecasts – the delayed, infrequent air 
times and a camera that lingered on melees – the problems extended beyond the network. 
Rick Welts, hired in June 1982 as the director of national promotions, recalls, “I’d call 
advertising agencies, and to get a return call was remarkable if you had NBA attached to 
your name.” As a result, David Stern, tasked with overseeing business and legal operations, 
understood that the NBA needed to “put out the fires.”23 The development of NBA 
Entertainment, which would help to promote the league in-house and on its own terms, 
became a key component of that strategy. To begin, Stern sent a memo to then commissioner 
Larry O’Brien requesting three-quarter-inch Panasonic VCRs for each of the teams, at a cost 
of $132,500, so that they could record all of the games and FedEx the tapes to the league 
office, creating a library of materials for the league’s own use.24 As the league’s archive 
began to grow, these tapes became crucial to the NBA’s media production and promotional 
efforts. 
In Travis Vogan’s examination of NFL Films, he argues that “football’s meaning is 
pliable” and that through their production division, “the NFL has developed various 
strategies to manufacture an image that sets the gridiron game apart from other sports and 
that distinguishes itself from other sports organizations.”25 In taking inspiration from NFL 
Films, the NBA’s own ‘entertainment’ division sought to do the same for basketball, 
distinguishing the sport and reframing its meaning. The creation of NBAE allowed the league 
to take charge of its own promotional materials and to change the conversation by “focusing 
on the players, their talents on the court, their talents off the court, their sense of 																																																								
23 John Fortunato, The Ultimate Assist: The Relationship and Broadcast Strategies of the NBA and Television 
Networks (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2001), 99. 
24 Sports Video Group, “SVG Summit.” 
25 Travis Vogan, Keepers of the Flame: NFL Films and the Rise of Sports Media (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 2014), 2. 
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personality.”26 NBAE enabled the league to reimagine itself as a television program, 
emphasize its characters and its narrative elements in order to minimize the negative cultural 
connotations that had emerged. Steve Sabol, former president of NFL Films, describes the 
football subsidiary as made up of “historians, storytellers, [and] mythmakers.”27 The same is 
true of NBA Entertainment. 
Following David Stern’s original mandate to go beyond the scope of film, however, 
NBAE’s additional promotional responsibilities also extensively shaped its mythmaking and 
storytelling efforts. The NBA’s plan at the time “was to utilize television as a key resource in 
changing the perception of the league and creating a new message,” according to John 
Fortunato, an NBA scholar. NBA Entertainment was fundamental in providing 
supplementary programming that could “support NBA games through telling stories and 
personalizing players,” Fortunato notes. NBAE helped to put out the fires, in other words, by 
educating fans on what the sport could be at its best and in highlighting the personalities of 
the players themselves. Adam Silver, president of NBAE beginning in the late 1990s and 
later NBA commissioner, reflects on the division’s mission as enhancing “the value of NBA 
game programming,” which remains “the largest revenue source.”28  
The success of NBAE, however, was enabled by broader industrial changes, such as 
the global deregulation of television and the ascendance of cable and satellite as viable 
distribution technologies. Jennifer Holt has described the dominance of neoliberal policy in 
the 1980s and its placement of “great faith in market solutions to economic and social 
problems.” These policies, in combination with new communications technologies, led to “a 
great acceleration of global commerce.” Thus, for Holt, the 1980s sees the emergence of 																																																								
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“transformative interconnected forces” in globalization, deregulation, and market 
concentration.29 This marketization, in turn, leads to changes in the packaging and marketing 
of TV programming, as reflected in the new commercial imperative of international 
television and considerably narrower audiences of cable television. Joseph Turow describes 
the transition, through the 1990s, towards “segment-making media,” which encouraged “a 
fractured population of self-indulgent, frenetic, and suspicious individuals” that could be 
blended into “a soup of geographical and psychological profiles.”30 Aided by computers and 
databases, advertisers increasingly moved away from demographics and focused instead on 
these “lifestyles.” During the 1980s, new cable channels such as Nickelodeon and MTV 
serve as ideal examples of “lifestyle-segmentation in action,” in gearing their programming 
and branding towards children and teens. By 1993, when the NFL leaves CBS for FOX, it 
was partly because they “feared its broadcasts on CBS were skewing too old,” much like the 
NBA’s departure for NBC around the same time.31 
In this new media ecosystem, with more flexible media forms and a mass 
proliferation of channels, content distributors and content owners alike sought to cultivate 
audiences that were oriented around such “lifestyles.” John Caldwell has described the 
resultant “visual sophistication” and “program individuation” that dominated the 
programming of the period. “Advertising teaches television in more ways than one,” 
Caldwell argues. “It is a hungry proving ground for new televisual production technologies; 
it is a leaky cache of creative personnel that denarrativizes television; it is an omnipresent 
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aesthetic farm-system for primetime.”32 Sport television, as a highly aesthetic and flexible 
form, lent itself to these qualities. NBA Entertainment’s own promotional campaigns, which 
reflected MTV and the televisual style of cable programming more so than the broadcast 
networks, allowed the league to successfully market itself as young, hip, and cosmopolitan. 
That Championship Feeling, on the Philadelphia 76ers’ 1983 Finals win, was the first 
major straight-to-video documentary produced by NBAE. Featuring popular music like Irene 
Cara’s “What a Feeling,” and taking advantage of the league’s improved archive of game 
footage and highlights, the video was a step forward for NBA productions and the 
crystallization of their own style, distinct from the guts-and-glory mythological style of NFL 
Films.33 The video reflected the populist leanings of Paul Gilbert and Don Sperling, who had 
been hired away from CNN, and Ed Desser, who understood the need to “do something 
different and create some programming that would be…better promotion for the league.”34 
The NBA effectively captured the burgeoning televisuality of cable aesthetics. 
 
Figure 1.1: In That Championship Feeling, the brightly colored and digitized graphics 
 are more reflective of cable programming than the historical register of NFL Films.35 																																																								
32 John Thornton Caldwell, Televisuality: Style, Crisis, and Authority in American Television (New Brunswick, 
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35 Santiago73, “Philadelphia 76ers 1983 – That Championship Feeling.” YouTube, 59:58. Post April 12, 2017. 
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While broadcast television had frequently relegated sports to the weekend, the 
expansion of cable channels and their demand for programming also opened more favorable 
opportunities for NBAE and pro basketball. “Sports television was basically Saturday and 
Sunday afternoons on those networks,” recalls Ed Desser, the NBA’s director of broadcasting 
at the time, though ABC had found success on Monday nights with its marquee NFL and 
MLB telecasts. “Sports media wasn’t the thing,” Desser adds, besides for “startup things,” 
which included a nascent ESPN airing “third-rate college football games and college 
basketball out of a trailer parked out in a field in Connecticut.”36 Though cable remained the 
“minor league” to broadcast television for majority of the decade, the medium would reach 
55.6 percent of U.S. households with televisions by 1989.37 Over this same time period, 
broadcast television’s grip began to loosen, as the three major networks saw their average 
rating decline from 50 in 1981 to 33.9 in 1991.38 The NBA hoped that an increased presence 
on cable would be the solution to their troubles with CBS. “Cable is going to need 
programming, and sports are the obvious solution,” said Rod Thorn in 1981, the general 
manager of the Chicago Bulls and later the NBA’s president of basketball operations.39 
In 1982, as the NBA’s ratings on CBS continued to stagnate, the league signed two 
two-year agreements with both ESPN and USA Network for forty regular season games and 
ten playoff games each, with ESPN’s package airing on Sunday nights and USA’s on 
Thursday nights.40  Less than a year after the foundation of NBAE, the 1983 All-Star Game 
became the first program to feature NBA-produced promotional materials, with a commercial 																																																								
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using the league’s most explosive highlights and concluding with a new slogan, “NBA 
action…it’s Fan-tastic.”41 Reflecting the newfound opportunities available for sports on 
cable, NBAE soon afterwards signed a deal with USA Network for the production of thirty 
halftime features for the season to come. USA would also air the NBA draft and the NBA 
awards luncheon, co-produced by NBAE and ProServ, the premier sports management firm 
at the time.42 NBA Entertainment had thus found an ideal match in cable television, which 
offered the league greater programming flexibility and promotional opportunities than CBS 
and the broadcast networks. At the same time, by archiving league content for later use or 
licensing, NBA Entertainment and its video library provided a crucial in-house media 
infrastructure that would enable the league to become an integrated global media company. 
With the NBA on the upswing entering the 1983-84 season, Larry O’Brien 
announced his resignation as commissioner, effective the following February. O’Brien 
recommended that the board consider David Stern for the job, the person for whom he had 
specifically created the position of executive vice president of operations in 1980. On 
November 15, 1983, Stern was officially voted the league’s fourth commissioner, a position 
he would hold for the next thirty years.43 Already evident in his creation of NBA 
Entertainment, Stern’s taking office would greatly accelerate the league’s investment in 
media production and distribution, as well as its overall conception of basketball as valuable 
media content. 
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The “Less is More” Strategy  
The 1984 All-Star Game in Denver was a turning point for the NBA in many 
respects. The last one for Larry O’Brien and the first overseen by Stern, it was also the first 
true All-Star Weekend, featuring Saturday events in addition to Sunday’s game. “David Stern 
had already made it quite clear to us that one of his objectives was to get back in touch with 
what he felt was a neglected history,” recalled Rick Welts in 1990. “And (outgoing 
commissioner) Larry O'Brien wanted assurance that we wouldn't embarrass the league.”44 In 
order to do so, they staged a slam-dunk contest to honor the Denver Nuggets’ roots in the 
American Basketball Association and a “Legends Classic” old-timers game.45 
The inclusion of the events also further validated the operations of NBA 
Entertainment, its primary history-building outfit, which could package and promote the 
highlights of old ABA dunk contests and the retired legends that were set to play. Like 
NFL’s imperative as a myth-making institution, NBA Entertainment’s work at All-Star 
Weekend reinforced a shared NBA-ABA heritage, following the 1976 merger of the leagues, 
and helped to mythologize the NBA brand. Yago Colás has argued, “If basketball is our 
world, then the NBA is its superpower. And if the myth of creation is the cosmogony of that 
world, the NBA’s myth of foundation is the origin myth of that world’s preeminent nation.”46 
The 1984 All-Star weekend thus helped to frame the NBA as the whole of basketball, like the 
league’s future efforts would reflect on a more global scale. Following the All-Star events, 
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Stern officially became commissioner and appointed Russ Granik to the executive vice 
president role as the league’s second-in-command.47 
The NBA’s TV fortunes continued to grow. The 1984 NBA Finals saw the first of 
three playoff battles between Magic Johnson’s Los Angeles Lakers and Larry Bird’s Boston 
Celtics, in which Bird obtained his revenge after losing to Magic Johnson’s Michigan State 
team in the famous 1979 NCAA Championship game. The growing popularity of college 
basketball, in fact, had aided in the rise of the pro game. As a result of Magic and Bird, who 
“turned the [college] game into an event,” the NCAA came to function like “a public 
relations agency marketing the future NBA talent pool via televised network and cable 
games.”48 The NCAA parlayed the newfound visibility into massive new TV contracts for 
itself. CBS paid $48 million for the rights to the NCAA tournament in 1981, and by 1985, the 
price had risen to $96 million over three years.49 NBA executives were happy to benefit from 
the television promotion, given that the decade began with NBA postseason games airing on 
a time delay, if at all. “I had a warm smile the first time I heard Dick Vitale say about some 
kid, ‘He’s a definite lottery player,’” recalls David Stern. “I knew it was happening. All of a 
sudden, they were being defined in their greatness by whether they were going to be in the 
NBA draft lottery.”50 The NBA’s cultural standing had significantly improved. 
With Magic and Bird now in the NBA, and the further growth of cable television, the 
league aspired to comparable media success. At the 1984 meeting of the National Cable 
Television Association, David Stern and Ted Turner announced a new two-year, $20 million 
deal to include 55 regular season games and 20 playoff games. With the agreement, TBS 
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would become the NBA’s exclusive cable partner, leaving behind ESPN and USA Network. 
Through the previous season, the NBA had aired 120 games across all three of the cable 
networks.51 In a press release, Stern described the league’s philosophy as privileging scarcity: 
“In reducing the number of games to be carried exclusively on one cable network, we are 
increasing dramatically the attractiveness of NBA basketball to both the viewer and the 
advertising community.”52 Stern began to refer to the TBS agreement as the “greatest cable 
contract” of any pro sports league, and credited CBS’s dropping its coverage with forcing the 
league’s hand into a more favorable overall position.53  
This approach would become known within the league office as “less is more.” Ed 
Desser, director of broadcasting at the time, explains the strategy as “let’s not overexpose 
ourselves, let’s try to make each telecast special.” The goal, given that the NBA was still 
“fighting for ratings” was to use more “measured” exposure to improve the ratings average. 
“What’s a more attractive thing for a television network,” Desser asks, “one game that gets a 
ten rating, or five games that get a two rating?”54 Given the NBA’s particular need to 
legitimize their product to sponsors, who wanted to see more substantial interest in the NBA 
in order to invest their resources, the answer at the time was the former. By the 1990s, as the 
NBA’s media product improved, as marketing strategies concretized, and as the relationships 
between the league, the teams, and the players stabilized, then “it was time to accelerate our 
exposure.”55 The NBA’s “less is more” approach over the majority the decade, which relied 
on artificial scarcity, helped the NBA to accrue greater cultural value and better demonstrate 
its worth to TV networks through steady ratings growth. 																																																								
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The strategy thus reflects the league’s deepening conception of basketball as a 
television program first and foremost, as well as their willingness to manipulate its mediation 
in order to enhance its media value. By lessening the overall number of games, and 
increasing the number of prime time offerings on cable, the NBA and NBAE were able to 
maintain greater control over storylines and narratives, building suspense for particular 
match-ups and depicting players as characters in an ongoing soap opera. The NFL had 
successfully accomplished the same in its streamlined Sunday and Monday schedule. With 
Monday Night Football, Michael Oriard has explained, ABC Sports president Roone Arledge 
“brought to televised football the idea that the show, not the game, was what mattered.”56 
The NBA translated this approach into the era of cable TV. 
The result of the reduced media exposure surpassed anyone’s best expectations. By 
the mid-1980s, viewership for sports television began to decline – except for pro basketball. 
“Ratings for most major league sports have eroded in the last five years,” wrote Amy 
Saltzman of Adweek, “and growing competition from national, regional and local cable 
outlets is likely to bring a continued decline.” The NBA, which had reduced its broadcast 
coverage and invested in the burgeoning cable industry, was the only sport to have seen a 
ratings increase over the previous five years.57 Indeed, since the ratings low of 6.7 in 1981, 
the NBA Finals saw an average rating of 14.7 from 1986 through 1990, with a high of 16.7 in 
1987.58 Ahead of the 1984-85 season, the Washington Post also spotlighted the NBA’s 
success by capitalizing on a “big event atmosphere” as a result of fewer telecasts. “Not so 
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coincidently,” wrote Anthony Cotton, “the league’s upswing in attitude has coincided with 
the first year of David Stern’s reign as NBA commissioner.”59  
Part of the league’s resurgence was, in fact, coincidental, timed perfectly with the 
popular rivalry between Bird and Magic, the high-flying theatrics of former ABA stars like 
Julius “Dr. J” Erving and George “The Iceman” Gervin, and the rookie class from the 1984 
draft, which featured the likes of Michael Jordan, Hakeem Olajuwon, Charles Barkley, and 
John Stockton. But these developments were also fully capitalized upon by Stern and NBA 
Entertainment. By stockpiling archival footage and developing promotional campaigns in-
house, the league was able to better define the identity of its own product, which the NBA 
felt it understood better and had a greater interest in than its network partner. 
One of these marketing campaigns, the first fully overseen by the new commissioner, 
was titled “America’s Game.” One of the campaign’s commercials, scored to Tchaikovsky’s 
1812 Overture, featured highlights of last-second buzzer-beating baskets, with the sounds of 
cannon fire as the shots are launched from half court.60 David Stern explained his inspiration 
to Vice in 2016: “I was becoming obsessed with the fact that America's pastime was baseball, 
America's passion was the NFL, but America’s game was basketball.”61 In addition to the 
promotional spots, which were punctuated by Portland play-by-play announcer declaring, 
“America’s Game – It’s fan-tastic,” the NBA developed a series of public service 
announcements to more positively imbricate the sport and its stars within the American 
social consciousness. As early as December 1983, Carlton Turner, drug czar to the Ronald 
Reagan administration, reached out to the soon-to-be NBA commissioner to seek the 
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league’s support, which was still in the process of shedding its ‘drug-infested’ reputation 
following the Los Angeles Times exposé in 1980.62 By late 1984, as part of their “America’s 
Game” ad campaign, NBA stars began to appear in national PSAs on drug abuse, the dangers 
of smoking, and “complex diseases.”63 
 
Figure 1.2: From one of NBAE’s “America’s Game” promotional spots.64 
 
In turn, the league’s relationship with CBS began to improve. Tommy Heinsohn, a 
former Boston Celtics forward, joined the network and was instrumental in teaching the 
production team about the nuances of the sport. Heinsohn “taught them what to look for,” 
which allowed CBS personnel to “then figure out how to best translate it visually.”65 Ted 
Shaker, the network’s executive producer of NBA broadcasts, agreed that the NBA’s ‘less is 
more’ broadcast strategy had worked, that “there had been too many games on TV and thus 
“there were no special matchups.” In conjunction, Shaker explains, the network’s use of 
commentary and replays aimed at viewer education had helped fans to focus again on the 																																																								
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games themselves, rather than the number of exterior issues, like “escalating salaries, drugs, 
free agents.”66 
Amanda D. Lotz has described a fundamental tension within television, which is 
simultaneously a “cultural institution” and a “cultural industry,” and thus operates as both a 
“social conduit” and a “commercial enterprise that primarily seeks to maximize profits.”67 
Sut Jhally has noted of sport, similarly, that while “sports have always been tied into a 
commodity sphere of one kind or another, their shape and organization [are] always 
dependent on their level of profitability.”68 In the mediatization of sport, reflected in the 
expanding role of NBA Entertainment and the sport’s mediation, the duality of television 
finds an ideal counterpart in sport. The NBA’s increasing attention to its media distribution 
and marketing results in a further blurring between sport as social good and commodity, as 
the league’s promotional ambitions intertwine with its public outreach efforts, as in the 
“America’s Game” campaign. Robert McChesney has described a historical “symbiosis” 
between sports and mass media, in which “media attention fans the flames of interest in sport 
and increased interest in sport warrants further media attention.”69 Mediatization further blurs 
these boundaries, as the interests of sport become nearly identical to the interests of 
television. Given cable’s expanding need for distinctive programming, the interests of 
television had begun to more deeply align with those of sport. The symbiotes become 
synonymous. 
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After one year on the job, in February 1985, Stern himself downplayed his role in the 
NBA’s overall turnaround: “No fan has ever bought a ticket or watched a game on TV 
because of an owner, a general manager, or a commissioner. What is going to excite our fans 
are the great athletes and the breathtaking plays they make. It’s my job to help provide a 
stage for that.” 70 While the players indeed drove in the fans, Stern’s administration worked 
to expand and alter the possibilities of that stage, by launching NBA Entertainment and 
investing in more flexible media distribution. The interests of the NBA, which desired a 
stronger media presence and stronger control over that output, had aligned with the evolving 
television industry, which required distinctive programming for an expanding number of 
channels.  
David Stern’s vision for America’s Game, ultimately, lay beyond the shores of 
America. “We call it America’s game,” he explained, while preparing for the 1985 All-Star 
Game, “but it is an important Olympic sport. Its interest is international. We have an 
enormous opportunity to share the exploits of our athletes.”71 In working to transforming 
basketball into a premier media product, and amassing greater capabilities as a media 
producer, the NBA next saw an opportunity in distributing its television program on a global 
scale, via new commercial satellite television operators. 
 
America’s Game Goes Global 
While the NBA had continued to cultivate its domestic television value through NBA 
Entertainment, there were larger global basketball machinations at work. As the Los Angeles 
Lakers were wrapping up their victory in the 1985 Finals, a rematch against the Boston 																																																								
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Celtics, the league office received a conspicuous telex from China, gauging interest in 
staging an event with the Chinese national team. A few years following a 1982 visit to China 
by a group of NBA stars, including Alex English and Artis Gilmore, the Chinese team was 
eager to return the favor and train on the NBA’s home turf. “Then it was much more 
entrepreneurial,” explains Terry Lyons, who organized PR for the tour and would eventually 
become director of media relations. “It sounds like a good idea, can we figure out some way 
to pay for it?”72  
The details for what became a month-long, eight-city tour from September through 
October were worked out as the team was on their way to America. Featuring training 
sessions with legendary NBA coaches like the Boston Celtics’ Red Auerbach and 1960 
Olympic gold medalist Pete Newell, and scrimmages against NBA teams, including the New 
York Knicks, Indiana Pacers, and the Chicago Bulls and their prized rookie Michael Jordan, 
the visit also took the Chinese team on a tour of various landmarks. These conspicuously 
tended towards monuments to American capitalism and military might: Wall Street and the 
New York Stock Exchange, the Intrepid Air and Space Museum, and the U.S. Military 
Academy at West Point.73 Billed as the “NBA China Friendship Tour,” the tour served as a 
significant step forward in relations between the league and the Chinese government, which 
would prove crucial as the NBA expanded its pursuit of overseas television distribution. 
By December 1985, the CBS broadcast rights were up for renegotiation. The league 
was in a strong bargaining position as a result of their “revolutionary” strategy of “less is 
more,” which was managing to keep the league on the rise as all other league sports saw their 
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ratings decline.74 Sports Illustrated had recently run its own feature on the sagging sports 
ratings, noting that “over the past three years…a kind of dry rot has set in for all major sports 
except pro basketball.”75 With a reinvigorated relationship with CBS, and greater leverage at 
the negotiating table, the NBA landed a four-year, $173 million contract, a significant 
improvement on their previous four-year, $88 million deal.76 
 Less reported on, however, was arguably the most significant feature of the new 
arrangement. CBS, previously, had overseen the international distribution of most major 
NBA events, paying the league around $250,000 for the right to do so. In Italy, however, 
where the league retained its own TV rights, they generated close to $200,000 in that single 
territory alone. “So we figured if we can’t make more than $250,000, if we have all of the 
games and the territory of the entire world to do it, then there’s something wrong with us,” 
explains Ed Desser. “So we let the deal expire and spent the next several years developing an 
international business from scratch.”77 
Global media scholar Timothy Havens has noted how, during this time, the “vast 
programming libraries” of major Hollywood studios “made them uniquely capable of 
fulfilling the rapidly growing demand for programming worldwide.”78 As of 1988, the U.S. 
would account for an estimated 75-percent of the world’s television export revenues, aided 
by the global proliferation of commercial operators. By that time in Western Europe, for 
instance, there were seventeen satellite-to-cable channels, of which eight were ad-supported 
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and required highly profitable programming.79 As the global television marketplace became 
increasingly lucrative for American television producers, the NBA would be among them. 
With the new CBS deal in effect following the 1985-86 season, the NBA began to 
more aggressively market itself and package its TV rights internationally. NBA 
Entertainment was central to this mission, providing in-house editing capabilities to create 
abbreviated one-hour versions of marquee games. “One of the first things that we did is 
created a one-hour cut-down version because most TV broadcasters couldn’t accommodate 
two-and-a-half hours,” explains Desser. This version of the games, designed specifically for 
a global television marketplace, would be sold in dozens of markets and become the NBA’s 
lead international program.80 Soon thereafter, the NBA saw the potential in offering their 
own foreign-language voiceovers for the ‘Game of the Week’ programs, especially in 
Spanish, which could be sold on a syndicated basis to all of the countries of Latin America. 
To do so, they brought in Walter Szczerbiak, who had commentary experience and spoke 
Spanish fluently, having become a star for the Real Madrid team of the EuroLeague.  
This was a significant step forward for NBA Entertainment, which served as an 
important conduit for the NBA’s international media growth by editing and translating the 
programming for overseas broadcasters. The NBA’s international pursuit, following the new 
CBS deal, was thus essential in the further transformation of basketball into media content 
and of the league itself into a functional media conglomerate. This growth was also aided by 
exhibition events like the China-Friendship Tour, which allowed the NBA to make inroads 
into national governments and broadcasts, and later by events like the World Basketball 
Open and the Atlanta Hawks’ tour of the Soviet Union, in which the NBA leveraged its 																																																								
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diplomacy for greater TV exposure in the participating nations. Such events reflect the “boots 
on the ground” strategy of localization and market penetration that was typically pursued by 
international television distributors during this period, thus reinforcing the deepening affinity 
between sports and television.81 Eventually, as the number of events increased, the NBA 
would open a number of overseas offices to assist its international media efforts. 
A new global frontier had emerged for the NBA. Following the NBA’s renegotiations 
with CBS and their newfound level of control over their own global distribution, the years 
1986 and 1987 saw a substantial increase in the NBA’s international deal-making. “There is 
a very great interest throughout the world in basketball,” explained Stern, when asked about 
the possibility of expansion teams in Vancouver or Toronto or even Rome, “and in countries 
that are knowledgeable about basketball there is a great deal of interest in the NBA.”82 The 
league’s leaders set about developing an international distribution infrastructure – with help 
of NBA Entertainment, the International Basketball Federation (FIBA), and newly-
established commercial television operators – that could properly cultivate and capitalize on 
this interest.  
Italy had perhaps seen the greatest amount of attention from the NBA, predating the 
renegotiations with CBS. The country had been airing two games a week since at least 
February 1985.83 By May 1986, Italian television carried games three through six of the NBA 
Finals between the Boston Celtics and Houston Rockets, at which point Boston won the 
series. Journalists from the country, as well as Spain and Israel, even flew to the United 
States to attend the games in person.84 By November, as the NBA continued to expand its 
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international agreements, their deal in Italy included 35 to 50 games, a comparable number to 
their cable package with TBS. While the NBA had not yet secured agreements in Spain and 
France, the league’s reach had expanded to approximately 25 countries since their 
reacquisition of the international rights.85  
One such country was China, building on the relationship established with the NBA-
China Friendship Tour in late 1985. In February 1987, David Stern travelled to China and 
met with the state-run China Central Television (CCTV) to work out a broadcast package. He 
offered to give away a package of NBA telecasts for free, a deal too good to refuse. When 
CCTV aired the 1987 All-Star Game, the NBA became “one of the first American media 
companies that was able to start broadcasting on Chinese television,” per Aynne Kokas.86 
Their strategy, of course, was to grow the NBA’s presence in China and better establish a 
market, which could eventually be parlayed into a more profitable arrangement. A year later, 
Stern would enact the same strategy in the Soviet Union, traveling with the Atlanta Hawks 
when they toured the country in July 1988. In both cases, the free packages eventually paid 
off in more lucrative and more extensive agreements.  
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Figure 1.3: Commissioner David Stern during the NBA/China Friendship Tour 
(Nathaniel S. Butler/NBAE via Getty Images) 
 
The next major step for the NBA came from the World Basketball Open (WBO) in 
October 1987. A few years earlier, the league offices had been visited by Boris Stankovic, 
the Secretary General of FIBA and de facto patriarch of global pro basketball. Stankovic was 
there to encourage the NBA to pursue international competition, which had historically been 
reserved only for amateurs—NBA players’ primary occupation as basketball players 
excluded them from amateur status, unlike most EuroLeague players. The Secretary General 
had proposed a tournament that would feature an NBA team and a selection of FIBA teams 
as “a kind of first step” towards truly global basketball. Stern agreed and offered to host it.87 
The Milwaukee Bucks, as the league’s representatives, would face off in Milwaukee against 
the Soviet national team and the European champions, Tracer Milan of Italy.88 
As co-organizers, the NBA also went about looking for sponsors early in the process. 
McDonald's, which was planning a more aggressive marketing push into the Soviet Union, 																																																								
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quickly signed on as the title sponsor, making the tournament into the “keystone” of its 
efforts.89 Thus the World Basketball Open became the McDonald's Open, a title that the 
tournament would hold through its final meeting in 1999. The NBA was also able to secure 
significant international broadcast arrangements, capitalizing on the attention of Italy and the 
Soviet Union. Globally, the tournament was aired live in Italy and on a tape-delayed basis in 
an additional twenty-five countries.90 While CBS, the league’s incumbent partner passed on 
the rights to the Open, the NBA came to an agreement with ABC to air the title game 
between the Bucks and the Soviet team and with TBS for the two preliminary games.91 
The McDonald’s Open was important for the league, not only for strengthening its 
relationship with FIBA and establishing a stronger presence in the international basketball 
landscape, but for evolving the NBA’s approach to marketing and sponsorship through 
television. In order to ensure NBA sponsors received the most substantial benefits, the league 
purchased all of the commercial time from ABC and TBS for an undisclosed amount, 
offering their regular sponsors a minimum of three thirty-second spots that would air on an 
international basis. In doing so, wrote Michael Hiestand of Adweek, “the NBA will have 
moved beyond being a mere supplier to become a full-service marketer.”92 In increasingly 
conforming to the logics of a media company, rather than a sports league, the mediatization 
of basketball continued to accelerate. 
Bernard Miège has argued that, over the course of the 1980s, it was no longer “so 
much the media which needed advertising to balance their budgets, but rather now it is 
advertising that rapidly needs new media, more flexible and diversified than those now 
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available.”93 Joseph Turow has similarly described the “close cooperation between 
advertisers and media firms,” which ultimately sought to “distill their media formats—their 
logo, values, interests, and sponsors—across as many technologies as possible.”94 As an 
aspiring full-service marketer in itself, the NBA sought to globally promote its own brand 
while also assisting in the international circulation of its sponsors. 
The NBA, with its specialized audience, thus continued to benefit from the flexibility 
of the burgeoning cable industry and its turn towards niche programming. Robert V. Bellamy 
refers to this as the “mutually beneficial relationship of the cable and sports institutions,” in 
which cable gains “a source of popular programming” and the sports organizations acquire a 
new distribution outlet, “weaning” themselves from the major broadcast networks.95 By 
1987, the year of the McDonald’s Open, cable had doubled its reach over the previous four 
years, “nourished by improved programming and by its physical expansion into half of all 
homes.”96 Journalist Ken Auletta, who chronicled this development, saw the process as one 
of democratization: viewers were being given more options, as the low overheads of cable 
companies could be “satisfied with small, targeted audiences.” The advertising industry 
responded by “shifting from national advertising to targeted promotion budgets,” thus turning 
away from the mass market to “hundreds of demographically distinct markets.”97  Sport 
offered the ideal conduit for these changes, as a genre of television that could reach mass and 
niche audiences alike. Sports television caters to the “ongoing interdependence of the 
broadcasting and cable industries,” explains Victoria E. Johnson, as the media industries 																																																								
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“strive to balance their portfolio of interests in order to engage both a broad(cast) audience 
and increasingly narrower niches within that audience.”98 
The NBA capitalized on these industrial changes by investing more heavily in the 
sport’s cable distribution and taking on greater advertising responsibilities. ABC was more 
than happy to oblige. Bob Iger, then vice president of programming for ABC Sports and later 
CEO of Disney, explained, “They opted to bear the risk. Since we had no programming 
scheduled for the time slot, it’s found money.”99 By the NBA’s turning around and selling 
the time to sponsors like McDonald’s, moreover, it reduced those costs for the league and 
allowed the American brands to expand their international presence, capitalizing on the 
worldwide simultaneity of the event’s broadcasts. This strategy would continue to inform the 
NBA’s future media endeavors, including the League Pass satellite service that launched in 
1994 and NBA.com in 1995. Silvio Waisbord describes, during this period, the “increasing 
homogenization of [television] systems on the principles of private ownership and profit 
goals.”100 The NBA aided in the process by airing their programming transnationally, 
smoothing the process of commercialization and further opening overseas markets to 
sponsors such as McDonald’s, Nike, and Gatorade. 
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At the McDonald’s Open, the Milwaukee Bucks went on to defeat the Soviet national 
team 127-100 and take home the gold medal. “NBA players are much quicker,” said Soviet 
guard Sarunas Marciulionis, “Playing against the NBA for the first time made us nervous in 
taking shots. We missed shots we normally make.”101 Ultimately, the NBA had succeeded 
both on the court and off it, leveraging the competition for greater international exposure and 
greater control over its own media operations.  
 
NBA International and NBA Entertainment 2.0 
Following the success of the McDonald’s Open, the league formed NBA International 
in late 1987.102 Tasked with providing and selling game feeds to its overseas broadcast 
partners, the league hoped to advance its global distribution and capitalize on the growing 
interest in its product. The foundation of NBAI, then, reflects the league’s increasing 
perception of the sport as media content. The division worked in close cooperation with 																																																								
101 Rick Gano, Associated Press, October 25, 1987. 
102 Doug Smith, “Championship Series Hooks the World’s Attention,” USA Today, June 5, 1989, 5C. 
Figure 1.4: Keith Smart of the Milwaukee 
Bucks dribbles against Sarunas Marciulionis of 
the Soviet national team, as the NBA and 
visible McDonald’s logo benefit from the 
transnational TV exposure (Andrew D. 
Bernstein/NBAE via Getty Images). 	
	 64 
NBAE, which continued to archive footage, and sometimes oversaw the advertising packages 
and foreign-language dubs, in the feeds that were being sold by NBAI.103 The relationship 
was so close between the NBAE and NBAI, and the league office still such a small outfit, 
that Ed Desser came aboard and worked under the divisions simultaneously, as vice president 
and general manager of both. “At one period of time, I had three different business cards I 
was walking around with,” he remembers, “As there were new things to do, they just sort of 
got thrown on my plate.”104 One of these was the formation of Television Ventures, which 
will be discussed in the chapter that follows. 
In January 1988, the upstart NBA International sold 52 games to the Pan-European 
satellite service Super Channel, putting the league in around nine million homes across 
Finland, France, West Germany, East Germany, and the Netherlands. Through the Dallas-
based International Broadcast Systems, which helped to engineer the agreement, the NBA 
also formed the “NBA South American Network” for its own satellite distribution, comprised 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. IBS 
additionally helped to secure a 25-game deal with Imevision, the Mexican government-run 
TV station.105 The international distribution of the NBA had doubled over the prior three 
years, since the league had taken back control from CBS. In addition to those above, the 
NBA had agreements for one to two weekly taped games with Bandeirantes in Brazil, 
Icelandic TV, Spain’s TVE, Great Britain’s BBC, and Berlusconi in Italy.106 It would be at 
least another year before Major League Baseball, comparably international in its player 
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makeup and marketing, formed its own international division. By 1991, MLB reached only 
61 countries on television, while the NBA had grown to reach 75.107 
NBA Entertainment, which aided NBA International in the increased deal making, 
also continued to expand its home video production, educating fans and improving the 
league’s appeal. Among the “video yearbooks” produced by NBA Entertainment following 
the 1987 season were The Drive For Five on the Lakers’ championship, The Home of the 
Brave on the Celtics’ season as runners up, the Atlanta Hawks’ Basketball’s Air Force, and 
the Houston Rockets’ Hangin’ Tough.108 Their video on Julius Erving’s farewell season, Dr. 
J’s Basketball Stuff, remained their best seller until 1989, when the Michael Jordan feature 
Come Fly With Me quickly sold 250,000 copies and went on to become the best-selling 
sports video of all time.109 Given their success, NBA Entertainment had become “the 
challenger for video supremacy,” led by Don Sperling, “its evangelical producer.” While the 
sports video market still lagged overall, accounting for only $100 million in sales within a $4 
billion industry, the NBAE production made significant inroads into a globalizing young fan 
base that idolized its new stars. “Those NBA Entertainment films were fodder for attracting 
young fans,” explains nonplayerzealot, who runs a popular NBA-related YouTube channel. 
“It was a combination of limited access in those years for kids that liked and/or played 
basketball and the well-produced nature of those tapes…”110 
Sperling was aided in his home video pursuits by an evolving NBA Entertainment, an 
“NBAE 2.0” of sorts, which had been redesigned and outfitted with a state-of-the-art 
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computer system. In its five years in operation, the division had amassed 40,000 videotapes, 
for which it maintained hand-written logs of significant plays. By 1988, editors were able to 
log the notable plays for each game into a computer, indicating the player, the type of play, 
and a one-line description, which even included the players’ positioning on the floor and the 
direction of movement. In addition to the standard midcourt angle of most telecasts, NBAE 
also received the alternate lower angles that could be used for more intense replay close-ups. 
While the log process still took the same three hours per game, more footage could be logged 
and relocating it later became much more efficient, especially for highlights cross-listed 
between players. “It was hard to find the cross-references, from the editor’s point of view,” 
explains Sperling.111 By producing, editing, and archiving game materials, NBAE both 
reinforced the sport’s status as media content and provided a crucial internal infrastructure 
for the NBA’s media operations, which would prove essential as the league continued to 
expand overseas. 
The NBA’s global efforts were also aided by the ongoing relaxation of regulations in 
countries that had previously prevented American programming from gaining dominance on 
government-run airwaves. Following “the rise of market-based political ideologies ushered in 
during the Reagan and Thatcher era,” Michele Hilmes has explained, “public broadcasting 
systems were privatized and restructured to compete in the marketplace.”112 Given the 
greater demands for more commercially viable programming, and in coordination with the 
NBA’s investments in a state-of-the-art media infrastructure defined by NBA Entertainment 
and NBA International, the league’s worldwide television presence again doubled from late 
1988 through 1989. “We were opportunistic,” explains Ed Desser. “We took advantage of the 																																																								
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technologies that developed. At the same time, internationally, there were more and more 
channels being launched around the world. Most places had only had one, two, three 
channels; that was it. So as they were launching new private networks, that created a demand 
for more programming…NBA programming had a brand name, and so we took advantage of 
that.”113 The NBA league office was thus empowered and emboldened to advance its 
international distribution. 
As of 1988, sports accounted for 1,800 hours of broadcast television and 5,000 of 
cable television, excluding the hours of radio programming and local television.114 Despite 
persistent fears of a glut of sports on TV, NBA basketball continued to excel, especially the 
early and mid-round playoffs on TBS. The 1988 conference finals between the Boston 
Celtics and Detroit Pistons managed to hit ratings of 8.1 and 8.8, setting a new cable record 
for the NBA.115 Eastman and Meyer describe how, when accounting for production costs in 
conjunction with rights fees, basketball had easily become the most profitable sport. Cheaper 
to produce than football and baseball, basketball was estimated to cost $512,000 to produce 
per hour in 1987, cheaper even than the average sitcom and dramatic series, at $800,000 and 
$900,000 per hour respectively. While basketball’s average rating of 6.2 in prime time slots 
sat below baseball’s 8.7 and football’s 17.2, it was cost-effective programming and its ratings 
continued to steadily improve.116 The Washington Post reported in September 1988 that 
sports programming had “turned the corner” as rights fees had leveled and the advertisers had 
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slowly returned. The NBA, however, thanks to its more judicious scheduling, remained the 
only major sports organization to have improved its ratings over the prior five years.117 
The league’s pursuit of global success strategically encompassed both media 
distribution and exhibition events, in which the latter provided a stronger local presence that 
could be parlayed into a more successful media presence. In July of 1988, for instance, the 
Atlanta Hawks embarked on a nearly two-week exhibition tour of the Soviet Union, which 
saw the Ted Turner-owned Hawks compete against the Soviet national team in Tbilisi, 
Vilnius, and Moscow. 118 Though depicted as a diplomatic endeavor, the tour enabled David 
Stern and the NBA to meet with Soviet officials regarding the league’s television presence 
there. Turner Broadcasting System, which had arranged the tour, also sent its executive vice 
president Robert Wussler, hoping to lobby the Soviet government into allowing their athletes 
to play in the NBA. 
No Soviet player had been granted permission by Soviet government to play 
professional basketball in the United States, due to the FIBA rules that would thereby prevent 
those players from competing for their country in international competition.119 This was 
arguably Turner’s primary incentive. If the Hawks could acquire Soviet players, and TBS 
could promote Soviet players, then the channel could become far more successful in the 
Soviet Union, a potentially massive and emerging market for television. The NBA itself also 
stood to benefit from the exposure. Commissioner David Stern and TBS personnel would 
thus use the tour to negotiate television rights and the movement of players to the NBA.120  
Ultimately, Stern would make the same offer he had made to China’s CCTV, offering the 
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Soviet TV and radio bureau, Gostelradio, a package of NBA games free-of-charge, banking 
on long-term market penetration over immediate profits. As basketball became increasingly 
defined by its mediation, the commercial interests of the NBA had proven more fundamental 
than any diplomatic endeavor. 
A few months later, in October 1988, the Boston Celtics were set to travel to Madrid 
for the second McDonald’s Open, the first joint venture between NBA and FIBA outside the 
United States. Like the first Open, TBS would televise the preliminary matchups while ABC 
covered the championship round. Globally, the tournament was expected to be televised in 
nearly sixty countries.121 The NBA, in conjunction with these exhibition events, continued to 
explode across international television screens. Spain and Italy, in particular, had grown into 
“basketball hotbeds,” with regular TV highlights and newspaper coverage.122 In Italy, in fact, 
there was talk that the popularity of basketball was slowly overtaking that of soccer. Dan 
Peterson, an American expat and regular commentator for NBA games on the Italia-Uno 
network, explained, “basketball is more exciting, a more spectacular game and it’s played 
indoors.123  
Greece, too, had continued to evolve as a major basketball market, especially after 
introducing commercial television. In fall 1988, the government finally launched an 
experimental state-run satellite service, which retransmitted from Sky Channel, 
Superchannel, CNN, MTV, RAI-1, RAI-2, TV5, and Spain’s TVE.124 Sports were now being 
broadcast during prime-time hours, with basketball and soccer becoming especially 
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successful.125 Basketball counted as three of the top five programs for the month of January 
1989, consistently netting between a 24 and 27 audience share.126 
By February, following the Atlanta Hawks’ tour through the Soviet Union the 
previous summer, the same was becoming true there. The Soviet Union was set to begin 
bimonthly taped broadcasts of NBA games, using the condensed versions produced by NBA 
Entertainment. There would be fourteen games for the remainder of the season, filled in with 
six minutes of commercials from Coca-Cola and Mastercard.127 Like the McDonald’s 
sponsorship of the World Basketball Championships, American companies eagerly sought to 
penetrate the Soviet market. As an additional gesture, the NBA had invited Rimas 
Kurtinaitis, after winning the Lithuanian three-point contest, to participate in the NBA’s 
competition at All-Star weekend. Not all of the players were thrilled, including Utah Jazz 
teammates Karl Malone and John Stockton. “If he comes over and wins, a lot of guys are 
guying to be teed off,” said Malone.128 While this would be the first and only time the NBA 
would make such a gesture, perhaps due to the negative response, the decision reflects the 
league’s evolving effort to address a more global television audience by featuring foreign 
stars. This approach, which reflects the further transformation of basketball into a television 
program, crystallizes in the 2000s as streaming technology allows for an even wider and 
more reliable international address. 
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Figure 1.5: Graphic insert from the 1989 All-Star Three-Point Contest.129 
 
Taped NBA telecasts now reached over seventy countries, stretching as far as 
Hungary, Zambia, Nigeria, Luxembourg, and Greenland.130  As the demand for American 
sports in Europe and Asia had continued to grow, the NBA, in particular, had “reaped the 
largest economic harvest.”131 The league had “jumped far ahead” of the NFL and MLB, and 
“slightly ahead” of the NHL. “It’s easy to see why,” noted Christine Brennan of the 
Washington Post. “Basketball is a very popular sport in many areas of Europe and the 
Americas. U.S. college players not quite good enough to play in the NBA go there. Italy, 
Spain and France have well-organized leagues.”132 This popularity was carefully cultivated 
by the NBA, which had helped to guide the international development of basketball. This 
was accomplished by its evolving in-house approach television operations, in conjunction 
with overseas exhibitions and training camps. 
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While the NBA amassed greater international control, and found a niche where it 
could pull ahead of its American sport counterparts, international revenues still generally 
lagged behind domestic revenues. The NBA’s total international rights netted them only $4 
million annually, against their $400 million in domestic grosses. “The important thing,” 
expressed Stern, “is that we’ve already laid the groundwork to take full advantage of any 
opportunities that come up.”133 This global groundwork would continue to evolve, hitting its 
next peak in 1992 with the Olympic “Dream Team.” Stern compared the investment to the 
league’s earlier investments in cable, via TBS, ESPN, and USA Network, which had helped 
to turn the league’s fortunes around: “In 1979, the NBA got $400,000 from network cable. In 
1989, we'll get $27 million. International opportunities, though embryonic, show just as 
much potential.”134 
 In June of 1989, seventy countries were set to carry the NBA Finals either live or on a 
tape-delayed basis.  One of those was the Soviet Union, which was set to air the Finals for 
the first time ever. Five countries – Italy, Spain, Greece, Brazil, and Denmark – went so far 
as to send their own TV commentators to sit courtside for their live coverage.135  The others 
would record voiceovers in their own home-country studios, a minor relinquishing of control 
back to the international broadcasters and away from NBAE.136 At the same time, as NBA 
programming continued to explode, the prior eighteen months saw NBA International grow 
from a few part-time employees to seven full-time ones. Ed Desser, VP for international 
broadcasting, reflected on the newfound global success of the once fledgling organization, 
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“It's no longer true that the first thing you do in the morning is reach for the sports page. Now 
I look at the world news page, to see what's going on in the markets we're distributed in.”137  
Through the coordinated actions of NBAE and NBAI, basketball had become firmly 
established as a media product. This only intensified by the end of the year, when the league 
left longtime broadcast partner CBS for NBC, which had offered the NBA greater oversight 
and involvement in the network’s media operations. The NBA on NBC presents the 
culmination of a nearly decade-long process of basketball’s deepening mediatization. 
 
The NBA on NBC 
In late 1989, at a Greenwich, Connecticut country club, David Stern and the top NBA 
officials meet in secret with Dick Ebersol, recently hired to run NBC’s sports department. In 
his first full day on the job, Ebersol had made it clear to Stern that he desperately sought the 
NBA rights. The network needed to make a splash, having lost the pro baseball rights the 
year before. Following six months of back-and-forth communication, Stern and Ebersol were 
prepared to make the move to NBC happen. The NBA “knew that there was a lot of money 
on the table” which CBS, their incumbent partner, was not prepared to offer.138 For NBC, the 
NBA was worth as much as $600 million over four years, beating out offers by both CBS and 
ABC. 
The fact of a bidding war between networks was itself significant, and was actually 
inspired by Major League Baseball’s leaving NBC for CBS. MLB Commissioner Peter 
Ueberroth and Bryan Burns, the league’s head of broadcasting, had orchestrated a massive 
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four-year $1.1 billion deal.139 “They created a term sheet and gave it to the network and then 
said, ‘that’s what the deal is, do you want to bid on it?’” explains John Kosner, the NBA’s 
director of broadcasting at the time.140 This was completely different than how renegotiations 
had traditionally been carried out. Before then, the network president would offer a slight 
raise over their current rate, in exchange for some additional games. NBC was completely 
offended by the audacity of a league telling a network what to do, as CBS would be when the 
NBA did the same. 
The NBA, having spent a decade cultivating its in-house media infrastructure, saw a 
valuable opportunity. John Kosner and Ed Desser, then vice president of international 
broadcasting, began crafting the NBA’s own version of the term sheet, which included a 
pregame studio show to be co-produced by NBA Entertainment. David Stern “half loved it 
and half thought we had lost our minds,” remembers Kosner, but he gave his approval and 
the NBA took the term sheet to the market. The incumbent, CBS, was predictably insulted by 
the entire approach: “They felt like this was arrogant and presumptuous and lack of 
appreciation for a longtime partner.”141 
Dick Ebersol, though, saw it as the opportunity he had awaited. “One of the things 
they wanted, more than anything else in the world, was to have a direct voice with young 
fans,” he explains.142 Not only was NBC’s bid the largest financially, their offer guaranteed 
four seasons of an NBA-produced show to air on Saturday mornings, aimed at young 
viewers. To that point, ABC had been the network to beat, given the reputation of Warren 
Buffet, the Berkshire Hathaway CEO and part owner of ABC’s parent company Capital 																																																								
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Cities.143 In the end, it was NBC that stepped up. “In the final analysis, NBC was just the 
highest bidder and had the greatest plan for monetizing us on their network,” David Stern 
recalls.144 Ed Desser, reflecting on the move from CBS to NBC, explains how the CBS deal 
had been a somewhat traditional sports rights deal. “Basically the network would say to the 
sports league, ‘well we know about television, you don’t; you’ll give us the rights, we’ll give 
you a pittance and you’ll thank us’ …NBC came along and it was a fundamental flipping of 
that.”145 The arrangement thus created a lasting impact on the nature of sports rights deals, 
the status of sports as media content, and the collaborative possibilities between a content 
producer like the NBA and a content distributor like NBC. 
 The NBA-NBC agreement was announced on November 13, 1989, and at $600 
million over four years, the deal was a 241% increase in the NBA’s deal with CBS. Through 
the use of weekend double-headers, the arrangement allowed for more games on television: 
twenty regular season games, the All-Star Game, and up to thirty postseason games.146 
Included in the deal was the previously noted Saturday morning “magazine show,” which 
Ebersol described at the time as “sort of an Entertainment Tonight for basketball fans.”147 
The show, set to begin a week before the season opener in October and continue until a week 
following the July draft, would include behind-the-scenes features and player spotlights 
“instead of the usual NBA highlight and strategy shows found on three cable networks.”148 
 A few weeks after the NBC agreement, the NBA also announced a new deal with 
Turner for $275 million over four years. In an innovative agreement between the partners, the 
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league had agreed to move its cable telecasts from TBS to TNT once the latter channel’s 
household penetration reached a large enough number.149 TNT would carry fifty regular 
season games and twenty-five playoff games per season. Terry McGuirk, president of Turner 
Sports, assured everyone that while the deal was not expected to turn a profit until later, they 
would not raise their rates on cable operators, which currently sat at 25-cents per 
subscriber.150 TNT coverage was set to include the NBA draft, the All-Star Saturday 
festivities, and new half-hour postgame show, Inside the NBA.151 David Stern also noted that 
TNT and NBC would be included in discussions of international television coverage, as the 
league continues to expand.152 NBC, in fact, had already secured the rights to air the 
upcoming 1990 McDonald’s Open in Barcelona, a trial run for the synergistic potential in the 
Olympics to come.153  
The NBA and NBC readied for the launch of their new NBA magazine show, now 
called Inside Stuff, which the network had guaranteed for the next four years. It would air out 
of the league’s newly renovated, state-of-art 45,000-square-foot studio and production 
facility in Secaucus, New Jersey. From that studio, in addition to Inside Stuff, NBA 
Entertainment would also produce halftime features, ads and promos, and their usual slate of 
home videos.154 Now more extensively intertwined, the NBA and NBC began to work more 
closely together on game presentation than the league ever had with CBS. John Kosner 
remembers going to lunch with Ed Desser and Tommy Roy, the NBC producer in charge of 
pro basketball: “Poor Tommy, we had like three pages, single-spaced, of stuff to go through 																																																								
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with him, of stuff that we wanted them to do. It was crazy… We were kind of creating it as 
we went along.”155  
 
Figure 1.6: From a commercial for Inside Stuff from 1991, which promoted a “Family Feud” style 
game featuring players from the Philadelphia 76ers.156 
 
By November, the NBA and NBC were ready for their first telecast, featuring the 
New York Knicks’ Marv Albert as commentator, “long recognized as the premier basketball 
play-by-play announcer.”157 Bob Costas was set to co-host the new pregame studio show that 
the NBA had required, alongside former LA Lakers coach and soon-to-be New York Knicks 
coach Pat Riley. Following the season opener between the Lakers and San Antonio Spurs, 
NBC broadcasts would give way to exclusive TNT broadcasts, before returning for the 
Christmas Day slate of games near the end of the NFL season.158 While some basketball fans 
remained skeptical of the NBA’s level of control – Leonard Shapiro of the Washington Post 
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referred to the new programming as “Inside Fluff” – the deal was already close to turning a 
profit for its partners.159  
The NBA’s latest media rights agreements were groundbreaking for the autonomy 
provided to a sports league, and thus reflective of the deepening symbiosis between the 
sports and television industries. For NBC, basketball functioned as a premier TV program 
and the NBA was accordingly treated as a genuine television production studio, transferring 
its show into the hands of the network for national distribution. The NBA spent the better 
part of the 1980s improving its media capabilities and creating an international media 
operation. Ultimately, NBC was able to trust the NBA’s media expertise in the production of 
Inside Stuff and the studio pregame show. With these newfound responsibilities, the 
subsequent decade would find the league expanding its scope and becoming a more vertically 
integrated conglomerate, due to new international opportunities and the advancement of 
direct-to-consumer distribution methods. 
 
Conclusion 
In April 1989, FIBA at last voted to admit professionals into the Olympics and other 
international tournaments.160 The restrictions now lifted, international players could join the 
NBA without relinquishing the right to play for their home country in the Olympics. In 
October, Sarunas Marciulionis became the first Soviet player to sign, agreeing to a deal with 
the Golden State Warriors.161 Ailene Voisin, who was been reporting on the NBA for over 
forty years, refers to Marciulionis and the four other major foreign-born players to sign that 
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season – Vlade Divac, Drazen Petrovic, Alexander Volkov, and Zarko Paspali – as the 
‘group of five.’ Their success “really triggered the whole first class of players, significant 
players, to really come into the league.”162 More and more players soon followed, like 
Arvydas Sabonis and Toni Kukoc. The “increasingly multinational NBA” was firmly 
underway.163 By the 2016-17 season, international players had grown to account for a full 
twenty-five percent of all NBA rosters.164 
With a more fully internationalized product, the NBA began to set its sights higher 
and higher. “We want to make basketball the No. 1 sport in the world,” declared David 
Stern.165 For the last Finals to air on CBS in June 1990, between the Detroit Pistons and the 
Portland Trail Blazers, the games were seen in 76 countries, the league’s most extensive 
distribution yet.166 The NBA understood the potential in privileging a global media 
marketplace, the same as the Hollywood production studios. Michael Curtin, writing in 1997 
on the “neo-network” era of television, highlights the relationship between globalization and 
fragmentation, between “mass cultural forms aimed at broad national or global markets” and 
“forms targeted at niche audiences.”167 The NBA’s splitting its TV packages – across a mass 
broadcast audience, a niche cable audience, and an international audience – reflects their 
engagement with these tendencies. As commercial television grew and satellite technologies 
evolved, the demand for cheap content greatly aided U.S. suppliers, the NBA among them. 
As Silvio Waisbord has highlighted, “the fact that most systems shifted toward an 
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‘American’ model of television gave a substantial advantage to the industry that had invented 
it.”168 The NBA, with basketball as its media product, was thus able to benefit from this 
global ecosystem as much as any Hollywood producer-distributor. 
As a consequence, the NBA had sought to consolidate and centralize its operations, 
taking on more production, distribution, and marketing responsibilities, and growing a 
league-owned archive of materials that could aid in that process. NBA Entertainment allowed 
the league to produce their own promotional materials and maintain control over their own 
brand, while also archiving the raw footage to be used for those productions. The NBA 
leveraged its savvy as a promoter and marketer to take on greater control of game 
presentation, stepping in when they felt CBS had not represented the product properly. As a 
media institution, the league reached new heights in 1986, when they renegotiated with CBS 
to regain their international rights.  The league reached yet another in 1989, when NBC 
offered them the opportunity to produce supplementary and promotional content on the 
network. 
By editing and dubbing the international versions of games to be sold to overseas 
broadcasters, the NBA came to excel during this period as a media company in its own right. 
While not quite a traditional “network,” as would be the case when they launched NBA.com 
TV in 1999 and became the first sports league with its own channel, the international 
groundwork laid by NBA Entertainment and NBA International would make the jump to 
self-distribution relatively effortless. The NBA, through the mutual efforts of NBA 
Entertainment, and NBA International, developed a global media product and relied on the 
flexibility of cable television to maximize their media control. The NBA, by investing in 
those new distribution technologies, was able to capitalize on a specialized audience and a 																																																								
168 Waisbord, “McTV: Understanding the Global Popularity of Television Formats,” 361. 
	 81 
global reach. Ultimately, basketball comes to reflect the commercial imperatives of its 
mediation above and beyond its function as a competitive sport. 
 In early 1990, David Stern was named Sport Executive of the Decade by the 
Associated Press, which credited him with turning around the NBA from its historic lows in 
the first years of the 1980s. Since taking over the mantle of commissioner, the league’s 
earnings quadrupled, game attendance increased by 31-percent, and the TV ratings continued 
to improve while other pro sports saw declines. As its international and media operations 
expanded, moreover, the number of league employees grew from only 25 staffers in 1983 to 
160 by 1990.169 “It was a time of extraordinary growth,” recalls Stern, “We had been 
entrusted with an asset that nobody wanted, so there were almost no rules, and there was no 
specific path to follow. We made our rules as we went along.”170 The NBA had been ideally 
positioned to take advantage of an evolving media landscape in the 1980s, as a struggling 
league without any expectations. “There was very little to lose,” notes Ed Desser. “This was 
a tiny little business. So it afforded the luxury of being able to take chances… It’s not that 
hard to get 100 percent increases every year when you start with a number like zero or 
one.”171 Stern parlayed the successes into a new five-year contract paying him $3.5 million 
annually, plus $10 million in bonuses, having leveraged the threat of his leaving to replace 
the recently retired Pete Rozelle at the NFL.172  
The period from 1982 through 1990, which sees the transformation of basketball into 
media content, provides a foundation for the NBA’s eventual conglomeration and more 
extensive global success. This was accomplished by the production and promotional efforts 
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of NBA Entertainment, the international television agreements secured by NBA 
International, and the groundwork of exhibition tours and training camps. While the NFL, 
through the creation of Monday Night Football and the success of NFL Films, had advanced 
the possibilities of sports on television in the broadcast era, the NBA’s strategic use of cable 
television and global satellite distribution reflects the transformation of sport into modern 
media content, in its ability to address global, domestic, mass, and niche audiences across 
multiple distribution platforms. 
In May 1989, David Stern outlined his global strategy as having five components: 
broadcasting, licensing, sponsorship, live games, and basketball clinics. “We are replicating 
what we’ve done in this country,” Stern explained. “We are very much in the entertainment 
business. We're looking at a global marketplace. We have to. We are a global company.”173 
Following the mediatization of sport during this era, as reflected most profoundly in the 
NBA’s agreement with NBC, the subsequent chapter will examine the further evolution of 
sports leagues as media conglomerates. 
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II. Manifest Destiny:  
Media Conglomeration and the Billion-Dollar Business of Basketball, 1990 – 2002 
 
“[Disney has] theme parks…and [the NBA has] theme parks. Only we call them arenas. They 
have characters: Mickey Mouse, Goofy. Our characters are named Magic and Michael. 
Disney sells apparel; we sell apparel. They make home videos; we make home videos.” 
 – David Stern, NBA commissioner, to Sports Illustrated (June 1991).1 
 
“Unless you are prepared to sit the entire year out, don’t f--k with David Stern. This is not a 
game. This is a billion-dollar business.” – David Falk, agent, on the 1998-99 NBA Lockout.2 
---------------- 
 
Introduction 
 
By the close of the 1990s, the NBA completes its transformation from a primarily 
administrative organization into a full-fledged media conglomerate. This is enabled by the 
industrial shifts, technological developments, and global media deregulation of the previous 
decade, which allowed basketball to function as media content and reach a more international 
television audience. Armed with many hours of lucrative live programming, the NBA 
leveraged its in-house production capabilities to take on additional media responsibilities. In 
1983, the NBA’s annual revenue stood at $140 million. By 1992, following its new 
agreement to leave broadcast partner CBS for NBC, the NBA’s revenue rose to $1.1 billion.3
 
For the 2001-2002 season, their final one with NBC, the league’s revenue had more than 
doubled to $2.6 billion.4 Sportswriter Jeff Coplon would term David Stern’s 1990s tenure the 
“Manifest Destiny Regime,” adding that the commissioner “grasped the root law of 
capitalism: grow or die.”5 
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 During this period, as convergent media empires emerge from continued 
deregulation and more flexible distribution technologies, the NBA becomes increasingly self-
sufficient in its own right. The launch of the “League Pass” satellite service in 1994 and 
NBA.com in 1995 serve as initial steps in the league becoming more deeply involved in its 
own distribution. This process arguably culminates in 1999, when the NBA becomes the first 
sports league with its own television channel. By the close of this period, then, the NBA 
operates as a genuine vertically integrated conglomerate, comparable to intuitions such as 
Disney and Time Warner, and helps instigate the shift towards the contemporary paradigm of 
transnational multiplatform media distribution. 
This period thus reflects the increasing marketization of sports and media. David 
Hesmondalgh uses the concept to describe “the process by which market exchange 
increasingly came to permeate the cultural industries and related sectors,” following the 
“increasing size and conglomeration of cultural industry companies.”6 As sport transforms 
into media content during the previous decade, sport too comes to be defined by principles of 
market exchange and commercialism. From 1990 to 2002, basketball becomes a billion-
dollar media business and the NBA becomes a key media conglomerate, as “part of a larger 
trend towards more and larger mergers and acquisitions in all industries.”7  
In the 1990s, Hesmondalgh argues, Disney becomes the archetype of the cultural 
corporation because they seemed to best understand that “combining ownership of content 
and distribution…was the way forward,” which was the blueprint for media conglomerates 
during the 1990s and 2000s.8 NBA commissioner David Stern’s use of Disney as a specific 
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model for the NBA, as noted in the epigraph, is thus especially revealing of the NBA’s 
overall commercial ambitions. Historian Walter LaFeber, in fact, uses the Michael Jordan-
Nike-NBA triumvirate to track the advent of the modern transnational corporation, which 
“differed from their late-twentieth-century descendants in at least five respects,” such as their 
use of foreign labor, the significance of technical knowledge over natural resources, the 
dependence of world markets, massive advertising campaigns, and more globally diffuse 
operations.9 While LaFeber identifies Nike as his exemplar of the modern corporation, the 
case can be made for the NBA as well, which began to expand its physical operations during 
this period into a series of regional offices around the world. 
The NBA’s increasingly transnational relationships reflect the development of 
Michael Curtin’s conception of “media capitals,” which he describes as “particular cities that 
have become centers for the finance, production, and distribution of television programs,” 
and which “do not necessarily correspond to the geography, interests, or policies of particular 
nation-states.”10 During the 1990s, the NBA both relies on and encourages these new “spatial 
and cultural relations” to create a global network of exchange via its own satellite offices and 
its partnerships with numerous national broadcasters.11 Norman Dezin has noted how, during 
this period, “global (and regional) sports television linked each major continent, from Europe 
to Asia, to North and South America, South Africa, Australia, and beyond. The NBA and 
Michael [Jordan] were everywhere.”12 The transnational expansion and integration of the 
NBA thus reflects ongoing shifts within the media industries, as the league capitalizes on the 																																																								
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media strategies of larger conglomerates in Disney and Time Warner. While the NBA is 
unique in this conversation, being a sports league, the NBA is also unique among sports 
leagues, in how successfully it transformed itself into a transnational entertainment entity. 
This chapter offers insight into this process of media conglomeration and how it drives, and 
is driven by, larger forces of marketization. 
The accelerated global proliferation of the NBA product is instrumental in 
highlighting the dynamics of American capitalism within the global media landscape during 
a significant transcultural moment. Michael Jordan, as a context-dependent “floating racial 
signifier,” helped to sell the NBA around the world.13 Depending on the geographic context, 
the NBA and its corporate sponsors, such as Nike, were able to shape depictions of Jordan to 
maximize the NBA’s appeal within any particular locality. Relatedly, Sohail Daulatzai 
describes how the NBA offers “a cultural expression of the marginalized in American 
society—namely, African Americans” that is globally commodified through “systems of 
production and distribution firmly rooted in Western capitalism.”14 In particular, the impact 
of the 1992 Olympics and the Dream Team’s gold medal victory thus goes beyond the NBA, 
as the sport of basketball became a central vehicle for the exportation of American culture 
during the remainder of the decade. “During the Jordan era,” Douglas Kellner has argued, 
basketball became “the game that best symbolizes the contemporary sports/entertainment 
colossus.”15 
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This chapter examines the rise of basketball as a billion-dollar business, following its 
mediatization during the 1980s, as sports leagues come to operate as media companies. 
Ultimately, this period explains the trajectory of the sports-media industry over the 
subsequent decades, as sport has heavily invested in digital media platforms and international 
audiences, both of which speak to leagues’ operation as conglomerates and their efforts at 
media self-sufficiency. To tell this history, I have conducted extensive interviews with key 
personnel at the NBA, Turner, ESPN, and Starwave, the early internet start-up that helped 
launch both NBA.com and ESPN.com As many of these individuals were employed at the 
executive level, these interviews are essential in articulating the significance of both 
particular corporate decisions and overall media strategies. In conjunction, archival news 
sources have helped to provide a clear narrative of events. 
After surveying the NBA’s newfound autonomy in its relationship with NBC, I will 
examine the creation of overseas satellite offices that signal the league’s new perception of 
itself as a corporate entity. Following the success of the 1992 Olympic basketball team, the 
NBA continues to invest in these regional offices, which allowed for more effective market 
research and media localization. This material is essential to the NBA’s further investment in 
flexible and direct-to-consumer media distribution, via direct broadcast satellite (DBS) and 
the internet, which provided the league with more extensive hands-on control than it had with 
cable TV. In conjunction, the NBA’s media strategy evolves during this period, as the league 
begins to privilege “all-access programming” to fans in order to take advantage of the 24-
hour nature of online platforms. These new endeavors enable the launch of a league-owned 
cable channel, NBA.com TV, in 1999. Just as the NBA leveraged its media capabilities upon 
leaving CBS for NBC in late 1989, the league does the same when it leaves NBC for ABC 
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and ESPN in 2001, maintaining its broadcast presence while doubling its cable partners 
alongside TNT. As in the 1980s, the programming flexibility of cable television allows the 
NBA to continue cultivating its abilities as a media institution, while also signaling the 
medium as a major competitor to broadcast television. 
 
NBC, TNT, and NBA Television Ventures 
The NBA signed its first deal with NBC in November 1989, for $600 million over 
four years, a massive 241% increase over the league’s previous deal with CBS. By the start 
of their first season, in the fall of 1990, the agreement had already nearly turned a profit for 
the network, owing to a unique promotional strategy on which the NBA had collaborated. 
Jim Burnett, of the advertising sales team at NBC, had already locked up $368 million from 
four automotive companies and another $140 million from Miller beer, totaling $508 million 
towards the $600 million rights deal.16  
The strategy had involved increasing the number of ad units per game from eight to 
sixteen and selling exclusivities within by quarter. “So basically, if you were Mitsubishi, 
you’d have exclusivity of the first quarter in one game and then the next day you’d have 
exclusivity of the third quarter. It was a totally new model,” explains John Kosner, the 
NBA’s director of broadcasting at the time.17 Perhaps most importantly, the advertising 
strategy signaled the continued mediatization of basketball, as the sport was treated by both 
NBC and the NBA as a television program, who worked together in adapting the game’s 
pacing to commercial breaks. As noted in the previous chapter, this overall media partnership 
was further reflected in the launch of both a studio pregame show and a Saturday morning 																																																								
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“magazine show” called Inside Stuff, as a “sort of an Entertainment Tonight for basketball 
fans.”18 Both programs would be produced by the NBA in collaboration with the network, 
out of the NBA’s new 45,000-square-foot studio and production facility in Secaucus, New 
Jersey. 
 
Figure 2.1: Inside Stuff host Ahmad Rashad during a segment on the 1991 Chicago Bulls.19 
 
As the NBA became more ambitious as a media producer-distributor, technological 
innovations persisted behind the scenes. In December 1990, NBA Entertainment signed a 
deal with the Satellite Information System Company, or SISCOM, to upgrade the 
management system for its video archive, improving the league’s production capabilities for 
Inside Stuff, home videos, and other promotional materials.20 “It was a very early system, 
obviously, completely based on linear tapes,” recalls Steve Hellmuth, who was hired to 
oversee the transition and later became the NBA’s executive vice president of media 
operations and technology. “It was just a paper kind of logging system that put the 
information into a database, into an archive, but once you did a search, it would only point to 
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the tapes on the shelf.”21 Though rudimentary, the system worked to smooth the production 
process and helped to lay the groundwork for the NBA’s eventual digital database. 
As the capabilities of computers improved, and the possibilities of media distribution 
expanded, the NBA’s top executives understood that staying informed of the latest 
innovations would be essential to their continued success and their global aspirations. In 
February 1991, the NBA officially launched a new division, “Television Ventures,” which 
was tasked with exploring new modes for the delivery of games, including direct-broadcast 
satellite and fiber optics.22 “The mandate is to keep the NBA abreast of all developments in 
the alphabet soup of new technologies,” David Stern told Electronic Media soon after the 
division’s creation.23 Ed Desser, of NBA Entertainment and NBA International, would 
relinquish his duties at NBAE in order to head the new division.24 “The idea was, there’s new 
stuff coming, we want to be the guys who take full advantage of that,” explains Desser. “We 
need to understand it, and that means it’s important enough to have a senior person who is 
spending their time looking into it, thinking about it, doing deals with it.”25  
The NBA had already conducted some early media distribution experiments. NHK 
Enterprises had helped with a high-definition telecast of the All-Star Game in Japan, and 
telecommunications operator COMSAT had contributed to the possibilities of pay-per-view 
NBA programming.26 “I would say a lot of this started with looking at digital signal 
compression technology,” recalls Desser, “And that was all about being able to stick more 
video in less bandwidth.” The NBA’s interest in HD and the possibilities of digital 																																																								
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compression soon led it to the door of satellite operator DirecTV, which would aid in the 
launch of an NBA satellite service in 1994.  
 In the meantime, NBC and TNT were both more than happy with the results of the 
first round postseason coverage in 1991. For the first full weekend of games, the two 
networks aired 26 hours of basketball, via three consecutive nights of double-headers on 
TNT.27 The strategy was a significant shift from the “less is more” approach that 
characterized the NBA on CBS, which had sought to decrease the league’s exposure lower in 
order to build anticipation. Now on NBC, the league was ready to increase their offerings 
and give fans as much basketball as possible, in what might be called a “more is more” 
approach. This only intensifies as new opportunities arise from the internet and home satellite 
distribution. By the 1995 postseason, every single playoff game was televised for the first 
time, creating approximately 200 hours of programming across NBC, TNT, and TBS.28 
 Given the NBA’s increasing investment in national (and international) television, the 
league began to take issue with individual teams securing their own national television 
contracts, via the superstations, which were defined as “any commercial over-the-air 
television station whose broadcast signal is received outside of the local designated market 
area.”29 The NBA felt that the Atlanta Hawks on TBS, the Chicago Bulls on WGN, and the 
New Jersey Nets on WOR not only damaged “national television revenue and exposure” but 
“hindered the ability of local teams to sell their games.”30 As a result, the NBA reduced the 
number of games it allowed to air on superstations from 25 to 20 in 1990. While TBS and 
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WOR acquiesced, WGN took the league to court in early 1991, challenging the organization 
on antitrust grounds. WGN won the lawsuit, which was upheld on appeal, allowing the 
station to quickly add an additional five games to its schedule.31  
While “the entire WGN lawsuit on the surface amounted to a dispute over the 
broadcasting of five games,” NBA scholar John Fortunato argues that the lasting significance 
of the WGN situation is in “the message of the NBA's need for the proper exposure of the 
product, its games, and the need to protect the largest revenue source—national television 
money,” which had now risen to a combined $875 million between its latest agreements with 
NBC and TNT.32 The league’s “willingness” to challenge teams and “to litigate to a great 
extent also sent a clear signal to all the other NBA teams who might attempt to challenge the 
league's national television contract structure,” according to Fortunato.33 The NBA 
demanded control – over its national distribution partners and indeed over its own franchises. 
The league’s actions reflect its increasing perception of itself as a media conglomerate, which 
saw its subsidiaries as acting counter to the best interests of the parent company. 
 While cable, in general, continued to threaten broadcast viewership, NBC had 
continued to excel thanks to the NBA playoffs. For the last week of May, no other broadcast 
network made it into the top five highest-rated sports programs except for the NBA and its 
postseason programming, which held all of the spots, ranging from a 6.4 rating to a 12.6 
rating for Game 1 of the 1991 Finals.34 The network had also lucked into the perfect matchup 
for its first Finals, between the already-transcendent Magic Johnson of the LA Lakers and the 
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newly-ascending Michael Jordan, playing for his very first title with the Chicago Bulls.35 
John Freeman of the San Diego Union-Tribune described it as the “Dream Season” matchup 
that CBS had always longed for and just missed.36 Around 24 million households watched as 
MJ and the Chicago Bulls defeated Magic Johnson and the “Showtime” Lakers in six games, 
the end of one era and the beginning of another. With an average rating of 15.8, it was the 
best rated Finals since the 16.7 achieved in 1987, when Magic defeated Larry Bird and put an 
end to the Boston Celtics dynasty.37 
As the second year of the NBA on NBC began, the network continued to benefit from 
its long-term ad agreements with Miller and eight automakers. As the marketplace continued 
to slump, the NBA deal had officially turned a profit for NBC. Turner, too, was already close 
to 75-percent sold out of its spots due to incumbent advertisers. Ratings, though, were 
sagging. While the 1991 Finals saw a 30-percent increase over the 1990 Finals on CBS, 
NBC’s regular season programming was down ten-percent and even its postseason ratings 
saw an eight-percent decline.38 “Domestically, we’re tapped,” admitted Don Sperling, the 
director of NBA Entertainment. “Ratings have peaked. Attendance has peaked. The market 
here has peaked.”39 Ultimately, the NBA’s solution would involve the further pursuit of a 
more transnational audience.  
In the meantime, they continued to evolve their “more is more” strategy in the hopes 
of improving their domestic ratings. For the second postseason under the most recent TV 
agreements, cable coverage again increased. TNT was now permitted by the NBA to cut-in to 
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various ongoing games of interest for two to three minute intervals, a small step towards 
offering full telecasts for every single playoff game. Don McGuire, senior vice president of 
Turner Sports, went so far to describe TNT as “the full-time NBA network.”40 NBC similarly 
aired its first ever triple-header of games on Sunday night, which would become a hallmark 
of NBA coverage moving forward.41  
For the June 1992 Finals, fans from 93 countries were able to tune in to watch 
Michael Jordan lead the Chicago Bulls over the Portland Trail Blazers in six games.42 Only 
two years earlier, that number had sat at 76.43 NBC hoped to use the Finals to generate more 
excitement and anticipation for the upcoming Olympics in Barcelona, dedicating most of the 
network’s promotional time to the games and to “familiarize viewers with some of the lesser-
known of the eleven NBA Olympians.”44 Commissioner Stern, too, was readying the league 
for the upcoming events. Counter to revisionist histories that depict Stern and the NBA as 
more restrained about the entire enterprise, the commissioner told Electronic Media, “The 
basketball final in Barcelona, Spain, may well be one of the most viewed events in the 
history of television – on a global basis. The popularity of our players internationally will 
likely take off from that point.”45 In the end, Stern was right. 
The period following the NBA’s leaving CBS and TBS for NBC and TNT, and prior 
to the 1992 Summer Olympics, demonstrates the league’s further investment in its own 
mediation. During these years, the NBA’s particular approach reflects a growing perception 
of itself as a media company, given its greater production and promotional responsibilities 																																																								
40 Rudy Martzke, “TNT to Again Act as Sub For NBC During Playoffs,” USA Today, April 21, 1992, 3C. 
41 David Wharton, “Amid L.A.’s Civil Strife in 1992, the Clippers Found a Way to Host a Crucial Playoff 
Game,” Los Angeles Times, April 16, 2017. 
42 Mike Conklin and Steve Nidetz, “TV Turns Bullish on Pro Basketball,” Chicago Tribune, June 13, 1992. 
43 Bill Barnard, “NBA Finals Notebook,” Associated Press, June 4, 1990.	
44 Thomas Tyrer, “NBC Planning Olympic Effort for NBA Finals,” Electronic Media, June 1, 1992, 4. 
45 Tyrer, “Stern Readies NBA For Global Frontier.” 
	 95 
and the related renovations to its studio and archive. This perception is reflected in the 
NBA’s wider strategic shift towards “more is more” programming, which sought to 
maximize the NBA’s national television presence by taking advantage of its simultaneous 
broadcast and cable partnerships. The organization’s multi-media strategy would only 
intensify as the NBA launched a league-controlled website and DBS service, signaling their 
arrival “in the realm of convergent media.”46 When the Chicago Bulls and WGN disrupted 
this paradigm via a separate national TV agreement, the NBA fought back against WGN in 
order to reinforce the league’s role at the center of the sport’s media production and 
distribution. While the NBA lost the case, the moment perhaps best captures the league’s 
overall approach during this time, as it sought to increasingly centralize media operations and 
wrestle control away from its own franchises. 
 
Bound for Gold: The 1992 Olympics 
 On September 21, 1991, the NBA’s Olympic “Dream Team” was announced on 
NBC, hosted by Bob Costas from the new NBA Entertainment studios in Secaucus.47 
Following the NBA’s collaborations with the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) on 
the McDonald’s Open, and the April 1989 vote that opened Olympic basketball to 
professional athletes, the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona would finally see NBA players on the 
proper international stage – to be televised domestically, of course, by NBC. From Secaucus, 
the team was introduced by USA Basketball President Dave Gavitt and Olympic head coach 
Chuck Daly, who had led the Detroit Pistons to their back-to-back championships in 1989 
and 1990. One by one, the first ten players were made official – Magic Johnson, Michael 																																																								
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Jordan, Charles Barkley, Larry Bird, Chris Mullin, John Stockton, Karl Malone, David 
Robinson, Scottie Pippen, and Patrick Ewing.48 
As a springboard for a more global NBA, and in anticipation of Olympic success, 
David Stern began to make plans for a series of overseas satellite offices. These would give 
the NBA a more tangible foothold in international territories. While the offices would grow 
in importance following Barcelona, their construction prior to the games reflects the NBA’s 
evolving global strategy. In February 1992, during the commissioner’s state-of-the-league 
address at All-Star Weekend, he told the press that offices would be opening in the next 
ninety days in Hong Kong, Barcelona, and Melbourne.49 The mandate was “to build 
popularity of the game of basketball and by doing so build the awareness of the NBA,” using 
league operators to observe and more deeply imbricate themselves in the fabric of local life.50 
The overtones of imperialism were not lost on the Australian press, which sought to assuage 
criticism. “Fear not,” explained the Herald Sun, “There is no millionaire American coming to 
Australia to buy one of Melbourne's NBL clubs… All the NBA wants is office space in 
Melbourne.”51  
This move reflected the increasingly commonplace approach of international TV 
producers at this time. Jean Chalaby has examined the methods by which U.S.-based 
channels, such as Discovery, National Geographic, and Bloomberg, sought to localize their 
offerings for international markets during the 1980s and 1990s. To find success overseas, 
companies relied on local offices with local staff that were well acquainted with the local 
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media and cultural landscape.52 The establishment of the NBA’s particular offices, whose 
personnel were tasked with similar market-priming responsibilities, reinforces the status of 
basketball as a global television program and the NBA as a global television company. At the 
same time, the NBA ran advertisements in Variety for its international programming. “The 
Global Appeal of NBA Television” reads the banner across the top of one such ad, which 
features Michael Jordan leaping upwards for a dunk, while a separate image of Magic 
Johnson drives towards the hoop. Colorful abstract lines around them indicate their motion. 53  
Within the NBA’s efforts to cultivate a strong local presence, one can distinguish the 
marketing strategy of this period as one of selling “America” to the rest of the world, which 
relied on colorful, youthful flourishes and American stars. This is opposed to the period that 
begins in 2002, as the NBA’s talent base internationalizes and the league begins to sell itself 
as more inclusively global. During the period from 1990 to 2002, the NBC years, the NBA 
uses primarily American stars and American styling – in conjunction with the localization 
and distribution efforts of its new regional offices – to sell an American TV show called 
‘NBA basketball’ around the world. Following the early editing and dubbing efforts of NBA 
Entertainment in the 1980s, which packaged the NBA for global distribution, the continued 
evolution of the division alongside NBC reinforces the NBA as sellable media content. 
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While the NBA prepared behind the scenes, the global impact of the 1992 Olympics 
on the popularity of basketball was immense. “You can’t really calibrate it, but you can 
imagine it,” reflects Donnie Nelson, who worked as an assistant with the Lithuanian team 
and has served as general manager of the Dallas Mavericks since 2005. “What effect did the 
Beatles coming to America have on music? It was the same kind of thing.”54 Over the years, 
the NBA has conducted research on its own international players. “I can’t begin to tell you 
how many of them say they started watching basketball at the ‘92 Olympics,” says Kim 
Bohuny, who oversees the NBA’s international basketball operations.55 Dirk Nowitzki of 
Germany, drafted into the NBA in 1998 by the Dallas Mavericks, confirms as much. While 
he had idolized Detlef Schrempf, a seven-year NBA veteran and the star of the German team, 
Nowitzki’s favorite player became the American Scottie Pippen. Many other future NBA 																																																								
54 Jack McCallum, Dream Team (New York: Ballantine Books, 2012), 313. 
55 Ibid., 313. 
Figure 2.2: An advertisement placed by 
NBA International in Variety (February 
2, 1992). 
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stars have similar stories. Sportswriter Jack McCallum has called it “the start of a 
revolution.” He continues, “In Argentina, Manu Ginobili, a fifteen-year-old with a wild, 
almost primitive athleticism, was watching. In Spain, twelve-year-old Pau Gasol, who had 
designs on being a doctor, and ten-year-old Jose Calderon, a budding point guard, were 
watching.”56 As these players increasingly enter the NBA in the decade that follows, they aid 
in the NBA’s ongoing media globalization, a key component of Chapter Three. 
The Olympics also served as a significant success for NBA Properties, the league’s 
licensing and marketing division, which was “turning out all kinds of red-white-and-blue 
fiddle-faddle” like cups and calendars.57 These products reflect the further marketization of 
basketball and the NBA’s further functioning as a multi-division corporation, similar to 
Disney, which could synergistically cross-promote merchandise and media properties. The 
merchandising would become a major point of contention throughout the Olympics, 
especially after USA Basketball President Dave Gavitt had convinced the athletes to give up 
their share of the revenue, which Larry Bird had recalled being told would be between 
$600,000 and $800,000.58  
This contributed to ongoing tensions as officials from the US Olympic Committee 
kept pushing players to sign basketballs by the hundreds. “It bothered me that business was 
wrapped around everything,” remembered Michael Jordan in 2011. “Sure, I was in business, 
but these were long-standing relationships I had with companies. They were contracts. All of 
a sudden I'm being asked to do a lot of stuff I wasn't comfortable with.” Jordan began to feel 
that the relationship was unbalanced, that he had exponentially increased the value of the 
NBA, the US Olympic team, and the Chicago Bulls franchise, and that his contributions were 																																																								
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not being properly appreciated.59 The NBA had become a (media) business first and a sport 
second. While this had begun during the previous decade, the commercialization of 
basketball was becoming increasingly visible at the Olympics. This was perhaps most 
infamously displayed when Michael Jordan and Charles Barkley, who were both sponsored 
by Nike, refused to wear the Olympic jackets produced by sponsor Reebok. “I don't believe 
in endorsing my competition,” Jordan said at the time. “I feel very strongly about loyalty to 
my own company.”60 
 
Figure 2.3: One of the 1992 Dream Team calendars produced by NBA Properties 
(Source: warlock2018, ebay.com) 
 
 
 The relationship between Michael Jordan, Nike, and the NBA, and the global 
possibilities and implications of their union, is worth interrogating more deeply. As Todd 
Boyd has noted, “if one is serious about discussing the NBA’s ascent into the stratosphere of 
popular culture, it seems that a great deal of that conversation must include a discussion of 
Jordan’s overwhelming influence in getting people to watch basketball who otherwise would 
																																																								
59 Ibid., 160, 184-185, 187. 
60 David Anderson, “On Loyalty to Company, or Country?” The New York Times, August 2, 1992, 8.	
	 101 
have never been interested.”61 Many scholars, especially over the course of the 1990s, began 
by examining the complex relationship between Jordan and race, both within the U.S. and 
abroad. As Douglas Kellner notes, it is not so much that Jordan transcends race, as many 
have argued, but that he can be either positioned “to serve as a role model for American 
youth and as the white fantasy of the good African American” or “denigrated to embody 
negative connotations,” in order “to represent transgressive behavior and to project society’s 
sins onto African Americans.”62 David L. Andrews further develops this duality by 
conceptualizing Jordan’s “mediated racial identity” as a “floating racial signifier,” which is 
“neither stable, essential, nor consistent; it is dynamic, complex, and contradictory.”63 
In order to transform Jordan into an All-American icon, Andrews notes, “Jordan’s 
marketing directors realized he had to be packaged as a Reaganite racial replicant; a black 
version of a white cultural model.”64 David Falk, Jordan’s agent at ProServ, explained his 
efforts to depict his client as maintaining “Norman Rockwell values, with a contemporary 
flair.”65 Falk and Nike, in conjunction, thus attempted to emphasize “an identifiable, if 
superficial, personality” instead of Jordan’s physical prowess alone. However, as stories of 
Jordan’s gambling emerged during the 1991-1992 season, the more negative coverage also 
initiated “a new and seemingly profitable spinoff industry,” in which “Jordan's new-found 
human frailties represented big business for the tabloid sections.”66 Yet the strength of the 
All-American image persisted. When Jordan retired briefly before the 1993 season, in what 
amounted to a mere sixteen-month hiatus, he was still invoked in absentia to distinguish him 																																																								
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from the “youthful African American miscreants who now dominated the popular 
representation of the NBA,” per David L. Andrew’s analysis of NBA news coverage at the 
time, a subject that is explored in more detail in the chapter that follows. Jordan’s comeback, 
in March 1995, further “provided the popular media with a context for accenting the neo-
Reaganite personal traits and characteristics that originally framed his mediated identity.”67 
Jordan, as the carefully cultivated All-American, thus provided both the NBA and 
Nike with an important foothold into nations around the world, as “the global awareness of 
the NBA intersected directly with the globalization of corporate America in the nineties.”68 
Through Jordan, both Nike and the NBA were able to appear as ideal global citizens, by 
frequently engaging “promotional discourses” that depicted them as “‘giving something 
back’ to American communities and even participating in that which ‘America’ sees as its 
most noble project, the globalization of democracy.”69 Walter LaFeber frames these efforts as 
an example of American “soft power,” which refers “to the influence of U.S. culture and 
commerce, rather than to its military and political muscle.”70 While soft power, as a term, has 
been used by advocates of America’s globalizing influence, critics point to replacement of 
local cultures and expression by American corporate interests.  
These tensions manifested especially in discussions of the ongoing international-
ization of television, as privatization continued into the 1990s and saw the further 
importation of American TV onto overseas airwaves. Much scholarship in the intervening 
years has run counter to these 1990s fears, highlighting the persistence and popularity of 
local programming over American imports. Kai Hafez notes how consumers in Asian, 																																																								
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African, and Latin American countries have frequently purchased satellite television “not in 
order to receive Western programs but to watch new satellite channels based in their own 
country or the extended language area.”71 As satellite and digital technologies evolved by the 
late 1990s, Michele Hilmes similarly explains how “a new, permeable form of national 
culture became the norm, with immigrant populations able to tune into channels from home 
via satellite even as they switched between domestic and other imported offerings.”72   
While American capitalism, then, may be especially culpable in the “the actual 
commodification of culture,” argues John Tomlinson, the issue with cultural imperialism as 
an argument is that “it makes a leap of inference from the simple presence of cultural goods 
to the attribution of deeper cultural or ideological effects.”73 Ramon Lobato has argued much 
the same in his study of Netflix, which continues to exist alongside local offerings. “The trick 
is to use both/and rather than either/or thinking,” Lobato explains. “Audiences do not choose 
between the local and the global but combine both in their everyday lives.”74 At a minimum, 
then, the NBA can be said to contribute to the ongoing marketization of sport, which has 
Americanizing effects; the NBA plays a market-priming role. This is reflected in Daya 
Kishan Thussu’s conception of international television flows, which can “effectively 
legitimize the ideological imperatives of a free-market capitalism” and thus reinforce “the 
American hegemony of global media cultures.”75 
Michael Jordan, the NBA’s international mega-star, played a crucial role in the 
process of media globalization and the NBA’s market-priming efforts. On the day of the gold 																																																								
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medal game in Barcelona, after he been playing cards until six am, Jordan spent the morning 
filming with NBA Entertainment, in what would become the Michael Jordan: Air Time 
video.76 Only a few hours later, against the Croatian national team, Jordan would lead his 
teammates with 22 points, securing a gold medal victory. Fulfilling his All-American 
persona, Jordan had helped the NBA to promote its basketball supremacy on an international 
stage, while simultaneously serving as the figurehead for the programming efforts of NBA 
Entertainment. The impact of the Dream Team thus surpasses the NBA, as basketball became 
a central vehicle for the exportation of American culture during the remainder of the decade. 
The NBA was able to capitalize on the mediatized state of basketball, and on the flexible 
image of Michael Jordan, to sell the sport around the world. As the demand for NBA 
basketball grew, the league leveraged the production infrastructure of NBA Entertainment to 
sell more programming designed specifically for international audiences. Not only did they 
produce localized versions of Inside Stuff, but they began to produce additional highlight 
shows, like NBA Jam and NBA Action, that were designed and localized for non-U.S. 
markets. Featuring MTV-style graphics and American music, these shows reflect the 
development of a particular NBA brand that could help to further imbricate American 
basketball within local cultures, including Canada, Mexico, and Japan. 
While the 1992 Olympics is a significant piece of this evolution, as LaFeber and 
others rightfully note, it is also important not to overvalue the contributions of the “Dream 
Team” itself to the NBA’s global prospects. Many effects that have been attributed to 
Barcelona alone were in progress prior to the Olympics, some for many years, such as the 
broader international television distribution of the NBA, the inclusion of international 
players, and the opening of international offices. The Olympics accelerated the NBA’s 																																																								
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expected timeline of growth, opening up new markets and avenues of distribution, but it did 
not significantly alter their course. This is the importance of more fully studying and 
chronicling the history of the NBA as a media institution. In tracing their industrial 
development since 1982, with the foundation of NBA Entertainment, the impact of Michael 
Jordan and the Olympics is more accurately contextualized as but one major piece in a much 
longer and more complex trajectory. 
 
Manifest Destiny 
 Following the success of the Olympics, the NBA and NBC reached a new four-year 
$750 million extension, a 25-percent increase over the prior deal. More significantly, NBC 
agreed to share advertising revenues with the NBA, once the network reached a certain sales 
threshold, reported as $1.06 billion. In a more rare move, NBC actually opened all their 
financial records to the NBA, so that the league could see the actual sales data and 
projections. From NBC’s point of view, the NBA had been asking for more than their true 
value. The revenue sharing, noted Broadcasting & Cable, was the first of its kind between a 
league and a TV partner.77 As a result of the partnership, “The NBA is getting much more 
involved in helping NBC’s salespeople extract bigger bucks from advertisers.”78 In addition, 
Inside Stuff would become a year-round program, a major victory for NBA Entertainment 
and a further step towards legitimacy in the eyes of the broader television industry.79 In 
securing more extensive advertising and production responsibilities, while sharing in the 
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network’s revenues, the NBA was operating as a true media conglomerate more than ever 
before and perhaps more than any other pro sports organization. 
The advertising and marketing expertise of the NBA and NBC had facilitated their 
agreement, becoming the only profitable sports rights deal on the books in 1993. As a result, 
the NBA was the only league to see an increase in their rights fees. Whereas today, when the 
media ecosystem and demand for live entertainment has driven those fees to exponential 
heights, that was not the case for most sports organizations in 1993. A week after the NBC-
NBA extension, Major League Baseball proposed a deal with ABC and NBC for $144 
million per year, around half the value of its previous deal with CBS. Following the 
Olympics and the NBA’s continued investments in global television, the media market was 
shrinking for all American sports but pro basketball. With the sales of licensed NBA 
products ballooning 103% in 1992, to $260 million, David Stern’s ‘manifest destiny’ vision 
of NBA conquest went unabated. “There are 250 million potential NBA fans in the U.S., and 
there are 5 billion outside the U.S.,” he told Forbes in June 1993. “We like those numbers.”80 
A week later, Michael Jordan and the Chicago Bulls won their third consecutive 
championship over the Phoenix Suns, the first “three-peat” since Bill Russell’s 1960s Boston 
Celtics. While Jordan had climbed the mountain for a third straight year, he quickly crashed 
back down to earth. His relationship with Richard Esquinas, which included an alleged 
gambling debt of $1 million, initiated an NBA investigation, though it would ultimately clear 
him.81 In July, Jordan’s father was murdered in North Carolina. While the murder was 
entirely unrelated to his son’s gambling habits, it did not stop the speculation.82 In October, 
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he announced his retirement from basketball. “It's time for me to move on to something 
else,” he told the Chicago Sun-Times. “I know a lot of people are going to be shocked by this 
decision and probably won't understand. But I've talked it over with my family and friends, 
and most of all I'm at peace with myself.”83 
Despite the setback of losing its most global and popular superstar, the NBA’s 
expansion continued undeterred. A fourth office was opened in Geneva, which would serve 
as a European headquarters, while three different ownership groups began to bid on a 
possible Toronto franchise.84 The NBA had also secured an extension with Turner Sports for 
$350 million over four years, which would include 45 regulation season games and 35 
playoff games on TNT, plus another 25 regular season games and 10 playoff games on TBS. 
Beginning with the 1994-1995 season, every NBA playoff game would see the air, across 
NBC, TNT, and TBS. Like the NBC deal, the new agreement included revenue sharing 
between the league and its partner.85 Broadcasting & Cable even ran a cover story on the 
NBA’s success story, featuring an image of a smiling David Stern holding a basketball. In 
the interview, the commissioner compares the NBA to Disney and the league’s 27 franchises 
to 27 theme parks: “We very much think of ourselves as a global entertainment company.” 
Though he acknowledged that, “we’re still, in terms of the entertainment business, a 
relatively small player.”86 
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Over the course of the 1993-94 season, meanwhile, the NBA continued to grow its 
global presence. In February 1994, the Vancouver franchise was officially approved by the 
league, to be purchased by Arthur Griffiths. NBA Properties, the league’s marketing arm, 
remained heavily involved in the development of the team. Researchers hit the streets of New 
York, focus-testing groups of young people with a selection of colors, logos, and names. The 
proposed “Vancouver Mounties” eventually became the Vancouver Grizzlies, joined in the 
league’s Eastern Conference by the Toronto Raptors expansion team.87 South of the United 
States border, the NBA also began to plan a series of exhibition games in Mexico City, which 
would help with the opening of a new regional office there.88 Commissioner Stern had earlier 
made clear his intention to eventually open an NBA franchise in Mexico, which “would 
complete our North American agenda.”89 
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Figure 2.4: A story on David Stern in 
Forbes in 1993 features this chart of 
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The regional offices became essential to the league’s expansion into markets beyond 
the United States, especially as international play became more commonplace. “Eventually it 
got to a point where it just was not humanly possible to be in two places at once,” explains 
Terry Lyons, who become vice president of international public relations in 1993. “We’re 
handing out rings in wherever, and the commissioner is there, and we’re running Japan 
games an hour after that.” The regional offices were able to take on more of the planning 
burden, by working closely with local interests, at which point the NBA could “bring in the 
troops for the event itself.”90 As the league has continued to expand over the twenty years 
since, this has remained the trend. With more events, the various satellite offices have taken 
on more production and planning responsibilities, as the global responsibilities of NBA 
Entertainment have receded. Ultimately, the NBA functioned as a more globally diffuse 
organization, in much the same way as the “Disneys and Time Warners and Viacoms and 
Paramounts and Sonys” that they had aspired to become.91 
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Figure 2.5: A Canadian box of Frosted 
Flakes promotes the inaugural season of 
the Vancouver Grizzlies to young fans  
(Source: hockey02, ebay.com). 
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The post-Barcelona period was a key transitional moment for the league, hastening its 
transition into a full-fledged global entertainment conglomerate. Their physical operations 
expanded into a European headquarters in Geneva and a Latin American headquarters in 
Mexico City, in addition to the preexisting offices in Barcelona, Melbourne, and Hong Kong. 
The expansion of NBA play into Canada, via the Toronto Raptors and Vancouver Grizzlies, 
also served as an important league foothold north of the border. The satellite offices, as well 
as the new Canadian teams, had a two-fold purpose. They allowed for a further increase in 
international events and they deepened the NBA’s market research and localization efforts. 
This local knowledge, in turn, incentivized new and aggressive media investments. 
Following the success of the Olympics, the league was determined to find the best method 
for reaching an emerging and disparate international fan-base. With the help of partners such 
as DirecTV and later Starwave, the TV Ventures division sought to capitalize on its 
heightened global visibility, ultimately resulting in a direct-to-consumer push that would 
include the “League Pass” satellite service in 1994 and NBA.com in 1995.  
 
“More is More”: A New Media Strategy for a Digital Age 
 In May 1991, in the midst of the NBA playoffs, HBO had made a seemingly minor 
proposal, announcing plans to “multiplex” its HBO and Cinemax channels. Programming 
would now be spread out over several channels, such as an east coast and west coast feed, in 
order to present subscribers with as much variety as possible without actually expanding their 
content holdings. While the test started small, in Texas and Kansas under the management of 
the TeleCable Corporation, various multiple-system cable operators (MSOs) expressed an 
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interest in participating in the experiment.92 Following a successful initial run, HBO 
continued its multiplex experiment, to the chagrin of other cable channels, including 
Showtime and Encore, which began to fear that subscribers would drop their channels in 
favor of a fuller HBO slate. Within a year, in fact, Nielsen ratings had shown HBO 
viewership up by as much as eighty-percent. John Billock, HBO executive VP of sales and 
marketing, refuted the concerns of competitors, explaining that “HBO has no hidden agenda. 
Multiplexing is not exclusive to HBO.”93 Before long, other cable channels indeed began to 
take HBO up on their claim, including TBS/TNT, which would launch an NBA postseason 
multiplex. HBO’s strategy had provided further evidence that more total programming hours 
would be far more profitable for the NBA than a more selective slate of games. 
The evolving ‘more is more’ strategy was a major shift from the ‘less is more’ 
approach that had brought the league ratings legitimacy in the 1980s. Instead of thinking 
about ‘cannibalization,’ John Kosner and Ed Desser combined their insights from the 
Broadcasting and TV Ventures departments and began to value cumulative ratings. “It was 
unheard of, prior to that time, for anyone to have multiple games on at the same time,” 
explains Desser. “‘You’re going to cannibalize your own rating, that isn’t going to be a good 
idea.’”94 The NBA had an altogether different perspective, inspired by HBO’s success.95 If a 
single game airing unopposed at 8 pm were to average a 3 rating, compared with two games 
head-to-head averaging 1.9 and 1.7 ratings, the cumulative rating would add up to a 3.6 
rating versus a 3.0 rating—more people, in total, would be watching the games. “The idea of 
getting more games created more value and it all came back to that first premise: let’s put our 
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most valuable stuff on television,” recalls John Kosner.96 The introduction of the multiplex 
was thus a major step forward in the NBA’s overall media strategy, reflecting the subsequent 
introductions of a satellite service, a cable channel, and a website. The more NBA content on 
the air, the more consumers and viewers, the better—concerns of ratings cannibalization 
were an issue of the past. It was a media strategy ideally suited to the burgeoning digital age. 
 In April 1994, the NBA officially began its multiplex coverage of the playoffs, 
splitting games across TBS and TNT. While the idea originated with HBO, news coverage 
credited NBA and Turner with the invention. “Turner is calling this concept ‘multiplexing,’” 
reported the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, which also noted that the order came from the 
NBA league office and Turner had simply obliged them.97 ‘Multiplex,’ reported the San 
Diego Union-Tribune, is “the name David Stern & Co. came up with” to air forty playoff 
games across the channels. As a consequence of the prior TV agreements, the next year’s 
playoffs would finally feature the entire NBA postseason on television, across NBC, TNT, 
and TBS.98 By the close of 1996, led by the success of its NBA programming, TNT would 
finish first in the prime time cable ratings for the first time ever, surpassing USA Network’s 
2.0 ratings average with a 2.1.99 
Direct-broadcast satellite, meanwhile, was becoming a more legitimate domestic 
competitor to cable, opening up possibilities for even fuller television coverage.100 The 
NBA’s own satellite service had been years in the making, beginning with early research on 																																																								
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the possibilities of digital compression for the delivery of games. “Digital signal compression 
was first applied to high definition TV signals to get them to fit into 6 megahertz bandwidth 
slots,” the standard bandwidth for television stations, recalled Ed Desser in May 2017. “But 
then there was this really interesting sort of side benefit, which was, ‘hey, if we can use this 
signal compression technology to take a big fat high definition channel and squeeze it into 6 
megahertz, how many standard definition signals could we squeeze onto a satellite?’”101 
From that discovery, the DBS satellite business was born and the NBA wanted in on it. At 
the same time, as providers such as DirecTV and Dish Network required a way to 
differentiate their products, sports exclusives provided the ideal partnership. 
The NBA signed on with DirecTV in 1994, as did the NFL.102 For the 1994-95 
season, the NFL’s “Sunday Ticket” service and the NBA’s “League Pass” service both 
debuted. The NFL package would provide subscribers with access to dozens of out-of-market 
games every Sunday. The NBA’s League Pass, on the other hand, offered customers access 
to more than 400 regular-season games – any games that were out-of-market and not already 
televised nationally. By January 1995, the NFL’s package had sold 200,000 residential 
subscriptions and 5,000 commercial ones. While the NBA’s numbers were not yet available, 
they were careful to temper expectations. “We don’t foresee this as being a mass-distribution 
vehicle,” Ed Desser explained to Variety, in his capacity as TV Ventures president. “It’s a 
supplement to other programming. Our expectations, frankly, are modest.”103 Nonetheless, 
these new systems enabled both the NFL and NBA to take on more control of their own 
distribution, outside of the traditional broadcast or cable paradigm. By doing so, the launch 
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of both services reflects an ongoing transformation towards the leagues’ functioning as media 
conglomerates. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: From a 1996 commercial for NBA League Pass.104 
 
The institution of these increasingly flexible distribution technologies, and their 
opportunities for 24-hour programming, thus reflects a transition towards a more 
contemporary post-network concept of flow. Victoria E. Johnson writes that the 
contemporary “multi-platform era” of television has been defined by “hybridity,” for which 
sports programming is particularly compatible, in that “consumers are encouraged to seek out 
new information and make connections among dispersed media content.”105 Bernard Miège’s 
own definition of “flow” accurately reflects these contemporary media viewing habits, as 
they exist “outside prime time or overlap and stretch prime time’s borders in unpredictable 
ways.” For Miège, flow entails “a continuous flow requiring daily contact,“ “the 
development of audience loyalty,” and a “wide variety of consumption preferences.”106 By 																																																								
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reflecting these programming and consumption patterns, the establishment of League Pass, 
NBA.com, and later NBA TV, helped to ideally position the NBA for the multiplatform era 
to come. While the NFL and MLB, too, had comparable offerings or would shortly after the 
NBA, the league’s especially aggressive approach to media set a precedent, as an aspiring 
global entertainment conglomerate, that other organizations would be forced to follow. 
A year after the debut of the League Pass DBS service, the league debuted its web 
service, NBA.com. The site was developed in partnership with Starwave, an “intermediary” 
software company that would build and manage websites on behalf of clients, much like the 
streaming intermediary firms to be discussed in Chapter Four. Paul Allen, the Microsoft co-
founder and owner of the NBA’s Portland Trail Blazers, had founded the company in 1993. 
The choice of Starwave as partner, moreover, reflects an ongoing pattern in which the NBA 
often selects collaborators from within its ownership ranks, as they had done with Ted 
Turner’s cable operations and as they would do again with Mark Cuban’s connections in the 
streaming business. These alliances helped to minimize the loss of league control when 
turning to external parties. “It wasn’t the only path forward,” explains David Stern, on the 
choice of Starwave over building the operation in-house. “But we had a notion that had taken 
us far as well, that if we could find the best in class, or what we thought at the time we 
looked was the best in class, that partnerships were an important development that you had to 
learn to navigate.”107 
Starwave sought to capitalize on content owners’ eagerness to get online by 
leveraging its unique technological know-how to build clients’ websites from the ground up. 
The idea for a sports service began with Mike Slade, who had spent eights years in product 
marketing at Microsoft and was hired by Allen to run Starwave as its CEO. Slade had fond 																																																								
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memories of covering sports for a daily newspaper in college, one of the first papers to 
transition to an electronic publishing system. “In 1978, I had in front of me a screen with the 
entire AP sports wire on it,” recalled Slade in September 2017. “Years later, I was like, ‘how 
come I can’t have this, that was fun.’ To see every sports score and every stat, everything…I 
always wanted it again.” When Slade joined Starwave in 1993, his memory of the newswire 
was the one idea that really stuck: “I wanted to build an online sports section, the world’s 
biggest sports section basically.”108 As a result, ESPN became their first and most important 
partner, fundamentally affecting the shape of the web to come. 
 Completed in April 1995, the finished ESPN online platform was able to host score 
updates, photos, and featured audio and video highlights. Just as intermediary companies 
with the appropriate know-how are now hired to build streaming platforms for their clients, 
Starwave was required to do the same for the ESPN website from scratch.109 “We built all the 
tools – the technology to parse the data, and do the content management and the ad serving, 
and the load balancing,” explains Slade, describing features that are now commonplace in 
web building and hosting platforms like WordPress and SquareSpace. Tools were built for 
ESPNnet.SportZone.com, as it was then called, that allowed Starwave to analyze views and 
clicks. Starwave set cookies from the beginning to see who was coming, how often, and to 
which pages. Management could see, for instance, that traffic would peak on Monday 
morning when people at work could take advantage of high-speed connections at the office.  
This accumulated knowledge was essential to pitching advertisers on the value of 
internet advertising dollars over TV, print, or radio. Mike Slade recalls, “The whole pitch 																																																								
108 Mike Slade, in discussion with the author, September 12, 2017. 
109 For more on these “transparent” intermediaries, see Joshua Braun, “Transparent Intermediaries: Building the 
Infrastructures of Connected Viewing,” in Connected Viewing: Selling Streaming, and Sharing Media in the 
Digital Era, eds. Jennifer Holt and Kevin Sanson (New York and London: Routledge, 2014), 124-143. 	
	 117 
then…wasn’t ‘this is a better presentation of your brand,’ it was ‘you’ll get all this data and 
someday you’ll be able to sell direct to these people.’”110 Starwave was able to parlay their 
data collection into extensive ad sales. Ad Age reported in October 1995 that Starwave had 
signed eight major sponsors to contracts totaling over $1 million, including a $300,000 deal 
with Levi Strauss and other smaller deals with AT&T, Microsoft, and Pizza Hut.111 
Starwave’s partnership with ESPN also stipulated that ESPN be involved in any other sports 
endeavors, creating a three-way partnership with prospective clients, such as the NBA and 
the NFL, and splitting all of the advertising revenue three ways, much like the ongoing 
arrangement between the NBA and NBC for the league’s broadcast advertising. The 
Starwave-ESPN platform thus remained under joint ownership of Starwave and ESPN while 
the NBA leased its content and brand for the NBA platform. When Starwave set about 
programming its additional websites, the company simply cloned much of the original ESPN 
site and re-skinned it, then worked in any unique requests made by their client. The NFL, for 
example, which signed up after the NBA, required a toolbar across the top of the page with 
all of the team logos, a feature that remained on the site until 2017.112 
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Figure 2.7: NBA.com ahead of the 1996-97 season (Source: Wayback Machine). 
 
The NBA website was launched November 3, 1995, for the start of the 1995-96 
season. At the opening of Portland’s new Rose Garden Arena, Paul Allen addressed the new 
web venture, “We’re on the verge of some truly innovative changes that will make the 
sporting experience more engaging, more customized and more fun.” David Stern, as he had 
done with the NBA’s foray into international television, compared the website to the early 
investment in cable, which eventually became a more commonplace delivery system. The 
site would feature team pages, play spotlights, video clips, and real-time statistics, the last of 
which did not come easily at the time.113 “The real problem was more about, basically, real-
time publishing, that you’re updating data all the time, the scoreboard would have to be up on 
time,” explains Mike Slade. “You’re basically doing thousands of different kinds of queries 
per minute or whatever on the same databases.”114 
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While reliable video streaming remained a few years away, Starwave and the NBA 
were highly interested in offering audio broadcasts of games on the website, which was aided 
by a partnership with Progressive Networks and their RealAudio technology.115 Geoff Reis, 
who oversaw the NBA project at Starwave, told Broadcasting & Cable, “We will be putting 
up fresh daily multimedia content [that] NBA fans from around the world will be able to 
access.”116 While global bandwidth capabilities were varied, the hope was that audio 
streaming would help to reach a dispersed international fan base. For the website’s first 
Finals, in June 1996, NBA.com carried live audio from the postgame news conferences and 
real-time photo stills from the games. “It’s a total companion to the fans following the 
finals,” said Jamie Rosenberg, the NBA manager of interactive programming. Thus far, the 
operation had been successful, receiving two million hits per day early in the playoffs, and 
rising to 2.5 million leading up to the Finals.117   
Steve Hellmuth, who worked on the NBA website and serves as the league’s 
executive vice president of media operations and technology, explains that a sports website’s 
most important services are schedule and scores: “When can I watch and what’s the score?” 
News, features, and highlights offer further context, which can be useful in drawing more 
viewers to the actual games. “All of those things, to us, were engagement tools to get people 
to watch more TV, what we were really monetizing,” explains Hellmuth. “We did monetize 
on the website, to a certain degree, but more importantly it was a portal into the NBA, the 
same way social media is, to get you to video, where we really monetize.”118  
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Just as NBA Entertainment was originally created to do in the 1980s through 
commercials and home video releases, NBA.com was launched with the intention of creating 
additional value for telecasts. The strategy would also be the same for the NBA-owned cable 
channel to come, which began primarily as a ‘barker’ sales channel for the League Pass 
service. The “more is more” strategy that emerged over this period valued television as the 
league’s most important asset. Over the course of the decade, as a consequence, the league 
sought out new methods to draw as many viewers as possible to those telecasts, boosting ad 
revenues and increasing their leverage in subsequent rights negotiations. This was the 
ultimate purpose of League Pass, NBA.com, and later NBA.com TV. 
 The NBA’s efforts to maintain control over these burgeoning media operations were 
intensified by larger regulatory machinations. In February 1996, the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 officially went into effect, removing the barriers to ownership and operation across 
the communications business and instigating a series of massive corporate mergers. After the 
bill had passed the Senate, in June 1995, Disney came to an agreement to buy Cap 
Cities/ABC for $19 billion, making it the largest entertainment company in the world.119 A 
month later, talks began to accelerate between Turner Broadcasting System and Time 
Warner, already a TBS part owner.120 In September, Time Warner bought out the remaining 
shares of TBS for $7.5 billion, creating the new largest media company in the world.121 The 
following February, the Telecom Act was signed into law and the mergers were all officially 
approved. Jennifer Holt explains the Act as “the ultimate deregulatory initiative to complete 
the structural convergence of the media industries that began during the 1980s,” in that it 																																																								
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allowed “broadcast, cable, and telephone companies to create convergent media empires with 
newly expanded boundaries.”122 
 As entertainment empires emerged and the marketplace shifted, David Stern cast a 
careful eye, waiting for the right opportunity.  “I just want to be standing with this big bundle 
of carefully protected rights and be ready to go,” he told Ad Day, at the start of the NBA’s 
50th season in 1996. “With all the vertically integrated entertainment companies, some rights 
holders will want to sell bundled broadcast and digital rights, but that's not something I want 
to do now. If interest rates are volatile, you don't go long in bonds. And this is a very volatile 
communications technology marketplace.”123 The NBA would in fact hold onto their digital 
rights for another decade, at which point they indeed bundled their broadcast rights, in a deal 
with longtime partner Turner. In the meantime, the NBA waited and assessed, building their 
digital assets for when the right time came. 
After Disney purchased Cap Cites/ABC, and with it ESPN, the purchase of Starwave 
seemed an inevitability. In February 1997, talks began to accelerate. In April, Disney 
announced that it was purchasing 33-percent of Starwave for approximately $100 million. 
Nearly a year to the day later, Disney exercised their option to buy out the remaining two-
thirds of the company, folding Starwave’s operations into its Buena Vista Internet Group in 
order to expand Disney’s internet presence under a “common technology platform.”124 
Disney hoped to leapfrog competitors CBS, NBC, and Fox in the internet sports business.125 
Mike Slade had seen the move coming: “it was sort of obvious they were either going to 
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dump us, which was impossible, or buy us.” Starwave held too much leverage, as ESPN’s 
expert platform manager, to exist independent of Disney’s online operations and had to be 
brought in-house, whatever the cost. The relationship with the NBA, though, continued 
unaffected with the renamed ESPN Internet Ventures division. The NBA’s audio streaming 
operation had evolved into a $19.95 audio-only League Pass, which was simply moved from 
ESPN.com to NBA.com for the start of the 1997 season.  
 After the dust settled from the post-Telecom Act merger mania, the NBA and NBC 
came to another extension for $1.75 billion over four years, what would ultimately be their 
last agreement. With such a massive hike in fees, NBC was not expected to profit much, if at 
all. The last deal, however, had landed the network $200 million after revenue sharing.126 
“We made money in the early years,” recalled Dick Ebersol in June 2015, in a joint interview 
with David Stern. “But we took away the profit on each negotiation,” Stern quickly added.127 
Combined with a new Turner agreement, the NBA was guaranteed $2.64 billion through the 
2002 season. With an influx of money the likes of which the NBA had never seen before, 
they formed an internal committee to study the “new economics” of the league and the 
implications for the upcoming labor agreement.128 
 While the most extreme changes to the media landscape had occurred on the domestic 
front, the NBA’s primary motivation remained global. The introduction of League Pass and 
NBA.com were intended to reach far-flung and disparate audiences, even if the technologies 
required further development to reliably allow for international engagement. The NBA 
understood the potential in NBA.com for the greater control over the administration of their 
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brand and greater direct-to-consumer access, which could be further parlayed into increased 
viewership and revenue. Following from Miège, the NBA’s use of auxiliary delivery system 
worked to “stretch prime time’s borders in unpredictable ways,” through a continuous flow 
of daily contact.129 What began with the TBS/TNT multiplex had cohered, over a few short 
years, into a more complete multi-platform strategy. 
 
McNBA: The NBA as Format 
 As the NBA’s interest in media technologies continued to accelerate, the league’s 
global presence also grew to meet it. The original expansion into Canada, ahead of the 1995 
season, served as a beachhead and a model for greater international expansion. The NBA had 
worked diligently to try to supplant the popularity of pro hockey and pro baseball, launching 
a show aimed at teens called Dunk Street. “The content is split roughly fifty-fifty split 
between stories produced in Canada and footage from the NBA’s weekly international reel,” 
explained Stuart Foxman of Strategy, a Canadian business magazine. The show had helped 
the league to gain a valuable foothold on young viewers. Forty percent of the Dunk Street 
audience was aged 18 years and up, coinciding with an NBA survey that found that 
basketball had become the second-most popular sport amongst 18 to 24 year olds, following 
only hockey. “When the NBA launched in Canada, Commissioner Stern had said that our 
goal was to be the number two sport globally,” said Ken Derrett, managing director of NBA 
Canada. “As we are the number two sport in the U.S., coming in second behind hockey in 
Canada would be a significant accomplishment.”130 
 The Canada strategy, using localized TV programs in combination with marketing 																																																								
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research conducted by local offices, reflected the model for NBA operations around the 
world. Like Canada’s Dunk Street, Japan aired a different NBA-produced version of the 
same program titled Fastbreak while Mexico’s was titled Rafaga. While Dunk Street 
emphasized features and personal spotlights, Fastbreak contained more highlights, based on 
audience feedback and demand. Albert Moran defines the TV format as “a core or a 
structuring center,” or  “that set of invariable elements in a program out of which the variable 
elements of an individual episode are produced.”131 Formats, such as the NBA’s offerings, 
are a process. They remain “less than fully matured, incomplete, ever ready to incorporate 
further elements” that will thus “add, cumulatively, to its system of knowledge.”132 In 
addition to learning from the relative success or failure of the programs, these elements are 
acquired from the efforts of the various regional offices. Around the world, David Stern 
explains, NBA employees are deployed “on the ground, so that they can be part of the local 
scene and understand local television sponsorship, local licensing and retailing.”133 In this 
way, the NBA had been operating precisely as an international TV format producer. 
Formats, as the manifestation of these localizations efforts, are thus inherently a kind 
of imperialist project. While operating in service of profit rather than conquest, formats 
function as an accumulation of knowledge that works to benefit the original copyright holder. 
Marcel Danesi has argued that global brands such as the NBA, “by co-opting local 
signification systems and blending them with more global ones,” encourage individuals “to 
see themselves as members of local and global communities at once.” The NBA’s own 
involvement in this process, editing and translating the programming themselves for 
international broadcasters, thus works to blend U.S. and non-U.S. interests in such a way as 																																																								
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to craft a more marketable “global identity.”134 The NBA’s formatting of its global youth 
programming, featuring its usual American sponsors, demonstrates an uneasy alliance 
between the NBA’s earlier entrepreneurial efforts and a broader capitalist imperative to 
expand into new markets. The NBA’s ability to control international programming through 
its international offices allows for a much greater capacity for imperialistic behavior. Despite 
any dialogic cultural flows that may inform the NBA’s actions, the accrued information 
simply becomes marketing research, which is fed back into the formula for the commercial 
benefit of the NBA and its sponsors. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: From an episode of Dunk Street on YTV.135 
 
As of April 1996, Stern’s “manifest-destiny regime” had brought the NBA from 35 
countries in 1986, before the league reacquired its own international rights, to 175 countries 
and 45 languages for the 1996 playoffs.136 Later that year, the commissioner was the keynote 
speaker at the International Council meeting of the National Academy of Television Arts and 
Sciences. “Our game inspires local, regional, national and even international loyalty,” he told 
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the audience. “We are truly egalitarian programming… The emerging lesson for us is that the 
power of TV has given us global fans, and this is no longer a local thing.”137 The NBA took 
complete globality to be the sport’s ultimate horizon, with the National Basketball 
Association as the world’s league and David Stern as the world’s commissioner – a manifest-
destiny regime. 
The NBA’s global formatting efforts had also given way to a broader franchising of 
the NBA itself, a clear signal that the league fashioned itself as a conglomerate large enough 
for multiple subsidiaries. In June 1996, the NBA and NBC jointly announced the Women’s 
National Basketball Association (WNBA), which would launch the following year under a 
five-year revenue-sharing agreement. Featuring eight teams, playing from June to August, 
NBC agreed to televise ten Saturday afternoon games while ESPN and ESPN2 would each 
televise a game per week.138 The WNBA thus functioned as an adaption of the NBA league 
format, which demonstrated the NBA’s greater ambitions as a complete entertainment 
conglomerate as well as its continued perception of sport as media content. 
A more experimental investment was for an NBA-operated football league in 
collaboration with Turner and NBC, who had both recently lost their NFL packages. While 
the NBA remained a somewhat silent partner, NBC and Turner announced the league in May 
1998 at halftime of a Chicago Bulls playoff game with the NBA’s full approval. The new 
league would feature 10 to 12 teams and begin the following fall.139 “When this new league 
begins it wouldn’t surprise me if some NBA owners are owners of these teams,” Stern coyly 
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told the New York Daily News.140 While the NBA’s version of a football league was 
eventually aborted, given the already-full plate of the WNBA and labor negotiations, their 
initial involvement reflects a greater self-confidence in the NBA itself as format.141 If the 
NBA operational structure and media strategy could be translated and adapted into many 
different contexts, the international possibilities would become boundless. This culminates in 
late 2014, when the league becomes an equity investor and collaborator in Brazil’s Liga 
Nacional de Basquete (LNB), the first formal partnership of this kind.142 
 Some of the NBA franchising included copycat leagues beyond the their control. In 
China, a Hong Kong promotions firm launched the Chinese National Basketball Alliance, or 
CNBA. Using the NBA initials, as well as NBA players in its advertising, the CNBA was 
quickly sued by the NBA Asia office. The Chinese sports governing body had originally 
given permission for the CNBA to compete with the more established Chinese Basketball 
League (CBL), but quickly rescinded their approval after angering the NBA and the CBL’s 
backer, the American management company IMG.143 Andy Jay, the COO of Spectrum, the 
CNBA’s organizers and promoters, denied the accusation that he was copying the NBA: 
“Maybe we will benefit a little bit, but if you walked down the street and asked 100 people 
what the NBA was no one would know. It’s not a household name in China.” The CNBA 
nonetheless had used English names, 32 American players, and eight coaches. The NBA 
further clarified their stance, noting that their problem was not with the league itself, but the 
name alone. “We would support the development of basketball everywhere in the world. 																																																								
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We’ve no problem with the league. Our problem is with the name,” said Cheong Sau-ching, 
NBA Asia spokesperson.144 
At the same time, the CNBA name ultimately aids in the league’s expansion. Ramon 
Lobato and Julian Thomas have noted that such informally-produced instances “can extend 
market opportunities for brands, by making the brand visible in places where it might not 
otherwise be seen.” Like bootlegged NBA tapes had helped the league in the Soviet Union in 
the 1980s, the CNBA thus provided an important “market-priming role” for the NBA.145 
Following from Cheong Sau-ching, moreover, the development of NBA-caliber play only 
helped basketball succeed in those territories. This understanding results in the league 
becoming more proactive in international player development, launching a series of camps 
and later academies to train young athletes and prepare them for the NBA.  
Following the success of the Dream Team, as well as fifteen years of media 
expansion, the NBA of the late 1990s had emerged into a multipurpose media conglomerate 
and franchise. They had transformed NBA into a localizable TV format and were in the 
process of transforming the league itself into a business format. These initiatives aimed to 
more fully connect a globalizing NBA fan base with its U.S. base of operations. More than 
35-percent of traffic to NBA.com, for instance, had come from outside the United States 
since the site’s launch in 1995. By October 1997, as the Chicago Bulls prepared for the 
McDonald’s Open in Paris, the Bulls logo ranked among the ten most recognized corporate 
symbols in a survey of 25,000 teenagers from 41 countries.146 The NBA, formerly a 
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professional sports organization with a global curiosity, had become an international 
entertainment conglomerate. 
 
The Electronic Environment: Adam Silver and NBA.com TV 
Since its foundation in 1982, NBA Entertainment had become a fundamental 
component of the league’s overall growth, as the center of its production and the storehouse 
for all of its media and statistical information. When Adam Silver was promoted to President 
and COO of NBAE in December 1997, the move signaled a significant shift in the league’s 
media strategy, which would thereafter more substantially integrate their media interests with 
the actual performance of the sport, further laying the groundwork for the global NBA media 
landscape to come.147 Adam Silver’s NBAE functions as distinct incarnation of the division, 
following its inception and its initial digitization in the early part of the decade. 
 The NBA’s collaboration with Starwave also continued, as the February 1998 All-
Star game featured an audio live-stream and near-real-time video highlights, using 
RealNetworks’s streaming technology.148 In April 1998, Disney bought out the remaining 
shares in Starwave, fully absorbing the company into ESPN Internet Ventures.149 The NBA 
nonetheless extended their deal with ESPN, which would run NBA.com for another two 
years. The deal would continue the same revenue sharing that was part of the original 
agreement, as well as cross-promotion between the ESPN and NBA sites. Stephanie Scheer, 
the league’s director of Internet Services, went so far as to proclaim that the NBA website 
was “becoming a viable business in and of itself,” beyond its promotional value for the 
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league.150 While this would ultimately prove untrue as the dot-com bubble burst, the 
sentiment nonetheless indicates the significance of NBA.com within the league’s broader 
media strategy at this time. 
With the website more fully maturing, the 1998 Finals featured greater integration of 
the NBA Entertainment’s television and web efforts. While listening to live audio streams, 
the “NBA.cam” service allowed users to take snapshots of NBA action by clicking on images 
from the game’s eight different cameras, with the feeds updating every few seconds. In 
addition, video highlights would be made available on the website during halftime, in 
combination with shot-charts, statistics, and game commentaries from the players.151 
Meanwhile, at the Finals itself, NBA Entertainment worked to organize and corral 
representatives from the twenty countries there to cover the games in-person. “Tucked up in 
a corner of the Delta Center…is a small enclave that looks like something right out of the 
United Nations,” wrote a reporter for the Deseret News. In addition to NBC’s coverage, 
NBAE had control of its own specialized camera angles, which were quickly edited into a 
specialized international feed for the league’s 93 international TV partners across 175 
countries. The broadcasts were then completed with local commentaries, most commonly 
recorded in booths as the feeds arrived overseas from the United States. 152 While NBAE 
worked to smoothly distribute the games themselves, other personnel were there to document 
everything on the court and behind-the-scenes, for home video releases or for the league’s 
website. Adam Silver’s tenure at NBAE would be one characterized by such access and 
intimacy. 
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In 1998, despite the highest-rated NBA Finals in history, in which the Chicago Bulls 
won a third consecutive title over the Utah Jazz, worries abound that NBC would soon lose 
money on the NBA arrangement.153 To counteract the rising NBA costs, NBC raised their ad 
rates by as much as 50-percent over the previous year.154 More threatening to the long-term 
health of the agreement, rumors began to swirl that Michael Jordan would retire following 
the 1998 season. In February, during NBC’s pregame coverage of the All-Star Game, noted 
Jordan insider Ahmad Rashad offered his take on the situation, “For the first time, I believe 
him when he says he’s going to quit.”155 As the looming possibility of a labor lockout gained 
more momentum, Jordan’s retirement became increasingly certain. NBC noticeably began to 
promote Kobe Bryant, the 19-year-old Lakers star. “Promoting Kobe is no different than 
what we were doing promoting Michael in 1990,” said Dick Ebersol. “Business goes on.”156  
David Stern tried to downplay the growing unease, emphasizing the overall growth of 
the league. “We have to be able together to find a way to split this pie up, make the players 
even wealthier than they are, make our teams profitable, and find a way not to raise ticket 
prices at the rate that they've been raised,” Stern told Lou Dobbs on CNN Moneyline.157 By 
October, however, the necessary progress had not been made in labor negotiations between 
the owners and the players union. Stern and deputy commissioner Russ Granik announced 
that the first two weeks of the season would be cancelled. TNT/TBS would replace the games 
with “male-oriented action movies,” while NBC had until Christmas before any lost games 																																																								
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would begin to affect their schedule. The regional sports networks (RSNs) were in the most 
precarious position, given their sole focus on local sports teams; the networks could not 
reprogram in the same way as NBC or TNT and simply airing reruns of old games would not 
receive anywhere near the same viewership as live ones.158 In December, the NBA cancelled 
its schedule through the All-Star game in February. NBC tried to dismiss any talk of an entire 
cancelled season, which only served to draw more attention to the possibility.159 
NBA Entertainment, meanwhile, had used the work stoppage to expand their 
production capabilities and improve their archival information. NBA.com launched an “NBA 
History” section with video clips, player bios, and season recaps. The site also began to 
stream chat sessions with former stars, such as Julius Erving, a significant step towards the 
same-day streaming highlights set to be available at the start of the season.160 With a break 
from logging the massive influx of nightly game footage, moreover, NBAE employees were 
now free to catalog older footage from the pre-NBAE era of the 1970s, which could be added 
to the “oldies footage” packages that were being distributed to international markets. The 
improved archive would prove central to the upcoming “all-NBA channel” set to air in 1999 
through DirecTV. “We’re not as busy as we'd like to be, but we’re not sitting around,” Adam 
Silver told the New York Times.161 While the lockout did much to hurt the credibility and 
profitability of the league – the NBA had been the only major sport without a strike-
shortened season – the time off from basketball proved essential in cultivating central media 
operations that would distinguish the league for years to come. 
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 In January 1999, the lockout was officially ended. The schedule was expected to 
feature 40 to 45 games out of a possible 82, a number that ultimately rose to 50.162 As 
expected, Michael Jordan announced his retirement on January 13th. “Flying Man Jordan is 
Coming Back To Earth,” read the headline in the Beijing Morning Post, which went on to 
compare the news to hearing of a close relative’s death.163 Most coverage imagined the 
worst-case scenario for the NBA, in losing the superstar that had defined the league at its 
absolute peak, in the midst of “attempting to assess the damage of a labor dispute that forced 
the cancellation of more than a third of the regular season.” With his second retirement in 
five years, Jordan refused to say definitively whether he played his last game. While the 
decision was “99.9 final,” he noted, “I never say never.”164  
Basketball returned in February, complete with a new slogan: “I still love this game!” 
The NBA had hoped to earn back the trust of the fans by acknowledging their mistakes. 
Terry Cummings, a forward on the Golden State Warriors, added, “What must happen in this 
league, as a result of the lockout, is for everyone to become more intimate with the fans. The 
owners, players and fans all need each other, and we’ve got to show it.”165 This extended to 
the evolving production approach of NBA Entertainment. For the Spurs-Knicks Finals, 
NBAE filmed anything and everything, including the sights and sounds of Spurs star David 
Robinson’s ankles being taped on the sidelines, which was then stored in the NBAE archive. 
Under Adam Silver’s NBAE, which had since grown to 200 staffers, the driving philosophy 
had becoming access and intimacy. “The players and coaches understand it’s our job to 
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promote them, that we'll never use anything to harm them,” Silver told USA Today. “There’s 
film locked away in our vaults that will never see the light of day.” The eventual plan, he 
explained, would be to digitize the archive and make much of it available on NBA.com.166 
All of the footage that was amassed at the Finals, then, would become essential in 
distinguishing the NBA’s online offerings. 
 In the interim, the video library proved a key component of the NBA’s latest media 
endeavor – its own cable channel. Set to launch on DirecTV and digital cable for the start of 
the 1999-2000 season, “NBA.com TV” was the first league-owned, 24-hour network for any 
sports organization.167 “It was another example of being opportunistic and seeing an 
opportunity in a growing world… taking advantage of the fact that sports leagues actually 
create more hours of programming every year than all the studios combined,” explained Ed 
Desser. “It’s a huge amount of content, so why shouldn’t a sports league have a network?”168 
At launch, NBA.com TV would not feature any complete live games, acting instead as a 
“barker” channel intended to drive sales of their League Pass DBS service. During the day, 
the channel would feature two-hour edits of classic games, reruns of features from Inside 
Stuff, and other assorted NBA Entertainment-produced content. At 7 pm ET each night, the 
channel would go “live” with a news show featuring the previous day’s highlights and a 
preview of upcoming games, leading eventually into live cut-ins and statistical updates from 
NBA.com. At 1 am, a fifteen-minute video package would air to sum up the night’s action.169 
“We see this as an opportunity to tap into the rich array of information available on 
NBA.com and the vast television programming from NBAE’s video and film library,” said 
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Adam Silver, NBA Entertainment president and COO.170 “This is our Web site morphed into 
a television channel.”171 
 
 
Figure 2.9: During the 2000 playoffs, NBA.com TV reflects the convergence of television and the web.172 
 
Operating out of the NBA’s Secaucus studio complex, where the league produced 
Inside Stuff and its other programming, the start-up costs for the network were estimated at 
$10 million. DirecTV saw the addition of NBA.com TV as a further incentive to drive annual 
subscriptions of League Pass, which had thus far accumulated 150,000 DirecTV customers. 
In creating a more direct-to-consumer model, many industry analysts believed that the NBA 
was positioning itself away from traditional television distribution deals.173 Richard Tedesco 
of Broadcasting & Cable highlighted the promise of a channel “without network 
intermediaries,” forecasting something like the streaming television paradigm to come.174 
Various NBA spokespeople, however, were quick to downplay the broader ambitions for 																																																								
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NBA.com TV. “[NBA.com TV will] be in 3 million TV households. I don’t compare this to 
the cable universe of 70 million households,” explained Stern, comparing the endeavor 
instead to the league’s local markets. “…If it can get into 3 million homes, [NBA.com TV] 
will be a top 10 market for the NBA.”175  
The wider TV industry had offered the ideal environment for NBA.com TV, “a 
convergence of the Internet, television, and basketball,” per Commissioner Stern.176 Over the 
previous few years, a web presence had come to be considered an essential asset for TV 
programmers, a major shift since its early days as mere curiosity. Geoff Reiss, who had 
overseen the launch of the NBA website and was serving as senior vice president at ESPN 
Internet Ventures, explained to Broadcasting & Cable, “ESPN is not a TV network. ESPN is 
sports and sports gets expressed on TV, radio, in print and on the Internet.”177 By late 1999, 
as more and more content made its way online, certain problems had emerged. Disputes 
began to arise over sports rights, especially, as streaming audio and video highlights had 
become easier and more commonplace.  TV and radio rights-holders said that their 
agreements allowed them to deliver webcasts, while the leagues argued that they did not. The 
NFL permitted only one-time simulcasts of highlights, but not complete games, which had 
found their way online regardless. When the NBA found any unsanctioned radio feeds, they 
had successfully petitioned those stations to stop. But the scope of the Internet makes it 
“difficult to police,” admitted Adam Silver.178 Streaming technology nonetheless continued 
to evolve, given its immense promise. “The on-demand nature of Internet video,” read a 
Broadcasting & Cable special report, “is successfully competing with—and supplanting—																																																								
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TV and radio as a ready source for news clips…” Perhaps the ideal example of this “newly 
converged” media, notes the report, is “the satellite-delivered 24-hour NBA channel with 
‘wraparound’ content from the NBA website.”179 
While working on the NBA.com TV project, NBA Entertainment had also managed 
to come to an agreement with a number of international TV providers for the distribution of 
games, including NTK in Kazakhstan, Melita Sports Channel in Malta, Anem TV Network in 
Serbia, and RTVM in Montenegri. The deal raised the presence of NBA programming to 205 
countries in 42 languages.180 The international success of NBA Entertainment, in addition to 
the success of League Pass and NBA.com TV, soon thereafter led to a corporate 
restructuring. NBA Properties, the promotional arm that had become an important marketer 
in its own right with the 1992 and 1996 Olympics, was merged into NBAE, which would all 
continue to be overseen by Adam Silver. The merging of the NBA’s media, marketing, and 
international operations into a single clearinghouse would subsequently lead to a merging of 
strategies. While the global distribution of the NBA in the 1990s was defined by Michael 
Jordan and Americanness, the localization efforts already in place would soon give way to a 
more reciprocal approach to NBA programming, defined by the importation of an inclusive 
internationalism into the United States. 
By March 2000, the NBA made plans for “Phase II” of its NBA.com TV 
programming. They initiated talks with European leagues for the right to air on the NBA’s 
channel, as part of a push for more live offerings. At the same time, however, the league’s 
emphasis on television and ‘intimacy’ had begun to irritate certain coaches, who felt that 
wearing microphones during the course of games was an unnecessary distraction. When 																																																								
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Miami Heat coach Pat Riley refused to wear one, the NBA fined him $100,000. Ahead of a 
marquee Raptors-Sonics game on NBC, the league office sent out memo demanding 
compliance. “The ‘electronic environment’ for experiencing sports is changing 
dramatically,” the memo read. “The increasing multitude and variety of entertainment 
products now available, together with the new technologies that can deliver them in new and 
more immediate ways, gives our fans more viewing options than ever before. If the league is 
going to remain strong we have to continue to set the standard among sports leagues for 
innovation and creativity.”181 The memo established a precedent that privileged television 
and the ‘electronic environment’ above all, later exemplified in 2012 by the NBA’s fining the 
San Antonio Spurs $250,000 for resting their star players during a nationally televised 
game.182 The NBA catered to the interests of television, first and foremost. 
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merchandising – to CBS for $6 billion over eleven 
Figure 2.10: As of 1999, given the 
lucrative NBC contract, the NBA’s 
total television revenue had final 
overtaken that of Major League 
Baseball (Broadcasting & Cable, 
July 12, 1999). 	
Only a few days after the microphone 
incident, the Washington Post examined the ways in 
which “internet-enhanced television” was altering 
the sports media landscape. Many believed that the 
leagues themselves would soon broadcast their own 
games and post highlights to web “channels.” The 
NBA took the same diplomatic approach as before. 
“Right now, broadcasting is not our business—what 
we do is run a sports league,” offered NBAE 
president Adam Silver. “Of course, what that means 
five years from now could be completely different. 
The Internet and all this new technology is going to 
completely redefine everything.” The ‘internet 
broadcast rights,’ or streaming rights, had become a 
more valued commodity. While the NBA would 
continue holding onto their own until the market 
settled, NCAA set a precedent in 1999 when they 
sold the combined ‘March Madness’ rights – 
including broadcast, cable, satellite, radio, 
streaming, marketing, sponsorship, and	
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years.183 In 2007, the NBA was finally ready to cash in and package together its own 
traditional TV rights and streaming rights. By then, the league had expanded its direct-to-
consumer operations, having launched the “League Pass” broadband service and airing their 
own live games on the re-branded “NBA TV” cable channel. The “electronic environment” 
of sports television was set. 
 The 2000 Finals continued NBAE’s interest in Internet-TV convergence, featuring 
sixty video cameras, thirty still-photo cameras, and approximately eighteen microphones 
distributed among the coaches, referees, and the court itself. After being logged in Secaucus, 
the footage would be stored away for future use in NBAE’s multiple vaults, which then 
totaled around 180,000 tapes.184 But the tapes had become unwieldy, given Adam Silver’s 
plans to someday feature games and select footage on the NBA website. As a result, the 
league signed a deal with Convera, a new company from Intel and Excalibur Technologies, 
which would immediately begin work on digitizing the NBA archive.185 As part of the deal, 
the NBA received a 10-percent equity stake in Convera and installed David Stern on the 
Board of Directors.186  
By the start of the 2000-01 season, the NBA’s media convergence reached a new 
height with the launch of The NBA Beat, a studio show simulcast on NBA.com and 
NBA.com TV leading into their nightly coverage.187 Reflecting an evolved media landscape, 
the league’s “TV Ventures” division had since become “TV and New Media Ventures.” 																																																								
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While broadcast distribution remained the primary emphasis for the NBA, given its scale, 
“streaming video” had become “a very good way of serving niche products to disparate and 
dispersed audiences,” noted Ed Desser in late 2000.188 Given the league’s global ambition to 
become the main organization for the world’s second most popular sport, internet distribution 
appeared as a miraculous answer for the question of how to reach a global audience directly 
and simultaneously. In taking on more of these distribution responsibilities, between 
NBA.com, NBA League Pass, and NBA.com TV, the NBA had cemented its status as an 
integrated media conglomerate. 
In January 2001, the league announced a partnership with RealNetworks to offer 
audio and video streams of NBA.com TV, the first partnership between a cable channel and 
an Internet subscription service.189 In April, as a result of the deal, the NBA became the first 
pro sports league to stream a game telecast through the internet. They purposely selected the 
Sacramento Kings and Dallas Mavericks for the occasion, given both teams’ plethora of 
international stars and Mavericks owner Mark Cuban’s career in the streaming audio 
business. “As someone who was there at the birth of the webcasting industry, to be part of 
the first broadcast of an NBA game is very exciting,” Mark Cuban said in a statement. “The 
ability to watch an NBA game from almost any Internet-enabled device opens the NBA to 
fans worldwide. This is just the beginning and I'm proud that the NBA is on the forefront of 
the digital delivery of content and that the Mavs are a part of this watershed event.”190  
Though the NBA was the first to reach this particular benchmark, they were not the 
only ones preparing for the dawn of a new distribution paradigm. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media (MLBAM or BAM), a division within Major League Baseball, had also 																																																								
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been hard at work. Founded in June 2000, as a jointly owned subsidiary of all thirty MLB 
teams, BAM believed that a new digital economy could emerge with wider broadband 
adoption and improved streaming video technologies. “Baseball's grand online plans rely on 
fundamentally different economics than the old advertising-revenue model for the Web,” 
wrote Alan Schwarz of Newsweek, in an in-depth feature on BAM’s work as of late 2002. 
“MLB is attempting to wean Web users off the idea of free, mediocre content in favor of 
paying for premium, exclusive and personalized services.”191 Bob Bowman, who oversaw 
MLB.com as CEO of BAM, explained of their overall strategy at the time, “to be successful 
economically, subscription services have to be the engine… It's happening, and will continue 
to happen.”192 Indeed, this would ultimately prove accurate about the oncoming era of 
streaming television. 
Prompted by the evolving capabilities of internet distribution, NBA action had “gone 
global,” the Philadelphia Inquirer reported, as local star Allen Iverson competed against the 
Los Angeles Lakers’ Shaq and Kobe tandem in the 2001 Finals. While this was certainly not 
new, the league’s Finals presence had successfully expanded to 750 million households 
across 205 countries. NBA Entertainment, “the once-modest operation” in charge of the 
international agreements, had “become a high-tech multimedia conglomerate.”193 Through 
NBAE’s many different media and promotional arms, moreover, stars were able to become 
more global than ever before. “With things like the Internet,” said Heidi Ueberroth, NBAE 
vice president for global media, “the players are known as quickly around the world as they 
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are known here.”194 The simultaneity that Ueberroth describes would become a fundamental 
component of the NBA’s media strategy to come, which expanded on the possibilities of the 
“more is more” approach and its investment in the “electronic environment.” 
 
Conclusion: Beyond Basketball 
Despite the NBA’s innovations and investments in the latest and greatest media 
delivery systems, the domestic TV audience was dwindling following Michael Jordan’s 
retirement, dropping from a 4.3 average in 1998-99 to a 3.3 average for the 1999-2000 
season. For the following 2000-01 season, NBC hoped to boost the numbers by cutting the 
number of Saturday games to four, down from ten, assuredly as ominous a sign of the times 
as when CBS did the same fifteen years earlier. The network also believed the NBA might be 
helped by cross-promotion with the new XFL football league, the endeavor led by the World 
Wrestling Federation’s Vince McMahon that had emerged out of the earlier NBC-Turner-
NBA discussions.195 As the NBA headed into another round of rights negotiations with NBC, 
ratings on the network had fallen by 38 percent over the course of their $1.75 billion 
investment.196 The work stoppage and Michael Jordan’s retirement had hurt, and fans had not 
taken to any of the new stars that the league attempted to promote. No amount of 
technological innovation, no amount of access and intimacy, could curb such a decline. It 
seemed the once prosperous NBC-NBA era was coming to a close. 
In September, as the league inched closer to the start of the 2001-02 season, rumors 
began to circulate that Michael Jordan was getting ready to return to the NBA. After a pickup 
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game in Chicago, he said his decision was ten days away: “I’m doing it for the love of the 
game. Nothing else. For the love the game.”197 On September 25, Jordan officially 
announced his return, as a member of the Washington Wizards, for which he would have to 
sell his ownership stake in the team. NBC and TNT quickly set about reorganizing their 
schedules to accommodate more Wizards games, which had been entirely left off of the 
national slate.198 Despite the attempt to recapture the old magic, an older MJ was still not 
enough to turn around the slumping NBC ratings, which would ultimately hold at a 2.9 
average for the season, the same as the disappointing previous year. After losing $100 
million on the NBA during the previous season and projected to lose another $200 million 
during the 2001-02 season, NBC decided to walk away from their longtime partner.199  
In January, the NBA officially announced its new deal with ABC/ESPN and Turner, 
totaling $4.6 billion over six years. Not only would the league be more heavily investing in 
cable distribution, via ESPN, but the deal included an un-named new sports channel to be co-
owned by Turner and the NBA. ESPN would receive twenty-four playoff games, including 
one of the Conference Finals, as well as the NBA draft and draft lottery. As broadcast 
partner, ABC would air fifteen regular season games, five early-round playoff games, and the 
NBA Finals. Turner, meanwhile, would take the All-Star Game from NBC, in addition to a 
massive increase in exclusive regular season and postseason coverage.200  
The deal signaled the launch of a new era for the NBA and the wider sports media 
industry. When the NBA left NBC, their broadcast home for more than a decade, the joint 
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move to ABC and ESPN, in addition to incumbent partner TNT, reinforced the further 
dominance of cable over broadcast television. The NBA’s investments in the medium thus 
reflect an industry in transition. While the league still required the mass address that 
remained possible only on ABC, they also sought a more flexible schedule that only cable 
could provide. The new industrial implications were not lost on trade magazine analysts, who 
took the move as a broader indication that “sports television is definitely making its way 
from network TV to cable,” though the NBA, in particular, was “unique in that the vast 
majority of the games will be on cable.”201 The $2.2 billion from AOL Time Warner and the 
$2.4 billion from Disney-ABC-ESPN, at roughly $765 million annually, also offered a 25-
percent raise over NBC’s final deal at $615 million per year.202 
 While the money was certainly an incentive for the NBA’s transition to cable, so too 
was the opportunity for more extensive league control. Russ Granik, deputy commissioner, 
explains the relative inflexibility of broadcast TV, which would “wait until Sweeps were over 
in June before you’d see an NBA game on a weekday night… I think that was almost as 
important as dollars, was to try and get the games out there to more fans at more and more 
convenient times.” In splitting the majority of the package between TNT and ESPN, “it gave 
us a lot more and better coverage of what were still to us important games,” Granik notes.203 
This new cable-centric strategy is reflected in the 2002 deals, wherein the number of regular-
season games on broadcast television was reduced from 32 to 15. They were replaced by a 
greater number of primetime games on cable: TNT was set to air 52 games in primetime, in 
addition to the All-Star Weekend events and the first two rounds of the playoffs, while ESPN 
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would air an additional 75 regular season games, the NBA Draft and a variety of postseason 
play, before handing off responsibilities to ABC for the Finals.204 
The NBA’s deepening investment in cable distribution over broadcast speaks to 
scholarship that describes the period that follows as the post-network era. Amanda D. Lotz 
periodizes television as consisting of the network era (1952 to mid-1980s), multi-channel 
transition (mid-1980s through mid-2000s), and post-network era (early 2000s onward), the 
last of which is defined by its nonlinearity and viewer control. This emerged out of the 
programming multiplicity and audience fragmentation of the multi-channel transition and 
intensified with the aid of advanced computing power. Lotz argues that the post-network era, 
with “new tools” and an audience “fractured among different channels and devices,” is of a 
“profoundly different” nature than that of the network era.205 Over the next several years, the 
NBA’s cultivation of internet distribution, in conjunction with its investments in cable, would 
allow the league to excel within the fractured media landscape that Lotz describes. 
Alternative terms have served to emphasize different features at work in this 
evolution. Michael Curtin has used “neo-network era” to capture the concurrent network and 
post-network forces at work during the 1990s, which simultaneously pursued “mass cultural 
forms aimed at broad national or global markets” and more narrow “niche audiences.”206 
Victoria E. Johnson uses “multi-platform era” to emphasize the technological and 
experiential qualities of the post-network period. For Johnson, sports programming in 
particular occupies a similar role to Curtin’s neo-network era, by exhibiting features of both 
network and post-network television: “[Sport] simultaneously maintains more network-era 																																																								
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norms than any other program form, while it is also particularly well suited to new business 
practices, media outlets, and modes of viewer involvement that are enabled by…the post-
network era.”207 This conceptualization is reflected in the NBA’s actions leading up to 2002, 
which enabled the sports league to function as an integrated media conglomerate. 
On the Turner side of the new TV agreements, the NBA’s level of input and control 
continued to expand. Mark Lazarus, president of Turner Entertainment and later NBC 
Chairman of Broadcasting & Sports, witnessed the media innovations and aggressiveness of 
the league firsthand. “I really do think that they think of themselves as a content company, 
not as a sports league,” he explains. “They really were the first sports league to see the value, 
I think, of controlling their content and having business not just in the rights-fee realm, but in 
distributing their own content and being able to generate revenue from that.”208 Lazarus’s 
confidence in the NBA’s media savvy led to the proposal of a new joint cable network that 
would feature programming beyond basketball, tentatively titled the All Sports Network, that 
would rely on Turner’s CNN and Sports Illustrated holdings, as well as possible rights deals 
with other pro sports leagues.209 The plan would ultimately fall through by July 2002, but the 
arrangement reflects the NBA’s growing media ambitions and the trust of its media partners 
in its ability to succeed. While the All-Sports Network never launched, AOL Time Warner 
chose instead to invest in the NBA’s own digital cable channel, renamed NBA TV from the 
unwieldy NBA.com TV, at $45 million for a ten-percent stake.210 In 2008, Turner would take 
control of the channel altogether, along with NBA League Pass and NBA.com. 
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 As the digital revolution was brewing in the background by the early 2000s, cable 
was more publicly ascending over broadcast television. As of the late 1990s, cable and new 
media still remained largely “ancillary” for advertisers, mattering more for their “upscale” or 
specified appeal.211 By the 2003-04 TV season, however, basic cable finally overtook 
network television in the percentage of households viewing in primetime, a gap that 
continued to grow in cable’s favor over the next several years.212 In adding more of its 
programming slate to cable, the NBA contributed to this transition by further enhancing the 
medium’s distinct offerings. Where once sports was a hallmark of network TV, as 
exemplified by Monday Night Football and The Wide World of Sports, the NBA helped lead 
the charge onto cable TV, where sports could fill more hours of the schedule at more 
favorable times. While CBS and NBC had relegated the NBA to weekend afternoons, as they 
had for most sports, ESPN and TNT could continue to air NBA games in primetime 
throughout the week. When Monday Night Football left ABC for ESPN following the 2005 
season, it was part of a trend demonstrated earlier by the NBA.213 
Ultimately, the 1990s was the era of “Manifest Destiny” for the NBA, the execution 
of David Stern’s vision, in which the league planted flags around the world via new Canadian 
franchises and a number of overseas offices. At the start of the decade, Stern had considered 
the league to be “a relatively small player” in the entertainment business.214 Following the 
launch of NBA.com TV and the latest round of multi-billion-dollar TV rights agreements, 
which offered the leaguer greater autonomy than ever before, the National Basketball 
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Association emerged as a genuine global media conglomerate, expanding overseas in search 
of greater profit. The combination of League Pass, NBA.com, and NBA.com TV, moreover, 
began to offer the possibility of new kinds of programming – more direct and more 
simultaneous – that could reach all viewers with less need for localization, that could be more 
inclusively international. As the NBA began lose viewers domestically, the possibility 
became increasingly appealing. The close of this period, which culminates in the NBA’s 
leaving NBC for ABC/ESPN, thus heralds the wider industrial shift into a post-network and 
multi-platform era, the implications of which will be explored more deeply in the chapter that 
follows. Given these industrial and technological developments, the NBA works to cultivate 
a more global address, via streaming platforms, in order to more effectively appeal to an 
international audience. The NBA had become America’s league, playing America’s game on 
the global stage. Now, it would try to become the world’s league.  
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III. Games Without Frontiers: 
Sport and Internationalism in the Multiplatform Media Economy, 2002 – 2007 
 
“Competition and conquest are words easily interchangeable, and the whole spirit of our 
present commercial crusade to the Eastward betrays itself in the fact that we cannot speak of 
it but in terms borrowed from the glossary of the warrior. It is a commercial ‘invasion,’ a 
trade ‘war,’ a ‘threatened attack’ on the part of America; business is ‘captured,’ opportunities 
are ‘seized,’ certain industries are ‘killed,’ certain former monopolies are ‘wrested away’… 
The difference is hardly of kind and scarcely of degree. It is a mere matter of names… So 
perhaps we have not lost the Frontier after all.” – Frank Norris, “The Frontier Gone at Last” 
(1902)1 
“There are 250 million potential NBA fans in the U.S., and there are 5 billion outside the 
U.S. We like those numbers.” –David Stern, NBA commissioner, to Forbes (1993)2 
---------------- 
 
Introduction: Towards a Global Efficiency 
 
Despite a windfall of TV revenue from the NBA’s latest media rights deals with 
ABC/ESPN and Turner, the period from 2002 to 2007 was defined by turbulence and 
transition. The NBA’s ratings on ABC, for instance, would decline every single year, from a 
2.6 average during the initial 2002-03 season to a 2.0 average for the 2006-07 season.3 
Controversies from the very end of the NBC era, which were associated with the emerging 
‘hip hop generation’ of players, also carried over into the NBA’s new media partners. In a 
2017 retrospective of the era, Complex described the early 2000s NBA as a period in which 
“fear, misunderstandings, and stereotypes were rampant.”4 Tensions reached a fever pitch 
during the Pistons-Pacers Brawl in Detroit in 2004, when a fight between players and fans 
erupted through the arena and culminated in criminal charges for ten people.  
While the league had already internationalized considerably, I propose that the NBA 
utilized the further importation and marketing of global stars as a two-fold “solution” to their 																																																								
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domestic tensions and international ambitions. The hip-hop generation, defined most clearly 
by Allen Iverson, was slowly replaced by a new international generation, led by Manu 
Ginobili, Dirk Nowitzki, and Yao Ming.5 In a 2003 survey of self-identified NBA fans, for 
instance, nearly 50-percent of respondents noted that the “influx of international players has 
increased their interest” in the league.6 By the 2003-04 season, 16.6-percent of all players on 
opening day rosters were identified as “international,” a number that jumped to 19-percent by 
2005-06, eventually setting a new record of 21.3-percent for the start of the 2014-15 season.7 
This internationalization was encouraged and enabled by the advancement of live-
streaming technologies, which allowed for a more simultaneous and uniform global address. 
The 2000s sees a more widespread privileging of transnational audiences through 
transnational programming, rather than the exportation of American programming with 
localized flourishes, as was the case during the previous decade. Following the previous 
mediatization and marketization of sport, the NBA’s evolving approach to media production 
and distribution, which expanded the possibilities of sports programming in the early 
multiplatform era, is thus reflective of the broader media industry. 
The NBA’s strategy demonstrates the drive for ‘global efficiency’ through global 
legibility. In Michael Curtin’s Playing to the World’s Biggest Audience, Russell Wolff, then 
senior vice-president of programming at ESPN/Star, discusses the drive for “pan-regional 
efficiency” versus “local appeal.”8 While producers desired programming that could be 
successful in multiple regions, there remained local considerations that had to be met. This 																																																								
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remained the lesson for U.S.-based pan-regional channels, such as those by ESPN and MTV, 
which had experienced difficult launches in the late 1980s and 1990s. While MTV’s initial 
strategy was that American popular music could serve as an “international language,” 
ultimately the “one-channel-fits-all approach” proved a failure.  Instead, they launched MTV 
Taiwan, India, Japan, Korea, etc. and introduced customized programming blocks to much 
greater success.9 This aligns with the NBA’s previous approach, which had also relied on 
customized local programming, such as Dunk Street and other overseas versions of the 
NBA’s Inside Stuff magazine show. The advancement of streaming and internet distribution, 
however, encouraged the league to invest in internationalization at the base level, using 
international players and signifiers to craft a more inclusive product that made localization 
efforts more seamless. 
 In this way, the NBA parallels a wider industrial shift back to pan-regional 
programming, as demonstrated by robust internet TV distributors in HBO and Netflix, the 
latter of which, according to Ramon Lobato, can “effortlessly combine the local and the 
global within the one platform and constitute itself as many different products 
simultaneously.”10 The widespread growth of streaming platforms and their ‘library’ 
approach to programming has created new possibilities for international efficiencies. While 
Chuck Tryon, for instance, describes the efforts of Netflix to acquire “local content that 
appeals to international audiences,” these acquisitions can co-exist with content directed 
towards other cultures.11 Over-the-top (OTT) platforms are thus designed to be inclusive 
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ones. The NBA, during this period, similarly cultivates an inclusive transnational product via 
an inclusive international platform. 
   As part of this approach, established by 2007, the NBA works to shed much of the 
“Americanness” that had historically undergirded its marketing. Through the NBA’s 
increasingly global address and de-Americanized form, these consistencies allow for greater 
legibility and equivalence across national boundaries and marketplaces. This is in keeping 
with concurrent analysis of the TV format trade and its risks of homogenization. Silvio 
Waisbord, writing in 2004, describes how “traces of national belonging are downplayed and 
even eradicated,” which results in “a pasteurized, transnational product detached from 
national cultures.”12 Tanner Mirrlees, in his work on global entertainment conglomerates, 
similarly argues that U.S. transnational media companies “are de-Americanizing the content 
of TV shows and films so that they may more easily capture and control global, national, and 
trans-local lifestyle markets,” rather than those that explicitly “promote one-dimensional or 
homogeneous images of ‘the American Way of Life’ to the U.S. and to the wider world.”13 In 
this same way, the American NBA sought to minimize its own U.S. ties in order to appeal to 
overseas audiences as a more authentically global program. 
  The NBA’s media approach from 2002 through 2007 thus reflects qualities of “the 
amoeba,” described by Paul S.N. Lee in his analysis of imported media, as programming that 
maintains the same basic content across localities and changes only in form. The NBA’s use 
of local commentary teams, while promoting a collection of ‘international’ stars across 
multiple markets, reflects a desire for greater efficiency through these amoebic qualities. This 
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is made easier by streaming video, with its transnational reach, which can more easily bring 
audiences together under a single platform. Taken further, then, the NBA and 
internationalized sport exhibit tendencies of Marwan Kraidy’s concept of “corporate 
transculturalism,” which “emphasizes cultural fluidity as a tool to make corporations more 
profitable.”14 Through more fluid programming, in conjunction with more flexible direct-to-
consumer distribution, the producers of American sports television are able to market their 
content as more authentically transnational. The inherent internationalism of athletic 
competition allowed sport to excel in this practice, and perhaps none more than the NBA, 
which had already worked at cultivating a strong global presence during the 1980s and 
1990s. 
This transition towards globally efficient programming was accomplished within 
telecasts and promotional materials, reflecting previous sports media scholarship that has 
examined the relationship between sports performance and its mediation. Following from 
Margaret Morse’s inquiry into the “the electronic reshaping of the game,” Bernard Miège 
argued that by the late 1980s, many “sporting events are now not only produced for 
television but in function of television re-transmission.”15 Through the 1990s, under the 
direction of NBA Entertainment President Adam Silver, the NBA intensified its privileging 
of “the electronic environment,” by adding more cameras and microphones in service of new 
online platforms.16 The advancement of these operations, from 2002 to 2007, encouraged the 
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league to expand farther overseas in search of greater profits, like the other entertainment 
conglomerates to which they had aspired.  
Toby Miller, Geoffrey Lawrence, Jim McKay and David Rowe, moreover, have 
explored the global dynamics of sport that emerged by this period, arguing that as 
“economic, political, technological, and cultural changes have forged new relations of TV, 
sport, and nation…what constitutes a national game or a contest between representatives of 
local, regional, and national identities is subject to constant reformation.”17 As the boundaries 
between performance and mediation blur together, so too do national boundaries. As a media 
conglomerate, then, the NBA was well positioned to utilize the strategies of TV format 
producers and internationalized programming to gain a greater global foothold. By 
privileging international performance, the NBA was able to more effectively globalize its 
media. Globalization serves as the incentive for further digitization by the close of this era, 
and at the same time, digitization enables further globalization. This chapter thus illuminates 
the relationship between executive decision-making, the manifestation of such strategies 
within the telecasts, and the evolving digital infrastructures that allow those texts to circulate 
around the world. 
This chapter, ultimately, highlights the ‘multi-platform-ification’ of sport from 2002 
to 2007, a further step in its ongoing mediatization, which is established by 2007, the same 
year that Netflix and Hulu launched their streaming services and Apple debuted the first 
iPhone. By 2007, the NBA debuted its own standalone streaming service and began to further 
court global audiences through these expanded digital offerings, reflecting the influence of 
distribution technologies on programming strategies (and vice versa). A study of the NBA, as 																																																								
17 Toby Miller, Geoffrey Lawrence, Jim McKay and David Rowe, Globalization and Sport: Playing the World 
(London: Sage Publications, 2001), 11.	
	 156 
presented here, can help scholars to more fully understand and contextualize the 
establishment of a multiplatform era of television, as it relates to more than just narrative 
programming. “The model is changing,” explained Ed Erhadt, president of customer 
marketing and sales at ESPN/ABC Sports, after the 2002 rights deals were signed. “It’s a 
multimedia sports fan out there…We’re beautifully set up to take advantage of that and 
provide advertisers access to all those multiple touch points.”18 
This moment in the NBA’s own trajectory illuminates a key moment in the wider 
evolution of television, as the medium transitions from the neo-network era of the 1990s to 
the post-network era by the late 2000s. Sports programming helps to bridge this gap by 
retaining the mass address of the network era, while simultaneously offering a newfound 
level of flexibility favorable to the ongoing turn to multiplatform, direct-to-consumer 
distribution. The NBA is both a product of these larger industrial and technological 
machinations and an active contributor to their growth. The NBA understood that the Disney 
and AOL Time Warner partnerships could bring pro basketball into more homes, in more 
ways, in more countries than ever before. “The multiplatform aspect of what ABC, ESPN 
and Disney bring us includes animation, theme parks, stores, sports zones,” explained Gregg 
Winik, executive vice president at NBA Entertainment, ahead of the inaugural 2002-2003 
season on ABC/ESPN. “We’re looking at animation, sitcoms, feature films. There’s also the 
direction of making our AOL and ESPN.com presence totally integrated.”19 
As a result, the Hollywood Reporter joked that the NBA would have to change its 
NBC-era slogan, “I love this game,” to “I live this game,” if the “mighty multiplatform 
mushroom cloud of over-the-air, cable, Internet and entertainment products rains all over the 																																																								
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globe as expected.”20 By 2007, the mushroom cloud had indeed come to loom over the global 
media ecosystem, increasingly defined by names such as Netflix, Hulu, and Apple. In the 
NBA, AOL Time Warner and Disney had obtained the perfect programming to help power 
its global initiatives for years to come, and in its new media partners, the NBA had found the 
ideal distribution conduits to realize its global potential. 
 
Generation Next: Hip-Hop and the New Internationalism 
As the distribution of the NBA had continued to evolve, so too did its content, though 
not without conflict. Tensions between the NBA’s audience, press, and players, which had 
begun by the end of the league’s NBC run, spilled over into the first years of its ABC 
partnership. The hostility directed at the “young, black, rich, and famous,” to borrow the title 
of Todd Boyd’s book on the “hip hop invasion” within the NBA, recalled the same tensions 
that had plagued the league in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when media coverage blamed 
players’ youth and wealth on rampant drug abuse within the league.21 The coverage of the 
1998 labor lockout had exacerbated the hostilities, which published accounts from fans that 
blamed selfish players for the lost games.22 In Crashing the Borders (2005), New York Times 
sportswriter Harvey Araton’s book on this particular moment in the league’s history, he notes 
that the “condemnations of the NBA’s hip-hop milieu were widespread,” as “watchwords 
like posse – evoking street-gang violence – crept into the dialogue” and “[sportswriters] 
railed against some black NBA players for confusing upscale basketball crowds with the 
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audiences for rap,” revealing the deep-seated bigotry of both the fans and the press in the 
process.23  
Fans and news media alike increasingly expressed a deep resentment of the successful 
black athletes that appeared on their television screens. When NBA commissioner David 
Stern was a guest on MSNBC’s Hardball during the 2000-01 season, host Chris Matthews 
aired without reservation his opinion that the NBA did not have “real gentlemen kind of guys 
by most standards,” but rather “guys that are closer to the streets.”24 Allen Iverson, most 
famously of the Philadelphia 76ers, arguably took the brunt of racist fan and news media ire 
during this period. Other young and outspoken players also received their share of 
disapproval, especially as the NBA zealously searched for the “next Michael Jordan.” Fans 
looked for ways to undermine the comparison, as the NBA experimented alternately with 
Vince Carter, Tracy McGrady, Allen Iverson, and Kobe Bryant as the next transcendent 
international star. George Willis of the New York Post referred to them collectively as 
“Generation Next” ahead of the 2000 All-Star Game, which referred also to their global and 
digital potential. “Talk all you want about tattoos and corn rows,” writes Willis, implicitly 
referring to the press’s condemnation of the players’ personal style, but “the real of substance 
of this new group of players will come with their ability to market themselves digitally.”25 
Yet the vitriol directed at these young black stars, undermining any such opportunities, 
continued to dwell on their tattoos, cornrows, and relationship to hip-hop culture. 
This was reflected especially in the coverage of Allen Iverson and his peers at the 
time. A columnist for the Deseret News of Salt Like City, Utah notes that Iverson’s “tattoos 
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and attitude are not fresh” and accuses Alonzo Mourning of having “a chip on his shoulder 
the size of a BMW.”26 The local Palm Beach Post similarly accused Iverson of “arrogance” 
and “selfishness.”27 The St. Petersburg Times was more direct: “Allen Iverson is a thug… 
The 76ers star is part of the hip-hop culture that embraces the thug image. To people like 
him, being a thug is acceptable.”28 Such language was more the rule than the exception. In 
2004, after the ‘Malice at the Palace’ brawl between the Detroit Pistons and Indiana Pacers, 
The Detroit News published an editorial calling the NBA “a haven for thugs,” which “keeps 
filling its rosters with players who ought to be filling cell blocks.”29 Cultural critics and 
scholars alike have highlighted the use of “thug” as a loaded and racist epithet. NPR ran a 
story as recently as 2015 on the subject, titled “the Racially Charged Meaning Behind the 
Word ‘Thug,’” in which comparative literature scholar John McWhorter notes, “the truth is 
that thug today is a nominally polite way of using the N-word…It is a sly way of saying there 
go those black people ruining things again.”30 The same remained true in the early 2000s, as 
the press condemned the “thugs” that were ruining basketball. 
While the NBA’s public statements remained critical of the “dreadful stereotyping by 
the media of what it is to be an NBA player,” in practice, the organization frequently took to 
minimizing the influence of hip-hop culture within the league.31 In a special holiday 1999-
2000 issue of Hoop magazine, owned by the NBA, an infamous cover featuring Allen 
Iverson had his tattoos and diamond earring removed by airbrush. While NBA editorial 
downplayed the incident as an innocent accident, because the photo editor “thought the tattoo 
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looked like a bite,” David Stern told The New York Times, “I never understood why or how 
we did that. I wasn't consulted and it will never happen again.”32 While the intentionality of 
this particular event is murky, the NBA’s efforts to ‘airbrush’ out hip-hop culture manifested 
in other areas as well. A content editor on an NBA CD-ROM project in the 1990s described 
the instructions he had been given as, “Drop Dennis Rodman from the list of one hundred 
best players. No images of players fighting. No mentions of drug addiction. No backboard 
smashing in the product. No gangster aesthetic.”33 The NBA was able to precisely curate its 
image off of the court, through league-controlled platforms like NBA.com and Hoop 
magazine. Following the Pistons-Pacers Brawl, the NBA took the public’s negative response 
as an opportunity to more fully control its on-court image as well, instituting a sideline dress 
code that very clearly targeted hip-hop aesthetics and attempted to whitewash the league’s 
image. 
 																																																								
32 “Tattoo Who? NBA Gets Heat For Altering Iverson Photo,” Sports Business Daily, May 8, 2000; Wise, 
“Stern Faces Problems On and Off the Court.” 
33 David Shields, Black Planet: Facing Race During an NBA Season (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999), 21-
22. 
Figure 3.1: The infamous cover of Hoop 
magazine, an official NBA publication, 
which was altered to remove Allen Iverson’s 
tattoos. 
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In many respects, then, the NBA’s decisions in this chapter reflect a further 
consequence of sports’ ongoing mediatization. With a fear of lost viewers and profits, the 
NBA listened to the most outspoken and biased members of the public, like a film or 
television studio might an audience at a test screening that had expressed a desire for a whiter 
cast of actors; the league would, in fact, conduct consumer focus groups led by a Republican 
political strategist.34 William Rhoden of The New York Times highlighted as much in his 
2006 book, Forty Million Dollar Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of the Black Athlete, 
in which he argues that the “NBA actively grooms as many non-black players as it can, 
players from Europe or Asia, players who don’t bring along with them all the street baggage 
of black stars.”35 While some of these international stars were people of color, they did not 
have the same “street baggage,” as Rhoden points out, and were also seen as playing and 
performing basketball “the right way,” which emphasized passing, teamwork, and the 
“fundamentals” of the game.36 Such fans desired players that were more reminiscent of the 
Larry Birds of yesteryear, however rosy their memories, and less like the Allen Iversons of 
the moment. 
To a great extent, the actions here thus speak to Stuart Hall’s analysis of the black 
athlete in “The Spectacle of the ‘Other,’” wherein he highlights the notion that “one black 
body” can simultaneously encapsulate “the extreme alternatives of heroism and villainy,” 
which is reflective of the response to black NBA stars during this period, who could be 
simultaneously celebrated and condemned by fans and the press. Hall goes on to articulate 
“spectacle” as part of an imperialist project of translating “things” into “a fantasy visual 																																																								
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display of signs and symbols,” which speaks moreover to the NBA’s understanding of race 
as a superficial quality, its treatment of blackness as mere “image,” and the mediatized state 
of NBA basketball. Consequently, entities such as the NBA are able to successfully portray 
diversity and internationalism as “dissolving the harsh realities of racism into a liberal mish-
mash of difference,” ultimately appropriating “difference into a spectacle in order to sell a 
product.”37 This is an accurate description of the NBA’s approach through this period, which 
would ultimately utilize internationalism and inclusion in the name of global profit.  
By 2001, with Allen Iverson in the midst of a run towards an NBA Finals appearance, 
some of the press’s hostility had abated, and he had come to be portrayed more as a hero than 
a villain. A plethora of articles now alternately praised Iverson’s growth, maturity, and 
leadership. “Pariah to Pitchman,” declared one such article in The New York Times.38 
Michael Wilbon of the Washington Post, and later ESPN, wrote on the “evolution” of 
Iverson. “Cynics will look at the cornrows and tattoos, the bling-bling and the stocking caps 
and say nothing has changed with him,” he wrote, invoking a multitude of stereotypes, “but 
in truth plenty has changed.”39 Following the 2001 Finals, which saw Iverson’s Philadelphia 
76ers lose in five games to Shaq and Kobe’s Los Angeles Lakers, AI had the NBA’s top 
selling jersey for the first time.40 His marketing power seemed real and lasting. Harvey 
Araton of The New York Times nonetheless mocked the glut of articles on the newfound 
maturity of players like Iverson and Kobe Bryant, noting the uneasy hypocrisy of the 
criticism in the first place. “While young players were dissected like frogs in biology during 
an All-Star weekend inquisition in February,” Araton writes, “no one seemed to remember 																																																								
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Isiah Thomas and the great Jordan himself caught in serious gambling entanglements even as 
they carted home championship hardware.”41 The entire press narrative was askew, from the 
magnified attention to young players, to the exultation of past greats, to the latest 
manufactured redemption narratives. 
 While particular incidents continued to negatively define the NBA within a 
demonstrably biased press, there had simultaneously occurred a massive increase in the 
number of international players. In anticipation of the 2002 NBA Draft, featuring Yao Ming 
as the consensus top pick, the league launched a special NBA.com/China section written in 
simplified Chinese characters to better reach Chinese fans. “The NBA Draft has become an 
increasingly global event as more and more international players from all over the world 
have entered the draft and now play in the NBA,” said Brenda Spoonemore, vice president of 
interactive services for NBA Entertainment.42 While Yao Ming occupied the majority of 
headlines, the trend went beyond China: 29-percent of players drafted were born outside the 
United States. Many took this as a sign of a deficiency in American basketball ability. 
“Global Warning” read a headline in the New York Daily News. John Thompson, former 
Georgetown University head coach, who had been critical of the NBA’s goodwill towards 
Soviet athletes in the 1980s, had since grown critical of American athletes. “A lot of this is 
the result of the complacency and laziness of American players,” he said, reinforcing the 
stereotypes that had come to define the NBA’s Generation Next.43 Kenny Smith, an analyst 
for TNT, had a simpler take on the matter: “This is a wake-up call.”44  
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The internationalization continued into the 2003 draft. The Detroit Pistons selected 
Darko Milicic with the second overall pick, the first of another twenty international picks 
between both rounds. Many attributed the growth in international players to the worldwide 
visibility and success of the 1992 Olympic “Dream Team,” featuring the league’s top stars. 
This remains the NBA’s accepted narrative: young aspiring athletes watched players like 
Michael Jordan, Scottie Pippen, Charles Barkley, and Magic Johnson and were inspired to 
attain comparable greatness. While this appears unimpeachably true, it is also significant that 
the NBA’s international growth reached new heights during the league’s racially charged 
domestic turbulence of the early 2000s. While one cannot attribute a clear or direct 
intentionality to the NBA’s importing a greater number of international players in order to 
alleviate the league’s “image” issues, there were nonetheless indisputable benefits: the NBA 
could appease its sponsors, a certain percentage of its domestic fan base, and its international 
viewers that were more likely to watch their hometown heroes. 
Figure 3.2: Yao Ming on the cover of 
Sports Illustrated for their 2002-03 NBA 
season preview.  
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In 2005, Sean Frederick Brown published a study on the widespread international-
ization of American sport, arguing that sports identified as “American” were more likely to 
succeed, while those labeled as “foreign” were more likely to struggle, citing as evidence the 
declines in domestic viewership for pro basketball and baseball concurrent with their 
globalization.45 This does not account, of course, for the NBA’s loss of Michael Jordan, the 
1998 strike-shortened season, and the league’s greater investment in cable television over 
network television, though Brown acknowledged the latter two as possible contributing 
factors.46  
Crucially, the argument also underestimated the earlier global efforts of the NBA, 
which readied its audience for the more extensive importation of foreign-born players. 
Basketball fans had largely become accustomed to foreign-born stars, such as Dirk Nowitzki 
of Germany, Manu Ginobili of Argentina, Tony Parker of France, and Pau Gasol of Spain. 
English professor and NBA scholar Yago Colás has explained how Manu Ginobili, who 
joined the league for the landmark 2002-2003 season, even became an exemplar of the new 
NBA reality. Players like Ginobili served as “the greatest of the great white hopes” by 
embodying “a kind of dialectical synthesis of the racialized stylistic antithesis” between 
white players and black players. “This international game heals the ills of basketball and the 
racial conflicts of American society,” Colás argues, “but it does so via the white body of 
Manu Ginobili.”47  
International players came to represent the “proper values” of basketball by 
exhibiting a return to the pass-first, team-oriented “fundamentals” of the game. Whatever the 																																																								
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basketball explanation for the public’s interest, though, the reality is that these new foreign-
born stars were favored because they did not “bring along with them all the street baggage of 
black stars,” as sportswriter William Rhoden has noted.48 The NBA nonetheless took 
advantage of the public’s international interest. While the NBA had already begun to control 
its off-court image by minimizing the presence of hip-hop signifiers wherever possible, the 
importation of international stars allowed the league to further modify its on-court product, 
which could aid in the league’s global media pursuits by televising global styles of basketball 
that would be more recognizable to overseas fans. 
 
Figure 3.3: In Sports Illustrated (Feb. 21, 2005), an article cites the Pistons-Pacers brawl and “troublesome” 
players as reasons for fans’ growing disinterest in basketball, using an image of Darius Miles of the Portland 
Trail Blazers (left). The article’s counterpart (right) invokes the skill of emerging international players, 
including Manu Ginobili and Tony Parker, as reasons that fans should continue watching. 
 
 
Following the “Malice at the Palace” brawl, on November 19, 2004, the NBA 
attained the means to police its players’ behavior and branding more than ever before. After a 
skirmish broke out between players Ron Artest and Ben Wallace, Artest retreated to the press 
table, when a fan threw a full cup of soda at him: “Artest bolted from the table and…touched 
off a riot that, as [Commissioner] Stern put it, broke ‘the social contract between players and 																																																								
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fans.’”49 Nine players were suspended without pay, and five players and five fans faced 
criminal assault charges.50 Tensions between the players, the press, and the fans had reached 
crisis levels.  
By May 2005, following the brawl, sales of league-licensed products had fallen by 
thirty-percent, while regular-season television ratings were down on all networks.51 
Commissioner Stern hired Matthew Dowd, a business strategist and Republican Party 
consultant who had helped shape George W. Bush’s reelection campaign.52 Dowd was tasked 
with “broadening” the league’s appeal. The modus operandi became “image building.”53 
Ultimately, Dowd conducted two consumer focus groups composed of people that were 
admittedly not fans of the NBA, in order to determine how to get “casual viewers more 
excited” about the upcoming Finals.54 
In After Artest, David J. Leonard examines the ramifications of the brawl and the 
changing racial landscape of the league. In “highlighting the league’s blackness,” Leonard 
argues, “the Palace Brawl mandated the transformation of NBA policy regarding the 
governance of black bodies.” These new policies and “rhetorical campaigns” sought to 
“mediate these potentially harmful differences through demands for assimilation, 
disciplinarity, and conformity.”55 The most significant of such campaigns was the 
controversial implementation of a business casual “dress code” for all players on the 																																																								
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sidelines, announced at the start of the 2005-06 season. Banned articles of clothing included 
T-shirts, shorts, sneakers, sunglasses, chains, pendants, medallions, and headgear of any 
kind. LeBron James was among the few players to support the decision: “Sometimes you feel 
lazy on a flight and you don't want to put (dress) clothes on…But it’s a job and we should 
look like we’re going to work.”56 Stephen A. Smith, former Philadelphia Inquirer reporter 
and longtime ESPN commentator, defended the admittedly racially motivated decision as 
necessary. “Stern's only doing what teams want him to do since few have the guts to do it 
themselves,” Smith argued, “and he is doing what sponsors and advertisers have advised as 
being in the best interest of his business.”57  
While the NBA disputed that the dress code was the direct result of the Pistons-Pacers 
Brawl, many players and reporters drew the connection and remained highly critical of the 
decision as a clear effort to police young black men and their expressions of identity. “[Stern] 
surrendered to the almighty American stereotype, rather than get to the heart of more 
complex and vexing issues that are generational and racial,” wrote Harvey Araton in the New 
York Times.58 Allen Iverson took the decision personally: “They’re targeting my generation – 
the hip-hop generation.”59 Yet the seeming arbitrariness of the code was not lost either. Jason 
Richardson, of the Golden State Warriors, highlighted the absurdity of privileging 
appearances over character. “You still wear a suit, you still could be a crook,” he said. “You 
see all what happened with Enron and Martha Stewart…A guy could come in with baggy 
jeans, a do-rag and have a Ph.D., and a person who comes in with a suit could be a three-time 
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felon.”60 Put most succinctly, “Brooks Brothers is not an emblem of moral fiber,” read one 
editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer.61 
 
 
Figure 3.4: An ESPN feature examines the NBA dress code one decade later, 
comparing LeBron James before and after its implementation.62 
 
 The 2005-06 season thus began with a new dress code and a new zero tolerance 
policy, which extended to both fans and players. During a preseason game, an Orlando 
Magic fan was banned from games for life after he called Dikembe Mutombo a “monkey.”63 
Sanctions could sometimes be indiscriminate. In January, Antonio McDyess was fined 
$500,000 for leaving the bench during a game, a clear rule violation, in order to check on his 
pregnant wife in the stands.64 The following season, as the NBA attempted to move past the 
lasting sting of the “Malice at the Palace,” the Denver Nuggets and New York Knicks 
engaged in a similar skirmish, which also spilled into the crowd, resulting in an NBA-record 
ten ejections.65 In a statement, Stern made it clear that such behaviors would no longer be 
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tolerated.66 Each franchise was fined $500,000, while players received suspensions ranging 
anywhere from fifteen games to four. “The league came down with a sledgehammer, as if to 
obliterate even the possibility of such behavior in the future,” explained a ten-year 
retrospective of the Knicks-Nuggets brawl. “And indeed, there hasn’t been a fight anywhere 
near that size in the decade since.”67 By the close of 2006 into 2007, the league was close to 
finding a new identity, removed from hip-hop and focused instead on business-casual 
internationalism. 
The NBA’s programming strategy reflects Marwan Kraidy’s concept of “corporate 
transculturalism,” in which cultural hybridity merely serves “as an economic energy stream 
to be leveraged by transnational corporations and exploited by individual consumers.” Any 
genuine “progressive potential” is squandered by the strategic use of hybridity as a tool for 
economic gain.68 The NBA, as one such corporation by this time, similarly sought to deploy 
more internationalized “content” in order to enrich itself on a global scale. Following the 
2005 dress code, which enabled the league to dictate the appearance of its television star-
athletes, the continued importation of international players also altered the style of American 
basketball to better reflect international basketball and better address international audiences. 
In 2010, for example, sportswriter Jonathan Abrams chronicled some of the specific 
basketball moves that had followed foreign-born athletes into the league. Among them was 
the “Euro-step,” a particular kind of stagger-step drive towards the basket in which a player 
takes advantage of the permitted two steps without a dribble, that had since been adopted by 
American athletes. “Considering the well-established presence of foreign players in the 
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NBA…and with the awakening sense that the best international players have become more 
clever and skillful than many American players, the mimicry becomes almost necessary,” 
Abrams explains.69 This mimicry, of course, also created a product that could be more 
readily engaged across national borders. Overseas, NBA fans could better recognize in the 
NBA the kind of basketball being played within their home countries. At the same time, 
telecasts could highlight international players and their stories. The NBA began to prioritize 
its own multi-cultural globality, putting the league in an ideal position for the ongoing turn 
towards a global multiplatform media economy. 
The flexibility of cable and streaming television, respectively, afforded the NBA 
greater scheduling control on linear TV and a more global address through digital platforms. 
In turn, the NBA continued to excel internationally. As of 2005, fifteen percent of the 
league’s broadcast revenues came from overseas.70 By 2013, ten-percent of the NBA’s 
overall revenue came from its international operations, a seemingly small number, but one 
that topped both the NFL and MLB.71 As international players were slowly coming to define 
the league, bringing with them an altogether more global audience, the NBA’s gambit for 
global success was working. The league was living up to the “World” Basketball Association 
ambitions that commissioner David Stern had expressed a decade earlier.72 
 
 Sports Television in the Multiplatform Media Economy 
The simultaneous eradication of hip-hop and ascent of internationalism is reflected in 
NBA telecasts and promotional materials. It is thus essential to observe such an evolution in 																																																								
69 Jonathan Abrams, “NBA Imports Euro Step and Other Moves of a Global Game,” The New York Times, 
November 17, 2010. 
70 Frank Fitzpatrick, "A Wide World of Sports Fans,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 17, 2005. 
71 Mark Koba, “US Pro Teams Give ‘Away Game’ a Whole New Meaning,” CNBC, October 10, 2013.	
72 Michelangelo Rucci, “NBA is Coming to Spread the Word,” Herald Sun, February 10, 1992. 
	 172 
practice, as the manifestation of the programming strategies described thus far. Ultimately, 
the international appeal of these changes instigated further investment in streaming 
technologies and over-the-top platforms, as examined later. 
Victoria E. Johnson has described the relationship between ESPN and hip-hop during 
this same period, from 2001 to 2004, as an ideal case example of how sports programming 
helps the contemporary media industries “to balance their portfolio of interests” by engaging 
“both a broad(cast) audience and increasingly narrower niches within that audience.” In 
focusing on ESPN’s original productions, Johnson notes that “the language and aesthetic of 
hip hop” became a way to integrate and conjoin ESPN’s “multi-media universe.” This is also 
true of the live sports programming produced by both ABC and ESPN, as reflected in early 
NBA coverage on the networks. The advantage of hip-hop, Johnson argues, is that it shares 
in sports’ ideology of individualism, which could be invoked by ESPN’s original 
programming to instead “encourage and reward an investment in the status quo and corporate 
ideals.” Hip-hop and sport, in conjunction, thus provided an ideal conduit for the widespread 
promotion of “team and corporate sponsorship as commonsense structures of achievement 
and reward.”73 As an example, after Allen Iverson had successfully flipped the news media 
narrative by winning the 2001 All-Star Game MVP and leading his team to the 2001 NBA 
Finals, many wrote on the new commercial and marketing opportunities now available to 
him.74 Individual greatness, hip-hop, and corporate sponsorship functioned as an integrated 
promotional machine. 
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 Johnson describes how, ultimately, ESPN changed course in 2005 to target “more 
affluent and more suburban high-tech early adopters” through their programming.75 The case 
of the NBA presented here offers further context for this shift, as the Pistons-Pacers Brawl in 
late 2004, with its implications of hip-hop culture run amok, had aired nationally on ESPN.  
Following “the Malice at the Palace,” and the press’s racist conflation of hip-hop, blackness, 
and violence, ABC and the NBA began a new strategy that walked back some of the initial 
populism of their media partnership, and especially any materials that recalled hip-hop. The 
tech-savvy suburbanite thus became a more prominent target for ESPN, as Johnson explains, 
just as the NBA itself sought to cultivate a more conservative identity in consultation with 
Republican strategist Matthew Dowd.  
 This new “clean-cut” and whitewashed NBA is evident in the evolution of its 
telecasts from its first season on ABC/ESPN through 2007. While NBC had used grand 
orchestral themes, ABC and ESPN began to use ‘pop’ music, including hip-hop, and more 
extensively emphasized star players. Following “Malice at the Palace,” however, the network 
and the league returned to the classical style of NBC (and CBS) in an effort to minimize the 
NBA’s relationship with hip-hop subcultures. This packaging, in conjunction with the player 
dress code initiated for the 2005-06 season, led to telecasts by 2007 that feel most reflective 
of the NBA’s current approach. In addition to a de-emphasis on hip-hop, this approach 
includes the ‘color blocking’ of in-arena fans, in ways reflective of soccer fandom, in order 
to speak more effectively to overseas fans. This strategy is established by the 2007 Finals, 
which featured an extensively international San Antonio Spurs defeating the Cleveland 
Cavaliers, in the first of another eight championship appearances by LeBron James. 
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The 2001 All-Star Game on NBC, for instance, reflects the bias and ambivalence in 
the public’s perception of Allen Iverson and the league’s broader hip-hop culture. After 
opening with shots of Vince Carter, Chris Webber, Kobe Bryant, Tracy McGrady, Rasheed 
Wallace, Latrell Sprewell, and Kevin Garnett, the on-court styles of play, loose-fitting 
jerseys, and various “cultural markers of their upbringing in the urban ruins of the Reagan 
Revolution,” per Yago Colás, seem to clash with the more traditional organ and orchestral 
themes played between breaks.76 Before the start of the second quarter, moreover, NBC 
sideline reporter Lewis Johnson even calls the game “the ultimate playground experience.” 
Later, after cutting to Kobe Bryant and Kevin Garnett mid-discussion, commentator Marv 
Albert condescends to them, sarcastically calling it a “high-level statistical conversation” to 
laughs from partner Doug Collins. “Kobe citing historical stats,” Albert adds with 
incredulity.77 This in keeping with the work of Colás, who argues that the NBA “sought to 
capitalize on the new markets this ‘hip-hop invasion’ helped it penetrate while 
simultaneously trafficking in the social and cultural stereotypes arising out of blackness.”78 
By simultaneously extolling and undermining players, the NBC telecast is reflective of this 
tension, which offers further evidence for the “the extreme alternatives of heroism and 
villainy” that Stuart Hall has highlighted in visual representations of the black athlete.79 
The 2002 NBA Finals between the Los Angeles Lakers and New Jersey Nets, the last 
championship to appear on the network, offers further insight into NBC’s approach to 
producing and promoting the league. As an introduction to Game Four, Bob Costas narrates a 
mini-documentary to celebrate the history of the event, framing the 2001 Lakers as a 																																																								
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‘dynasty’ comparable to the 1960s Boston Celtics and 1990s Chicago Bulls. “Now, the Los 
Angeles Lakers chase their piece of history,” Costas explains, as violins swell. The spot is 
reflective of the myth-making approach of NFL Films, rather than the NBA’s unique pop-
centric strategy of the 1980s. For a series without the Bulls or Michael Jordan, the network 
spends a surprising amount of time invoking Jordan’s legacy, and the Celtics’ dynasties in 
the 1960s and 1980s, to sell the significance of the series. “Could [the Lakers] beat the 
Bulls?” asks Tom Tolbert on the pre-show, ignoring the opposing New Jersey Nets 
altogether.80 The emphasis remains on history, mythology, and nostalgia. 
The subsequent Finals between the Lakers and San Antonio Spurs, the first to be 
broadcast on ABC since 1973, represents a distinct change in the production and promotion 
of the NBA. In the introduction to Game Six, rather than the historical context of the 
previous Finals, ABC aired a montage set to Saliva’s “Raise Up” to promote different 
storylines within the series, which featured multiple highlights of Jack Nicholson yelling 
from his courtside Lakers seats. “Can San Antonio get it done in LA? Can the Lakers push 
the series back to Texas? Who will raise up?” asks the gravel-voiced narrator, before cutting 
to another fast-paced montage highlighting stars of Finals past. While ABC, too, was 
interested in cultivating the history of the league, the endeavor was secondary to the need for 
quick cuts and popular music.81 
The same is reflected in the promotional spots for the following year’s 2004 Finals, 
which features Destiny’s Child performing a special NBA-specific spoken word opening. 
“No matter the game, there can only be one winner,” they declare in unison, before segueing 
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into LA Lakers and Detroit Pistons highlights set to “Lose My Breath.”82 In a similar spot 
promoting ABC’s regular season coverage in 2004, the network uses Justin Timberlake’s 
“Can’t Get Enough,” set to a montage of dunks and passionate yelling, from Jason Kidd, 
Kevin Garnett, and once again Jack Nicholson, as well as key international players in Manu 
Ginobili and Dirk Nowitzki.83 While NBC had privileged classicism and mythology, ABC’s 
more populist style emphasized hit songs, emotion, and star matchups and storylines (that 
could be cross-promoted with ESPN). 
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Figure 3.5: NBC’s emphasis on history and legacy (above) is in stark contrast to the colorful explosion 
effects of ABC’s NBA programming (below). 
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Following the Pistons-Pacers Brawl, however, the NBA’s partners altered their 
approaches to downplay the league’s relationship with hip-hop and promote the league’s 
burgeoning internationalism. ESPN, for instance, aired a promotional spot for the 2005 
Conference Finals featuring Phil Collins’s “In the Air Tonight.”84 While still emphasizing 
pop music and imaging, the use of Collins is an overture to an older demographic. The 2006 
All-Star Game on TNT, moreover, feels like one of the first “modern” NBA telecasts, in its 
return to the classical style of NBC, while retaining a degree of irreverence. For the opening, 
a live orchestra plays the All-Stars into the building, who enter wearing matching red, white, 
and blue jackets and perform a synchronized dance routine. Following the first quarter, TNT 
airs a recap highlight package set to pop-punk music, reflecting the hip-hop-less state of the 
NBA soundtrack. At the same time, on the court, an up-tempo style was becoming clearer, 
led by Steve Nash and LeBron James, who went on to win the game’s MVP award.85 The 
feel of the sport had evolved considerably since the slower, more physical approach of the 
2001 and 2002 Los Angeles Lakers. This athleticism, which was more reflective of 
international basketball, made easier the task of selling the NBA overseas. 
By 2007, a new paradigm had been established, defined by international stars and 
styles of play, an NBA-sanctioned manner of dress, and the targeting of international 
audiences through in-arena and on-court practices. The 2007 Finals, the first to feature 
LeBron James, whose Cavaliers would lose to the San Antonio Spurs, featured an NBA-
record nine international players on their rosters, including Manu Ginobili of Argentina and 
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Tony Parker of France.86 Parker became the first European-born player to win NBA Finals 
MVP, following a season that saw Dirk Nowitzki of Germany become the first European to 
win regular season MVP.87  
While the league promoted these new global stars, they also took to modifying the in-
arena mise-en-scène. During the 2007 Finals, for instance, fans in San Antonio were dressed 
in color-blocked white shirts to “white out” the arena, reminiscent of a passionate overseas 
soccer match.88 Sports Illustrated took note of the phenomenon by 2013, using the soccer 
descriptor for the “sea of red” at Staples Center. In 2015, John Branch of The New York 
Times took this further, arguing, “with the proximity and visibility of fans surrounding a 
basketball court, NBA arenas…may represent the pinnacle, the near-perfect blend of 
allegiance, marketing and stagecraft.”89 Though the origin of this level of coordination is 
contested – some give credit to college football, others to hockey – its reminiscence to “the 
soccer model” of fandom is not.90 
 
Figure 3.6: Game 1 of the 2007 Finals in San Antonio. The “white out” look, which has become increasingly 
commonplace at American sporting events, manipulates the arena space in a way that better addresses 
international television audiences. 																																																								
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  Richard Giulianotti discusses such fan behaviors in its U.K. soccer context. He 
describes the “social solidarity” of this sort of fandom, and its enhancement of a “collective 
consciousness.” By coordinating clothing or colors, a “display of visual solidarity,” the act 
becomes “one of the few means by which fans scatted across the world may continue to 
signify their deep allegiance to a local team.”91 Douglas Kellner and Hui Zhang expand on 
this in their discussion of global media spectacles. Sports fans, they argue, are “like a 
congregation and their cheers and boos are a form of liturgy.”92 As the NBA is broadcast 
globally, then, this visual solidarity becomes a spectacle through which faraway fans can 
connect. These behaviors work to intensify the perceived equivalence across markets. As 
Mike Chant, NBA senior director of team programming, explains, “If you can create an 
environment in-arena that is exciting, that translates well on TV.”93 This approach allows 
NBA producers and writers to better target international fans by incorporating material in-
arena. 
  Since 2007, this in-arena internationalization has been reflected in changes at the 
level of the uniforms, the “costuming” of the game. For the 2013-14 season, the league began 
to periodically use short-sleeved jerseys. Sal LaRocca, Vice President of Global 
Merchandising, cited the global marketplace as the incentive for the move and that the league 
tries “to stay ahead of the curve.”94 This move was coupled with the decision to place 
corporate sponsor logos onto jerseys, which moved the look of the sport even closer to 
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soccer. While this was no doubt driven by the potential for extra revenue, Adam Silver 
specifically referenced soccer in justifying the change. In 2014, he called the move 
“inevitable” and explained, “increasingly as we see Champion's League and English Premier 
League televised in the U.S., I think it’s going to become more acceptable and more 
commonplace for our fans as well.”95 After the league officially announced the move for the 
2017-18 season, Silver reiterated this point and also noted the possibility of foreign 
companies investing, in the hope of expanding the league’s growth overseas.96 The two-fold 
move of short sleeves and corporate logos, therefore, is directly meant to facilitate a pan-
regional legibility, one that follows the pace and demands of the global marketplace. There is 
an erasure of American signifiers, and in their place, the signifiers of soccer grow more 
prominent.  
This trend is established by 2007, as streaming technology had sufficiently advanced 
to reliably reach a global audience, which was not possible in the early dot-com period of the 
mid-to-late 1990s. Streaming television expanded media markets and offered new direct-to-
consumer opportunities for integrated content owner-distributors. Streaming has further 
encouraged particular production strategies that suit its strengths, as evident in the greater 
efforts to pack sports programming with more international stories. In conjunction, entities 
such as the NBA and ESPN, which had previously used hip-hop to promote their brand of 
commercialism, felt pressure to scale back on that identity to more effectively reach 
conservative America. Internationalism thus “solved” the two-fold “problem” of how to both 
appease racist domestic unease and more effectively program to overseas audiences. 
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From 2001 through 2004, as Victoria E. Johnson highlights, hip-hop played a key role 
in ESPN’s brand identity, often in collaboration with the NBA. Following the Pistons-Pacers 
brawl, however, which was pointed to as “evidence” of hip-hop’s violence and social 
disorder, the NBA (in collaboration with its media partners), capitalized on its ongoing 
internationalization in order to better position itself within a global multiplatform media 
economy. As demonstrated by the NBA’s telecasts and promotional materials, this 
internationalization was often accomplished through in-arena strategies. The NBA’s drive for 
globally efficient programming, then, derived from the increasing alignment of the live event 
and its mediation. 
 
The Internet TV Revolution 
 The NBA reinforces globalization and digitization as an integrated process. 
Following the more widespread importation of international athletes, and their promotion as 
the league’s leading stars, the NBA accelerated its investment in digital distribution, in order 
to more directly reach overseas audiences. In July 2005, USA Today ran a feature that asked, 
“Can the future of TV be seen on the web?” Multiple media institutions, including ABC, 
ESPN, CBS, Fox News, and Major League Baseball, had come to develop more robust 
digital services, both of the ad-supported and subscription-based variety. While MLB’s 
platform had evolved out of its internal Baseball Advanced Media group, the ABC/ESPN 
operation had its roots in the Starwave acquisition, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Sports programming had become “the killer app for streaming to your computer,” according 
to Michael Kelley of PricewaterhouseCoopers, given sport’s volume and its global, out-of-
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market appeal. As the technology continued to improve and become more accessible, an 
“internet TV revolution” seemed increasingly likely.97 
The NBA had fallen slightly behind MLB in terms of its streaming capabilities. Pro 
baseball had been regularly streaming games since 2003, and BAM itself had grown into a 
key intermediary in the digital distribution business, filling the role once occupied by 
Starwave. BAM had been hired to oversee the launch of streaming platforms for NCAA and 
Major League Soccer, whose live-streams would operate through MLB.com.98 In 2005, the 
San Antonio Spurs’ victory over the Detroit Pistons became the first Finals to be live-
streamed through NBA.com, while the league also began to experiment with pre-game 
podcasts and highlight packages for mobile phones. NBA executives framed these 
investments as especially important for international growth. More than half of traffic to 
NBA.com regularly came from outside the U.S., and during the NBA Finals, the highest 
concentration of users came from China. In order to better accommodate those fans, the 
league’s website featured live audio broadcasts in fifteen languages, including Cantonese, 
Mandarin, Tagalog, French, German and Spanish.99 
By January 2006, the NBA had sufficiently readied their streaming video capabilities 
and announced the launch of League Pass Broadband, though it remained an added feature of 
its satellite and digital cable service. For a half-season price of $109, League Pass Broadband 
offered up to forty regular season games a week on NBA.com.100 At the same time, the 
league continued to prepare for an eventual standalone service. “We’re doing a balancing act 
of national rights holders, local rights holders and League Pass rights holders,” explained 																																																								
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Gregg Winik, executive VP and executive producer of NBA Entertainment. “We just want to 
dabble in this for this year and see what we learn.”101 As discussed later, the problem would 
be solved one year later in a reorganization of the NBA’s linear and digital rights, which saw 
Turner take control of the domestic League Pass platform.  
 
 
Figure 3.7: A user screenshot of NBA League Pass Broadband from 2008 (Robert Occhialini, flickr). 
 
A few months later, in April 2006, longtime NBA Entertainment president Adam 
Silver, who had steered the league into the digital media age, was promoted to deputy 
commissioner. He would retain his NBAE duties, combining his responsibilities over 
NBA.com, NBA TV, and the league’s twelve international offices.102 Silver’s appointment 
was tied specifically to his global expertise, as Stern tasked him with expanding the league’s 
presence in Europe and Asia. “The challenge is to continue to bring NBA basketball to 
(international) markets, both in person through preseason games and through television,” 
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Silver said.103 As an overall media strategy, then, the global and digital were deeply 
integrated, as reflected in the programming of NBA.com and NBA TV, as well as the 
appointment of Adam Silver to the number two position in the league. This would only 
become more evident when Silver was announced as David Stern’s replacement as 
commissioner in 2012, officially taking the job in February 2014.104 
 The NBA’s growing international cast had again become a prominent talking point 
for news media during the 2006 Finals, as Dirk Nowitzki led the Dallas Mavericks against 
the Miami Heat, who would go on to win the series. At the same time, one-fifth of all NBA 
players were now foreign-born.105 The internationalization of the NBA justified the further 
expansion of international direct-to-consumer distribution, in order to cater to fans that 
wanted to see their own national stars. In October 2006, while the NBA’s broadband League 
Pass platform went live in the United States, they announced additional plans for a separate 
service to be sold in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, featuring Chinese-language broadcasts 
for about ninety regular season and playoff games.106 These moves were also tied to a 
revamped NBA.com, which now included ten national spotlight pages, in addition to its new 
webcast offerings.107 While the NBA, ultimately, became the third pro sports league to 
launch a streaming video service, behind the BAM-created services for Major League 
Baseball and Major League Soccer, the NBA remained far ahead of other American sports in 
its aggressive international expansion.108 
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 In order to further cultivate its relationship with China, the NBA launched a new 
NBA China subsidiary in September 2007, headed by Microsoft’s former top executive in the 
country, Tim Chen, who was hired as “the point man for navigating governmental issues and 
boosting explosive NBA growth potential in the world's most populated nation.”109 As part of 
its responsibilities, NBA China would be charged with expanding TV rights, sponsorships, 
and digital distribution, and consulting with the Chinese Basketball Association on both 
marketing and infrastructure. By 2006, China had become the largest NBA market outside of 
the U.S., generating $50 million annually of the NBA’s total $4 billion revenue. The NBA 
saw Nike’s growth in the country, from $8 million in 1994 to $100 million by 2002, as an 
achievable goal. Unlike the tactics used by other imported pro sports in China, including the 
Manchester United and Chelsea soccer clubs, the NBA remained in China year-round, 
running clinics, games, and tours. “The NBA has proven they’re part of the furniture, part of 
the landscape now,” explained Chris Renner of Helios Partners, a sports marketing company 
in Beijing.110 The NBA, a successful media conglomerate with still greater global aspirations, 
was continuing to draw on the established localization strategies of larger transnational media 
companies, including its own media partners in Disney and Time Warner. 
The NBA had sought to create a globally inclusive television program. While the 
league’s interests in global media had been initiated by satellite distribution in the 1980s, 
their ambitions were vastly expanded and improved by the simultaneity of internet 
distribution in the 1990s and 2000s. During this era, modifications to the sport and its 
performance served to reflect international styles of play and improve transnational legibility, 
thus more effectively addressing the league’s new global constituency. In Inside Prime Time 																																																								
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(1983), Todd Gitlin describes how, “in network and advertiser parlance, ‘the market’ is still 
personified as a hypothetical anti-Semitic Midwesterner ready to switch channels at the first 
sign of Stein.”111 Since this period from 2002 to 2007, the imagined audience has become an 
altogether more international one, which similarly wishes to see itself reflected. Rather than 
tailor particular programs, however, streaming platforms allow for integrated content owners, 
such as Netflix, Hulu, or HBO, to adjust their content libraries in total. Just as Netflix 
maintains a collection of content that can appeal simultaneously to a number of 
demographics, the NBA platform also features highlights and games that can address any 
particular locality. The drive for full global efficiency is thus accelerated by the advent of 
streaming television and OTT platforms. In a multiplatform media economy, the NBA, its 
partners, and its competitors have increasingly sought and privileged a global audience. 
 
Conclusion: NBA Digital 
  The NBA’s international and digital value contributed to the outcome of the rights 
negotiations with Disney and Turner in late 2006. In October, the league began talks with its 
incumbent partners about contract extensions, as the current deals were set to expire after the 
2007-08 season. Digital rights were the centerpiece of the discussions, as Turner Sports 
looked to expand a New Media division that oversaw the websites for pro golf and 
NASCAR.112 The NBA’s recently launched League Pass broadband platform and the 
ongoing NBA TV digital cable channel were thus attractive potential properties, as the 
current deals did not allow either Turner or ABC/ESPN to stream any NBA content on their 
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own platforms.113 Despite the value in the NBA’s digital offerings, the linear TV ratings had 
declined every single year through the 2006-07 season, from a 2.6 average during the 
league’s first season on ABC (2002-03) down to a 2.0 average.114 TNT had also seen a nine-
percent decline from the previous season and ESPN had not fared much better.115 While the 
partners had hoped for a postseason boost, the numbers never came. The 2007 Finals on 
ABC between the Spurs and Cavaliers dropped 28-percent from the previous year, itself one 
of the lowest rated Finals, to a 6.2 rating.116 John Hollinger of the New York Sun, and later 
analyst for ESPN and VP of basketball operations for the Memphis Grizzlies, credited the 
decline to poor matchups, an over-emphasis on cable, and promotion of stars at the expense 
of better teams.117 
 This attitude, however, did not take into account the increasingly fragmented post-
network media landscape, which valued direct-to-consumer distribution more highly than 
ever before. Major League Baseball’s BAM, for instance, which had continued to expand its 
streaming capabilities for itself and its various clients, had seen its annual revenue grow to 
$400 million.118 Thus in June 2007, despite the NBA’s sagging domestic ratings, the league 
successfully negotiated a new eight-year, $7.4 billion rights deal with Disney and Time 
Warner, a 22-percent annual increase. Both partners gained the ability to simulcast live 
games on their digital platforms, while ESPN also obtained expanded global television 
coverage for ESPN International in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. 
George Bodenheimer, president of ESPN and ABC Sports, considered the agreement a 																																																								
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“prototype for TV sports deals going forward,” given the expanded digital rights and a clause 
that bestowed digital rights to any future OTT platforms from the rights-holder. The digital 
discussions “kept our lawyers busy,” noted David Levy, president of Turner Sports.119 David 
Stern was finally ready to cash in the NBA’s digital rights after he had remained patient into 
the 21st century. By 2007, the “volatile communications technology marketplace” had settled 
sufficiently for Stern and the NBA to sell their “big bundle of carefully protected rights.”120 
The new agreement also allowed for lucrative multiplatform advertising potential, in 
which Disney or Time Warner could offer combined “across-the-board packages” of 
television, internet, and mobile commercial time tied to NBA content.121 Adam Silver, NBA 
deputy commissioner, described this possibility as a significant incentive. “We all agreed that 
these were rights that advertisers were demanding,” he explained, “And it made no sense to 
send them into the marketplace with one hand tied behind their backs.”122 John Kosner, 
former VP of broadcasting at the NBA, had since moved to ESPN to oversee their digital 
media endeavors and thus played a pivotal role in the 2007 negotiations, which had also 
included mobile distribution rights. “All of these things were logical extensions of a 
philosophy to use technology to expand the reach and service of the sport,” he reflected in 
2017. “Mobile streaming was just the latest example… I mean the NBA is doing virtual 
reality now, you’ll see augmented reality…Those will all be viewed as ways to expand the 
reach of the sport, plus create new valuable categories that either the rights bidder will bid for 
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or you can split up.”123 This became especially evident in the NFL’s bifurcation of the 
Thursday Night Football rights between Amazon, Twitch, and Fox.124 
 It was evident, too, in the NBA’s continued restructuring of its digital distribution 
following the initial 2007 agreement with Disney and Time Warner. Turner, hoping to 
expand its digital content holdings to fuel its new platforms, set its sights on NBA League 
Pass and NBA TV. After months of talks, a deal was announced in January 2008, which 
would see the formation of a new entity called NBA Digital. Turner would assume 
responsibility for operating and programming NBA TV, NBA.com, and NBA League Pass, 
though digital advertising would be sold jointly and NBA Entertainment would continue to 
produce content for the properties out of Secaucus. As part of the new deal, the NBA’s 
digital operations would also move from their New Jersey location to Turner’s campus in 
Atlanta. Turner’s David Levy called the venture “a new strategic business model and an 
innovative template for growth.”125 
 The agreement was also a way for the two organizations to become more deeply 
integrated and essential to one another in a tumultuous media environment. Mark Lazarus, 
then president of Turner Entertainment Group, recalls, “The main strategic imperative was to 
just get further intertwined with the NBA, so that when the next set of rights came around, 
we would be in a stronger position to retain rights for television.”126 David Stern, on the 
NBA side of the negotiations, felt similarly. The NBA was not in a position to undertake the 
level of infrastructural investments that Turner had already completed. “So it was a good 
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thing to both have that partnership and lay off those expenses to someone that had the 
expertise that they had,” Stern recalled in February 2018. “It also kept Turner and us melded 
at the hip, in a good way… We always, in some ways, went beyond just a mere television 
deal but were looking for a way to induce our partners to be extra interested in us and what 
we do…”127 Turner obtained a more robust digital portfolio and the NBA gained the 
infrastructural reach and expertise that it required for its global media ambitions. In 
integrating their operations, they became inextricably linked operations, to the degree that 
any future dissolution is extremely unlikely. NBA Digital is “a real deep partnership that’s 
going to be hard for anyone to unwind over time,” notes Mark Lazarus, now Chairman of 
Sports & Broadcasting at NBC, who still works with the NBA tangentially through NBC’s 
regional sports networks.128 
Crucially, the NBA’s transfer of digital infrastructure and operational responsibility 
to Turner enabled the league to focus more fully on their global distribution. Steve Hellmuth, 
executive vice president of media operations and technology, notes that the majority of his 
duties now involve global operations. “That [agreement] has allowed us to focus one-
thousand-percent on international up here at NBA Entertainment,” Hellmuth explains. 
“Every day I spend the vast majority of my time on international, because that’s where our 
revenues are growing very very rapidly, and that’s where our business really needs a lot of 
attention. So we have Turner doing all domestic and doing a great job and then we’re all 
focused on international.”129  
The 2008 deal that launched NBA Digital thus held massive implications for the 
future operation of the league, reminiscent of the NBA’s decision in 1986 to regain control of 																																																								
127 David Stern, in discussion with the author, February 12, 2018. 
128 Mark Lazarus, in discussion with the author, April 18, 2017. 
129 Steve Hellmuth, in discussion with the author, June 28, 2018. 
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their international satellite distribution. In foregoing some domestic oversight, the NBA 
could gain far greater international leverage, where revenues continued to expand without 
concerns of saturation. For the 2009-10 season, the NBA partnered with RayV, a digital 
intermediary service, to program an international-only League Pass service. For the 2010-11 
season, the league revamped the platform in collaboration with NeuLion, the company that 
had recently programmed the NHL’s service.130 Internationally, the NBA could more 
effectively self-distribute, and thus earn greater profits, than in the domestic U.S. market, 
which remained carved up by major players in Fox Sports, ABC/ESPN, and NBC Sports. As 
with the 1986 CBS deal, which had enabled the NBA to focus more extensively on 
international distribution, the 2008 Turner deal allowed the NBA to reach a new level as a 
global media empire in its own right.  
 Exemplified by NBA Digital, a broader revolution in sports streaming had taken hold. 
The more widespread adoption of direct-to-consumer video services allowed the leagues “to 
crawl into crevices that weren't there before,” explained sports economist Andrew Zimbalist 
to the Hollywood Reporter. “They are creating an asset that hadn’t existed in the pre-digital 
days.”131 The Turner-NBA partnership served as a model of this new paradigm, in Turner’s 
assuming control of NBA’s digital offerings and the emerging possibilities of cross-platform 
sponsorship. Other leagues, too, had made similar investments. The NFL’s presentation at the 
2008 TV upfronts, “Anytime, Anywhere, Any Screen,” promoted an integrated advertising 
package across cable, online, mobile, and print media. The NHL’s own streaming platform, 
programmed and operated by BAM’s competitor NeuLion ahead of the 2007-08 season, 
offered title sponsorship for its online-only programming, not unlike linear TV opportunities. 																																																								
130 Jason Dachman, “NeuLion Takes Over NBA League Pass International,” Sports Video Group, October 26, 
2010. 
131 Shahnaz Mahmud, “Whole New Ballgame for Ad Revenue,” The Hollywood Reporter, May 29, 2008.	
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As a result, explained Major League Soccer commissioner Don Garber, sports organizations 
were no longer as dependent “on their relationships with their broadcast partners for revenue 
generation.”132 This reflects a particularly key motive for the increasing shift towards 
streaming distribution, which offered content owners the greatest opportunity for 
centralization and control. 
The industrial history of the NBA thus demonstrates the crucial role of sports in the 
broader distribution revolution, and in doing so, offers greater context for both the incentives 
and consequences of digitization and globalization. In Distribution Revolution: 
Conversations about the Digital Future of Film and Television (2014), Michael Curtin, 
Jennifer Holt, and Kevin Sanson note that “the scramble to manage the digital future of film 
and television has sparked both turmoil and transformation, forcing industry leaders to 
reconsider established maxims about how screen media are created, circulated, and 
consumed.”133 In The Television Will Be Revolutionized (2014), Amanda D. Lotz frames the 
book “as a calling into existence and systematic explanation of the multi-channel transition 
period of the 1980s and 1990s,” which would offer context that “prepares us to be able to talk 
about and theorize a post-network era.”134 This chapter, which chronicles the NBA’s 
extensive investments in cable and broadband distribution during this same era, offers 
additional context and explanation in the hopes of more fully understanding the television 
industry’s “turmoil and transformation.” 
The NBA’s inclusive internationalism, which was both enabled and encouraged by its 
investments in digital and direct-to-consumer distribution, offers an alternative framework 
																																																								
132 Ibid. 
133 Michael Curtin, Jennifer Holt, and Kevin Sanson, Distribution Revolution: Conversations about the Digital 
Future of Film and Television (Oakland: University of California Press: 2014), 1. 
134 Amanda D. Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized, 2nd ed. (New York: NYU Press, 2014), x.	
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that more fully integrates sports into our understanding of the multiplatform economy and its 
transnational media empires. Global and digital television are deeply intertwined: Disney, for 
instance, chose to house the ESPN+ streaming service that launched in 2018 within a shared 
direct-to-consumer and international group, or DTCI, and appointed Russell Wolff as general 
manager of the service, given his extensive global expertise.135 As the NBA’s own digital 
investments have intensified, so have its efforts towards a globally efficient 
“internationalism,” as reflected in the growth of International League Pass and the league’s 
greater investments in foreign basketball leagues and players. In the subsequent and final 
chapter, as streaming distribution steadily gains momentum over cable television, the post-
network media ecosystem fuels the further expansion of the NBA as a global media empire, 
as well as the increasingly global media ambitions of individual teams, leaving behind almost 
all remnants of the NBA as a mere professional basketball league. 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
135 Todd Spangler, “Disney Puts Longtime ESPN Exec Russell Wolff in Charge of ESPN+ Streaming Service,” 
Variety, October 31, 2018. 
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IV. The House that Hoops Built: 
A Global Media Empire for a Post-Network Era, 2014 – 2015 
 
“I think the NBA, the less it becomes about the game, I think at some point the NBA is going 
to have to look at itself in mirror and say, are we about basketball or are we about player 
movement and three screens and Twitter and all this stuff, or do we care about the game – do 
we care about the actual on-court product and people understanding it? …It’s less about the 
game than ever before and it just trends more and more in that direction.” – Zach Lowe, 
ESPN basketball writer, on Bleacher Report’s The Full 48 podcast, January 2019.1 
 
---------------- 
Introduction 
By the 2014-15 season, as the NBA’s global digital strategy has cohered and 
solidified, new opportunities emerge that enable the organization to reach its greatest heights 
as a global media empire. As a multiplatform media paradigm is established by 2007, with 
the launches of Hulu, the iPhone, the Netflix streaming platform, and the NBA’s own 
standalone streaming service, the immediate years see the intensified pursuit of globally 
efficient television programming via the simultaneous global address of over-the-top 
platforms. From 2008 through 2013, the NBA continues its importation of international 
performers, a number that rises from 77 players for the start of the 2008-09 season to 92 for 
2013-14.2 A particularly meaningful moment for the international state of the NBA comes in 
2011, when the German-born Dirk Nowitzki leads the Dallas Mavericks to the franchise’s 
first championship. Following that season, however, the NBA enters into a labor lockout that 
shortens the 2011-12 season from 82 games to 66, an event that is significant to the contours 
of the NBA’s mediatiziation and marketization, as examined later in this chapter. During this 
time, the NBA’s ratings on ABC also steadily recover from the events of Chapter Three, 
rising from a low of 2.0 in 2007 and peaking with a 3.3 during the strike-shortened 2011-12 																																																								
1 Zach Lowe, “Zach Lowe on tanking, Tom Thibodeau, and Trades,” interview with Howard Beck, The Full 48, 
January 10, 2019. 
2 “NBA Players From Around the World: 2008-09 Season,” NBA.com, February 19, 2009; “NBA Tips Off 
2013-14 Season With Record International Player Presence,” NBA.com, October 29, 2013.	
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season.3 The period from 2008 to 2013, then, largely affirms the status quo of the NBA – as 
media content and media conglomerate – that is established at the close of Chapter Three.  
This chapter, which follows the course of the 2014-15 season, illuminates the next 
iteration of the NBA and the global sports media industry. By the updated 2014 edition to 
Amanda D. Lotz’s The Television Will Be Revolutionized, she identifies a post-network era 
that “remains unchanged and unchallenged by the last seven years.”4 The concept of the post-
network “acknowledges the break from a dominant network-era experience,” Lotz explains, 
which extends beyond just viewer choice and nonlinearity, as the industry ultimately moves 
closer towards a media ecosystem “devoid of networks or channels as the distinct industrial 
entities they’ve served as thus far.”5 This chapter examines the new post-network paradigm 
by highlighting the entities that have amassed greater autonomy in a more diffuse global 
paradigm, including sports leagues, sports teams, and streaming intermediary companies, 
such as BAMTech and NeuLion. The NBA, as a media institution whose global ambitions far 
surpass the scope of basketball, is the house that hoops built. 
While revenues from streaming television have continued to lag behind those 
produced by cable television, the gap between them has considerably narrowed since 2007. 
By the close of 2018, ESPN was down nearly 15 million cable and satellite subscribers from 
2011, equating to an estimated $1.44 billion in lost revenue.6 Streaming services, meanwhile, 
have excelled during this period. The combined number of worldwide streaming 
subscriptions, an estimated 613 million, finally jumped the 556 million global subscribers of 
																																																								
3 Paulsen, “ABC’s NBA Season is Lowest Rated Ever on Broadcast TV,” Sports Media Watch, April 14, 2017. 
4 Amanda D. Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized, 2nd ed. (New York: NYU Press, 2014), ix. 
5 Ibid., 28.	
6 Clay Travis, “ESPN Loses Two Million More Subscribers in Fiscal 2018,” Outkick the Coverage, November 
23, 2018. 
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cable television.7 ESPN launched a standalone streaming service, ESPN+, hoping to 
capitalize on the trend and make up for lost revenue.8 Such streaming platforms now offer 
content owners the greatest degree of direct-to-consumer access and economic opportunity. 
As this chapter will demonstrate, the further acceleration of streaming has fueled the further 
marketization of sport, whose institutions have placed an even greater emphasis on 
commercial exchange given streaming’s expanding opportunities for corporate growth.  
The mediatization and marketization of the NBA, in particular, reach a peak during 
the 2014-15 season. It was the first full season to be overseen by new commissioner Adam 
Silver, after David Stern stepped down as the league’s chief executive after thirty years in the 
role. Silver, whose tenure as president of NBA Entertainment had driven the league towards 
global multiplatform distribution in the late 1990s and 2000s, continued the expansionist 
“Manifest Destiny” ambition of Stern by capitalizing on post-network opportunities for 
transnational autonomy. Ahead of the season, the league leveraged its global and digital 
value in renewing its media rights agreements with ABC/ESPN and Turner for a combined 
$24 billion over nine years, at last closing in on the NFL, which had secured $27 billion over 
nine years in its previous 2011 negotiations.9 Simultaneously, the NBA officially opened the 
Replay Center at its Secaucus, New Jersey headquarters, through which all twenty-nine of 
the team’s arenas were connected by fiber-optic cabling, facilitating a seamless shuttling of 
video across the United States and around the world. Though the NBA greatly benefitted 
from the influx of capital from Disney and Time Warner, the Secaucus-based infrastructure 
enabled the league to operate more than ever before as a fully self-sufficient media 																																																								
7 Andrew Liptak, “The MPAA Says Streaming Video Has Surpassed Cable Subscriptions Worldwide,” The 
Verge, March 21, 2019. 
8 Anthony Ha, “ESPN Launches its Streaming Service ESPN+,” TechCrunch, April 12, 2018.	
9 SI Wire, “NBA Announces 9-Year TV Deal with ESPN, Turner Sports,” Sports Illustrated, October 5, 2014; 
Kurt Badenhausen, “The NFL Signs TV Deals Worth $27 Billion,” Forbes, December 14, 2011. 
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institution, in controlling its own distribution pipelines, which it had purchased from Zayo 
Group, a fiber provider.10  
To assist the NBA in its global streaming pursuits, the league partnered with NeuLion 
on its international-only service ahead of the 2010-11 season.11 NeuLion is an example of a 
key player that has emerged in the post-network ecosystem: the streaming intermediary, a 
largely invisible entity that provides technological expertise and manages internet platforms, 
while the branding of the content owner receives top billing. League Pass remains the NBA’s 
in name and in deed, while NeuLion manages its operation, likely receiving some 
combination of fees and subscription percentages as compensation.12 Internationally, and 
with the aid of streaming distribution, the NBA maintains more control than ever over its 
own production and distribution. At the same time, the decision to keep a single intermediary 
service in charge of nearly all non-domestic markets has led to an intensification of the media 
strategies from before 2007, which relied on international signifiers to most efficiently 
address an inclusive global audience. 
The NBA’s international media interests manifest especially in the case of Brazil, 
which has been presented as a major frontier for integrated producer-distributors like the 
NBA and Netflix. While Netflix has installed web servers and technological infrastructure to 
prepare the nation for its own media initiatives, the NBA has similarly purchased a stake in 
the country’s national basketball league and built training centers in order to more effectively 
cultivate both an NBA audience and a pipeline for future athletes (or NBA “cast” members). 																																																								
10 Zayo Group is a company that specializes in ‘dark fiber,’ a business in which unused telecommunications 
fiber can be resold by network providers for private purposes. More on the NBA’s arrangement with Zayo 
Group in Jonathan Vanian, “How the NBA Finals are Beamed Across the Globe without Hiccups,” Fortune, 
June 16, 2015. 
11 Jason Dachman, “NeuLion Takes Over NBA League Pass International,” Sports Video Group, October 26, 
2010. 
12 While the NBA and NeuLion have not revealed the economics of their specific arrangement, a percentage of 
subscription revenue and various enablement fees is typical of intermediary services.	
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The case of Brazil demonstrates the evolution of the NBA’s global distribution to this point 
and illuminates the future of the league as a global media empire. 
The post-network media ecosystem has also enabled individual sports franchises, like 
the Sacramento Kings, to become global companies in their own right. While the Kings’ 
global visibility is assisted by the distribution of its local broadcasts on NeuLion’s League 
Pass, the organization has been among the few that most actively court global fans, alongside 
the Milwaukee Bucks and Golden State Warriors. The Kings’ approach is in keeping with the 
wider entry of Silicon Valley capital into the NBA. Not coincidently, the league’s franchises 
that have most aggressively pursued global audiences and cutting-edge communications 
technologies hold ties to Silicon Valley institutions. In the NBA, the tech sector has found 
lucrative content to power its global initiatives, following ESPN’s own use of the NBA to 
pursue “more affluent and more suburban high-tech early adopters.”13 In Silicon Valley, the 
NBA has a found an ideal partner to accelerate its global distribution plans with the aid of the 
industry’s emergent media technologies.  
The chapter relies on conversations with personnel from the NBA, NeuLion, and the 
Sacramento Kings, as well as visits to the headquarters of all three, in order to examine the 
marketization and mediatization of sport in the post-network era of television. Victoria E. 
Johnson’s proposal that sports organizations have become “fully-fledged media institutions 
of the post-network era” is made especially apparent during the 2014-15 NBA season, which 
allows us to examine the causes and consequences of sports leagues like the NBA, and even 
																																																								
13 Victoria E. Johnson, “Historicizing TV Networking: Broadcasting, Cable, and the case of ESPN,” in Media 
Industries: History, Theory and Method, eds. Jennifer Holt and Alisa Perren (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2009), 61-62. 
	 199 
teams like the Sacramento Kings, as genuine media conglomerates.14 After discussing the 
new streaming media power structure, as enabled by NeuLion and other digital 
intermediaries, this chapter examines the NBA’s entry into Brazil and the league’s affinities 
with Netflix. Finally, I examine the entry of Silicon Valley capital into the NBA and the 
Sacramento Kings’ particular approach to distribution, which points towards the next stage of 
the global relationship between sports, media, and infrastructure. 
 
The Hub and Spokes: Towards a Post-Network Paradigm 
For the 2014-15 basketball season, the NBA opened its “Replay Center” in Secaucus, 
New Jersey. As part of the undertaking, all twenty-nine of its arenas became connected by 
fiber-optic cabling to that central hub. While this assisted the Replay Center in speeding-up 
gameplay reviews following difficult foul calls, the development also streamlined the NBA’s 
media production, distribution, and archival process. During games, the NBA gained faster 
access to game footage that it could edit and post to social media platforms, and following 
games, the complete footage could be tagged and stored more quickly than ever before. The 
league office refers to this structure, based out of its Traffic Ops Center, which monitors the 
video feeds as they enter the building, as the “hub and spoke” model: Secaucus acts as the 
hub of the wheel, the wires act as the spokes that connect it to its franchises, and arenas are 
the tire that makes the entire enterprise spin onward. Far beyond basketball, the NBA 
operates as a robust producer and distributor of media content. 
																																																								
14 Victoria E. Johnson, “Everything New is Old Again: Sport Television, Innovation, and Tradition for a Multi-
Platform Era,” in Beyond Prime Time: Television Programming in the Post-Network Era, ed. Amanda D. Lotz 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 133. 
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Figure 4.1: Inside the NBA’s Replay Center in Secaucus, New Jersey (Source: NBA). 
 
 
The NBA’s modern digital infrastructure involves multiple moving parts along the 
hub and spokes. National telecasts may travel outside to a production truck, where they are 
edited for an international package and then sent to one of the NBA’s two colocation centers, 
or ‘colos,’ in Newark, New Jersey and Turner’s “Techwood” campus in Atlanta, Georgia. 
Regardless, all feeds travel from the arenas to Secaucus via the high-speed arena network, or 
H-San, a ten-gigabyte network that allows the league to shuttle thirteen feeds of HD quality 
video at 200 megabytes per second. Each arena provides thirteen different camera angles, 
which arrive in the basement of the NBA headquarters and are subsequently encoded for 
distribution. These feeds can be sent within the building to the Replay Center for review, or 
externally to the colos, where they can be redistributed to international partners. This 
structure has streamlined access for global distributors, while limiting the amount of data that 
the NBA must house in Secaucus. 
This infrastructure would facilitate the launch of the NBA Content Network, a global 
business-to-business video-on-demand service for the NBA’s media partners, ahead of the 
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2016 season.15 Through the network, personnel from Turner, ESPN, MDeportes (Spain), 
Viasat Sport (Russia), CCTV (China), or even the NBA’s own franchises can sign into the 
system and request clips for broadcast or for the in-arena video board. Once the order is 
received and approved, the file is pulled from their StorageTek tape library, which features 
robotic arms that find and grab the required video and send it onward to its destination. Each 
tape features 4.5 terabytes of data, or about forty full games, of which hundreds line the walls 
of the silos. In all, there are about 25 petabytes of data in the NBA’s Video Library, which 
equates to approximately 25 million gigabytes. The library continues to grow with each 
season and about 25-percent of the league’s oldest filmed footage have not yet been 
digitized. The NBA’s content storage is a key component of its success as a self-distributor 
of media in the post-network era. 
 
Figure 4.2: The NBA’s Content Network enables media partners to download content for their broadcasts an 
on-demand basis (Source: NBA). 																																																								
15 Jason Dachman, “NBA Streamlines B2B Content Delivery With Cloud-Based NBA Content Network,” 
Sports Video Group, January 20, 2017. 
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 In its duties as a media producer, moreover, the feeds from the H-San are also sent 
upstairs to the Game Distribution Center (or GDC), where NBA editors can look for 
highlights and package them together with multiple angles. This ‘multi-view’ content, which 
could include footage of Stephen Curry making impossible baskets from the tunnel, can be 
posted to Twitter, Instagram, and other social media platforms. It is also saved into a ‘bucket’ 
for later, so that it can be packaged with other highlights to fill commercial gaps in the 
NBA’s streaming platforms. For the international League Pass, the NBA quickly realized that 
fans in Germany, for instance, had no need for local commercials in Salt Lake City. 
Following the 2014-15 season, rather than continue to post generic slates that read simply  
“the game is in break,” the NBA began producing compilation videos such as “Top 10 
LeBron James Dunks” or “Top 10 plays of November.” These are completed in the GDC and 
then sent to NeuLion, the company that manages the league’s international streaming 
platform.  
While the NBA oversees much of the back-end infrastructure of its game distribution, 
it has left the front-end of streaming platforms to these “intermediary” firms. Turner, through 
its oversight of NBA Digital, has managed the NBA’s domestic streaming platform since 
2008. NeuLion oversees International League Pass, which includes all other countries but 
fourteen. In China, League Pass is overseen by Tencent, which launched its version of the 
service in 2016.16 When most content owners seek to put their content online, they turn to 
these streaming intermediaries to program and manage their branded streaming platforms. 
HBO and ESPN, for example, lacking the appropriate infrastructures for their HBO Now and 
WatchESPN ventures, both turned to the same company: the Major League Baseball-owned 																																																								
16 Malika Andrews, “NBA Fans in China Now Have Access to View Games on NBA League Pass,” Sports 
Illustrated, October 14, 2016. 
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BAMTech, the entity originally known as Baseball Advanced Media, which had previously 
launched the streaming platforms for Major League Soccer and the NCAA. In August 2016, 
BAMTech made headlines when Disney finally had enough of leasing the firm’s services for 
its ESPN platform and purchased 33 percent of the company for $1 billion. One year later, in 
August 2017, Disney bought another 42 percent for $1.58 billion, valuing the company at 
$3.75 billion.17 In the contemporary streaming media economy, the streaming intermediary 
has become immensely valuable. 
Amanda D. Lotz describes how “internet distribution requires an entity to organize 
and deliver programming,” using the term “portal” for the “crucial intermediary services that 
collect, curate, and distribute television programming via internet distribution,” such as 
Netflix, Hulu, HBO Now, and CBS All Access.18 These intermediaries, though, require 
additional intermediaries to program and manage this collection, curation, and distribution. 
Such companies are “transparent,” as Joshua Braun describes them, in that they minimize 
their own branding in service of their client. Though the HBO name is on the marquee of the 
HBO Now platform, for instance, BAMtech designed and operated it. Braun, in examining 
the “infrastructures that underlie” streaming video, notes that these intermediaries 
“increasingly enable, but also structure, the distribution of video online” and that they 
ultimately “stand to become just as essential to the media ecosystem as cable providers and 
broadcast affiliates before them.”19 This has become increasingly clear in the post-network 
																																																								
17 Sarah Perez, “BAMTech Valued at $3.75 Billion Following Disney Deal,” TechCrunch, August 8, 2017. 
18 Amanda D. Lotz, Portals: A Treatise on Internet-Distributed Television (Ann Arbor, MI: Maize Books, 
2017), 8. 
19 Joshua Braun, “Transparent Intermediaries: Building the Infrastructures of Connected Viewing,” in 
Connected Viewing: Selling Streaming, and Sharing Media in the Digital Era, eds. Holt and Sanson (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2014), 125, 138. 
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era. If a content owner wants its content streaming around the world, it needs an intermediary 
to do that work. 
Transparent intermediaries thus hold a fundamental position within the infrastructure 
of streaming video, enabling and delimiting the possibilities of how audiences view and 
engage with content. In doing so, these firms complicate how we conceive of content 
ownership and media flows, which now involve the contributions of additional parties in the 
process of production and distribution. Lotz explains that the growing strategy “in which the 
content rights holder distributes directly to the consumer…provides a far more efficient 
economic model.”20 This is evident in the launches of NBA League Pass, HBO Now, CBS 
All Access, and ESPN+. Yet these portals require the work of specialists to operate them – to 
design and program their interface, encode the video, track and analyze audience behavior, 
set geo-restrictions, and oversee any problems with the finished front-end video. Sports 
programming, specifically, also requires the editing of highlight packages and condensed 
versions of games. 
Over the last twenty years, since intermediary companies such as Starwave and 
AudioNet influenced the early development of global internet-distributed media, sport has 
remained their most reliable and most lucrative client. Sport has been uniquely positioned to 
succeed within a media environment that has great need of live and spontaneous content. 
Victoria E. Johnson notes how, especially following the 2007-08 Writers’ Guild strike, sports 
programming offered networks “a TiVo-proof, labor dispute-proof, and recession-proof, 
historically stable, ritually available package (characterized by sport's seasonal and calendar 
regularity).”21 In addition, sport can be relatively easily repackaged with local commentary 																																																								
20 Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized, 153. 
21 Johnson, “Everything New is Old Again,” 114. 
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crews and local advertising, without modifying or adapting the content to the extent that one 
would a typical TV format.22  
Geography, moreover, is central to sports. This is both in an additive sense, whereby 
distributors must package content for a specific market, as well as a subtractive sense, in 
which regional blackouts prevent the airing of particular games in particular locations. A 
Knicks game, for instance, cannot be streamed in the New York market and nationally 
televised games (on TNT or ESPN) will not appear on League Pass if that channel is 
available in the area. In the era of internet-distributed television, this process is conducted by 
streaming intermediaries such as NeuLion, who will set those restrictions in the game’s 
administrative tools once it is posted in their schedule. In a multiplatform post-network era, 
geolocation has grown into a central component of an intermediary’s value, as firms 
emphasize their proprietary geolocation tools in pitches to prospective clients beyond sport. 
Joshua Braun differentiates between operations of geofencing, which allows clients like Hulu 
and Netflix to “easily restrict access to their content to audiences in the regions they specify” 
and of geotargeting, which can “provide different versions of their content catalogues and 
interfaces to users in different markets.”23  Sport has afforded these companies a level of 
experimentation and experience that has subsequently been put into use for other media 
owners, such as HBO or Univision. 
																																																								
22 Michael Keane, Anthony Y.H. Fung and Albert Moran, New Television, Globalization, and the East Asian 
Cultural Imagination (Aberdeen and Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), 74. 
23 Braun, “Transparent Intermediaries,” 126. 
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Figure 4.3: Inside NeuLion’s operations center in Plainview, New York (Heather Walsh, Newsday). 
 
Sports services have also widely adopted a single uniform, inclusive “international” 
platform, which is then differentiated for each market by language. This is more easily 
accomplished for sports programming, which can flexibly substitute a local announcer team 
and local commercial breaks, than for platforms like Netflix or HBO. By placing a single 
intermediary in charge of nearly all non-U.S. markets, moreover, this arrangement offers 
more oversight for the content owner and reduces the number of parties between the content 
provider and its central platform-managing intermediary. This paradigm is cost effective, 
then, if not particularly easy to manage. For that reason, NeuLion’s process of localization is 
aided by satellite offices in many of the regions it oversees. NeuLion’s office in China, for 
example, works with local clients and will relay the proper Chinese commercials to play 
during ad-breaks. In spite of these local markers, NBA’s international League Pass remains 
an inclusive, globally efficient platform – there is a single shared platform for nearly all fans 
outside of the U.S.24 With an international League Pass subscription, Spanish viewers can 
																																																								
24 Fourteen countries are excluded from NeuLion’s platform, including China, which uses a League Platform 
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watch from the French feed or Portuguese fans can watch the Korean feed. This feature, 
however, is removed from the Turner-operated domestic platform. 
Though the managers of international platforms aspire to genuine transnationality, 
allowing for engagement with various feeds across borders, platforms are still built on 
reinforcing borders through geolocation. Ramon Lobato articulates geoblocking as indicative 
of the contemporary global media ecosystem. In providing “an automated mechanism to 
enforce territorial licensing arrangements with rights-holders,” geoblocking “is a form of 
access control enacted at the level of content and platform regulation.”25 Though 
international streaming platforms, like NBA League Pass and NFL Game Pass, are intended 
to be as uniform as possible across borders and market their own internationality, they 
remain dependent on the reinforcement of location-awareness and differentiation. The value 
of these international passes and the intermediaries that build them is in tracking viewer 
behaviors, tagged by location, in order to price their services more aggressively or to 
leverage the data to advertisers. The most measurable remains, as ever, the most marketable. 
In The Informal Media Economy (2015), Ramon Lobato and Julian Thomas describe the 
incentive for market segmentation, which “enables media producers to price their goods 
according to local income levels, to control sequencing and to extract the greatest return from 
each market.”26 Companies like NeuLion make this possible in programming, designing, and 
managing the platforms and their measurement tools; the differentiation is built into the 
system. 
																																																								
25 Ramon Lobato, “Introduction: The New Video Geography,” in Geoblocking and Global Video Cultures, eds. 
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26 Ramon Lobato and Julian Thomas, The Informal Media Economy (Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity 
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While at the level of platform management, geotargeting allows for the closing (and 
also opening) of borders, there is a simultaneous valuation and reinforcement of content that 
will most efficiently flow through those borders. Transnational streaming providers such as 
Netflix and HBO have sought to acquire “local content that appeals to international 
audiences.”27 The NBA, similarly, benefits from high-profile international players that can be 
highlighted in replays. At the level of the regional sports networks, whose broadcasts are 
circulated through the international streaming platforms, there have also greater efforts to 
address international fans. The Milwaukee Bucks, for example, have worked to more 
extensively feature Greek star Giannis Antetokounmpo, which included airing a package 
produced by their Greek television partner that congratulated Antetokounmpo for making his 
first All-Star team in 2017.28 This goes hand-in-hand with the efforts of the intermediary, 
which has designed a platform that addresses any and all international fans simultaneously.  
 
Figure 4.4: Greek basketball fans congratulate Giannis Antetokounmpo on making his first All-Star team, in a 
video that circulated across Greek linear television, the Bucks’ in-arena video board, NBA League Pass, and the 
Bucks’ Facebook page.29 
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Ramon Lobato has highlighted that Netflix is significant for its ability to “effortlessly 
combine the local and the global within the one platform and constitute itself as many 
different products simultaneously.”30 For sports, this is possible within the same program. By 
the Bucks’ airing the package in-arena, it was broadcast worldwide through the NBA’s 
streaming platform. The NBA uses the international presence of NeuLion’s platform to 
feature players and marketing that will simultaneously address the most possible fans in the 
most possible countries. As streaming increasingly comes to dominate TV distribution and 
U.S.-based conglomerates seek international audiences over streaming platforms, there is a 
subsequent intensification of efforts to de-Americanize content for global distribution. The 
result is content that is international and inclusive, yet culturally vague. 
Transnational flows, evidently, are not simply one-way or even straightforward in 
their directionality. The intermediary, moreover, demonstrates that no longer do these flows 
derive from a simple producer-distributor agreement, but a more complex arrangement in 
which these firms can significantly set the terms by which global audiences engage with 
media content online. A globally efficient product, created by the intermediary and the 
content owner in conjunction, encourages media producers to produce more transnationally 
appealing content. In the realm of global internet distribution, then, these intermediary firms 
function as collaborative rights holders, just as Turner or Fox Sports might provide for 
domestic linear television, while conceding greater control to the content owners. With 
NeuLion, the NBA obtains the most effective infrastructure to reach global consumers while 
maintaining control over production. With the NBA and other clients, NeuLion obtains the 
programming to fill its propriety platform, while receiving compensation through some 																																																								
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combination of platform fees, device enablement fees, per-subscriber percentages, and 
revenue sharing.  
Thus in trying to make sense of global media flows in the post-network era, streaming 
intermediaries offer scholars a perspective that is simultaneously industrial, cultural, and 
infrastructural. These firms oversee robust infrastructures of satellite and cabling that shuttle 
video around the world, while also editing together content that circulates through their 
platforms and making sure that the final front-end feed is properly calibrated to each region. 
At the same time, streaming intermediaries operate as partners to major media companies and 
conglomerates, who entrust them with their content, sometimes to such an extent that the 
client is ultimately compelled to purchase the intermediary outright. As television continues 
to globalize and digitize, it is not a matter of if or when the intermediaries become as 
essential to the media ecosystem as cable operators and broadcast affiliates before them; that 
time is here. 
Streaming intermediaries have become highly in-demand for any conglomerate with 
greater aspirations of vertical integration, including the NBA as one such institution. 
As intermediary firms become more expensive to outsource, companies with enough capital 
to buy a preexisting one or build their own have sought to do so. NBC, for instance, launched 
Playmaker Media in May 2016 to service its own sports streaming operations, as well as 
clients from outside Comcast-NBCUniversal. Turner Broadcasting System similarly acquired 
a majority stake in iStreamPlanet to bolster its streaming capabilities after its contract with 
MLB Advanced Media expired following the 2016 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament.31 
In March 2018, Endeavor, the parent company of Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) 																																																								
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and Professional Bull Riders, both clients of NeuLion, purchased the company for $250 
million. By taking control of NeuLion, Endeavor can bring the streaming operations of UFC 
in-house and offer direct-to-consumer services, while continuing to provide services to the 
NBA, NFL, and other NeuLion clients.32 Even Amazon, whose prestigious Web Services 
division has been hired to provide cloud services for clients as diverse as Netflix and the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency, found it necessary to purchase the Portland-based streaming 
intermediary Elemental Technologies for $500 million in September 2015.33 The absorption 
of Elemental into AWS has allowed Amazon to better compete with BAMTech, NeuLion, 
and iStreamPlanet in the business of streaming video encoding and transcoding. Disney’s 
majority ownership of BAMTech, meanwhile, allows them to bring their streaming 
infrastructure in-house and avoid any further reliance on AWS for streaming needs. 
 The NBA’s particular system, of a “hub and spokes” that stretches around the world, 
thus illuminates a post-network paradigm of media ownership beyond sport. As streaming 
has begun to overtake the dominance of cable, intermediary firms like NeuLion occupy an 
increasingly central position within major media conglomerates, offering a profound linkage 
between sport and the wider media industry. The simultaneous global address of an 
international streaming platform has also encouraged particular strategies of content 
production, as is evident in the example of the Milwaukee Bucks and later in the example of 
the Sacramento Kings. In the case of Brazil that follows, the NBA exhibits further affinities 
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between itself and Netflix, and in doing so, reinforces the deepening status of sports leagues 
as media conglomerates and sport itself as a “leading multi-platform content application.”34 
 
Basketball without Borders: Brazil as Global Media Frontier 
In December 2014, following the launch of the Replay Center and establishment of 
the NBA’s new in-house distribution network, a partnership was announced between the 
NBA and Brazil’s Liga Nacional de Basquete (LNB). While the NBA has long made deals in 
foreign markets, the deal with LNB is something new; it is not simply the NBA spreading its 
product to as large a consumer base as possible. Instead, the two leagues will work together, 
collaborating on “innovative marketing” and “enhanced game presentation” to increase fan 
engagement and improve business and player development.35 The NBA receives an equity 
stake in LNB and will lend its money, personnel, and business acumen to facilitate the 
league’s growth, while LNB will provide the NBA with stronger ties to the International 
Basketball Federation (FIBA) and the still-expanding global basketball market. The deal 
continues “the NBA’s quest for global sporting dominance and potential interest in 
eventually unifying the sport at the highest level under one set of rules.”36 
  Brazil is especially meaningful because of its history as a major market for soccer. 
More recently, though, soccer’s market power has been declining. In the 2018 World Cup, 
Brazil was eliminated in the quarterfinals, for the third time in the last four tournaments, by 
Belgium.37 As Ewan MacKenna of The New York Times explains, “Brazil’s national team is 
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in many ways a shadow of its famous past,” which has not sat well with a fan base that favors 
winning. The dearth of talent, he goes on to argue, is caused by infrastructural troubles. With 
the last three presidents of the CBF brought up on corruption charges, there is no strong 
managerial voice to direct the future of the sport. Talent has suffered, star players look to 
leagues overseas, and in the end, the whole sport loses its luster.38 At the same time that 
soccer faces infrastructural weakness, the NBA has stepped in to bolster Brazil’s basketball 
infrastructure, growing the sport’s cultural distinction and reshaping the game in its own 
image. Brazil has become the South American headquarters for the league’s Junior NBA 
program. Working with the local government’s sports secretary, Marco Antonio Cabral, the 
NBA announced plans to build a multi-sport complex in the Rocinha area of Rio de Janeiro, 
the country’s largest favela. The complex will offer youth programs to teach “the 
fundamentals of the sport while instilling core values” such as “teamwork, respect and 
sportsmanship.”39  
  The NBA’s youth programs can be described as a pyramid. At the bottom, Junior 
NBA features 18 million participants in 53 countries under the age of fourteen. The NBA 
works with local basketball federations to train both players and coaches, working “hand-in-
hand to provide opportunities for youth to participate and learn the game and have fun...”40 
As children advance, they work their way into the NBA’s more elite development programs, 
which includes the “Basketball Without Borders” summer camp and the NBA Academies, of 
which there are now three, in China, India, and Australia. In February 2015, the NBA also 
launched a special Basketball Without Borders Global Camp during All-Star Weekend, 
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featuring the consensus best players from the four camps that occurred during the previous 
summer. “We’re identifying at a young age the top prospects in the word,” explains Troy 
Justice, senior director of international basketball operations at the NBA. “All the NBA 
personnel, scouts, GMs, they’re all there in the gym watching these kids, getting a chance to 
scout them.”41 By any measure, then, the Global Camp and its broader international 
development pipeline have been an unqualified success for the NBA, cultivating a number of 
players that have kept the league’s global engine running. 
  Such developments, combined with soccer’s decline and the NBA’s input into 
Brazil’s own national league, LNB, have created a massive future there for the NBA. But it 
also leads to uncomfortable questions. On the one hand, the Brazilian endeavor provides 
“social benefits” for “a community as complicated and delicate as Rocinha.”42 On the other, 
the NBA cannot be considered a solely altruistic organization for the public good, as it also 
remains a for-profit media conglomerate. The relationship with Brazil’s government allows 
the NBA direct access to the school system to instruct children and inculcate them as 
consumers of an NBA-specific brand of basketball. The same was true in China, where the 
NBA agreed to a deal with the Ministry of Education to build a “fitness and basketball 
development curriculum in elementary, middle and high schools,” which aimed to “provide 
enhanced basketball training to at least 3 million students by 2017.”43 One cannot discredit 
the genuine social good that the NBA has provided in these places, both currently and 
historically. Terry Lyons, former VP of international communications, recalls a visit to China 
in the late 1990s, during which the league worked with the U.S. state department to provide 
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computers to a makeshift school for the children of migrant workers.44 The NBA has used its 
reach and power for true charity. At the same time, the NBA benefits from these agreements 
by more effectively cultivating future fans and future athletes, in order to maintain the 
league’s global footprint. The commercial incentives cannot be disregarded. 
 
Figure 4.5: At a Jr. NBA event in Vietnam, participants wear jerseys with NBA logos and hold signs promoting 
the League Pass streaming platform (Source: NBA). 
 
 These questions are also not unique to the NBA, which reflects a broader investment 
in the Brazilian market by foreign media interests. When Netflix, for instance, found that 
Brazil’s poor internet coverage was making its widespread adoption impossible, they began 
to install web servers around the country free-of-charge, and provided even more to local 
telecommunications firms, in order to create a high-speed broadband infrastructure that 
would allow the platform to succeed into the future.45 Like Netflix, the NBA has improved 
Brazil’s basketball infrastructure, ostensibly for “free,” in order to benefit later. In this 
regard, Brazil is only the latest in a long line of examples in which Western media interests 
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have sought to cultivate what were perceived to be lucrative and unsaturated markets. In the 
1980s, the NBA offered China and the Soviet Union free telecasts in order to grow its own 
brand. Ted Turner assisted in the USSR, in particular, as he had already established a 
presence there for TBS.  
Turner continued to expand the presence of his properties in Russia into the 1990s, 
where he proceeded to wire the country for high-speed internet. Ailene Voisin, sent by the 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution to cover the 1994 Goodwill Games in St. Petersburg, recalls the 
juxtaposition of a struggling country, in which people were forced to sell toilet paper on the 
street, having among the most developed internet infrastructures in the world. “Laptops were 
always sketchy around different cities and countries,” she remembers, but “we connected 
from St. Petersburg, it was a piece of cake. And that was all because Turner was broadcasting 
the games and needed to have state-of-the-art equipment over there.”46 Over twenty years 
later, Turner’s strategy is evident in both Netflix’s and the NBA’s investments in Brazil: 
short-term financial sacrifice for long-term growth. When PricewaterhouseCoopers published 
their 2018-2022 outlook on global media, these actions illustrate why they considered the 
NBA to be every bit as powerful a global competitor as Netflix.47 
  Thomas Lamarre, in his essay on media geographies, works through Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assertion that distribution is not a neutral process but a productive one. 
Distribution produces “a complex set of social functions” that are “meaningful and valuable 
in themselves.” He cites the television format, specifically, as a distributive process that 
“discovers compatibility, convertibility, or equivalency between national culture,” and seeks 
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to transform the local into the regional.48 This process, evidently, is not neutral. Formats are 
imbued with a drive to create regional efficiencies, often in the image of the place of origin. 
The NBA’s distribution, which has similarly relied on the logic of the format to adopt and 
develop an inclusive global address, is also not neutral. It is imbued with a globalizing drive, 
attempting to convert local basketball cultures into an American game. By using a flexible 
and adaptable format, and by positioning the original American game as increasingly 
international, the National Basketball Association seeks a global distributive efficiency. This 
has been further enabled by the NBA’s particular distribution infrastructure, including 
NeuLion’s League Pass, which allows the league to “finish” its own format, rather than 
leaving it open for other parties to control.49 The NBA has near-total management of its own 
image. As seen in the case of Brazil, moreover, the league often relies on local political 
infrastructure to expedite the image-building process, becoming more fully imbricated in the 
fabric of local life.  
  The NBA’s success in Brazil, beginning in 2014, has since encouraged the league to 
push the strategy established with LNB even further. In February 2019, the NBA announced 
that it would launch its own twelve-team pan-African basketball league, in partnership with 
FIBA and former U.S. president Barack Obama, who will have an unidentified but “hands-
on” role in the new league. “Combined with our other programs on the continent,” 
announced NBA commissioner Adam Silver in a statement, “we are committed to using 
basketball as an economic engine to create new opportunities in sports, media and technology 
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across Africa.”50 While the NBA remains a sports league in name, it is perhaps more 
importantly a media empire with worldwide cultural and political influence. 
 
High Upside: Silicon Valley and the NBA 
At the close of the 2014-15 season, the Golden State Warriors won their first 
championship since 1975 over the Cleveland Cavaliers, in what many considered to be a 
victory for Silicon Valley business principles. One year later, the New York Times ran an in-
depth feature titled “What Happened When Venture Capitalists Took Over the Golden State 
Warriors.” Only a few weeks afterwards, The Wall Street Journal similarly declared “The 
Golden State Warriors Have Revolutionized Basketball,” as the team remained on pace to 
win 73 games, breaking the seemingly unbeatable record of 72 wins set by the Michael 
Jordan-era Chicago Bulls in 1996.51 “[Majority owner Joe] Lacob was not the first venture 
capitalist to buy a franchise,” Bruce Schoenfeld writes in The New York Times, “but he is the 
first to operate one according to what might be called Silicon Valley precepts: nimble 
management, open communication, integrating the wisdom of outside advisers and 
continuous re-evaluation of what companies do and how they do it.”52 The Warriors’ 2015 
title symbolizes the deepening marriage between the NBA and Silicon Valley as two 
institutions with aligned media ambitions.53 
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As the ongoing digitization of the American sports industry helped to facilitate its 
deepening globalization, the lucrative possibilities of direct-to-consumer distribution also 
caught the attention of Silicon Valley capital. By “Silicon Valley,” I include the Bay Area 
CEOs, venture capital firms, and hedge fund managers, as well as their shared interests. This 
includes the web of relations and decision-making that favors a particular economic and 
cultural status quo. Thus I would also include the investors, perhaps not located directly in 
the San Francisco Bay Area, who have an interest (financial or otherwise) in what happens to 
Silicon Valley businesses. As an increasing number of venture capitalists from the Valley 
have bought their way into the NBA, the league has come to import (and invest in) an even 
greater number of ‘cutting-edge’ technologies, including virtual reality and video streaming 
platforms, which have further accelerated the NBA’s expansion into overseas markets.  
The NBA, following its domestic turbulence circa the late 2000s, presented intriguing 
possibilities as a buy-low industry with global value. By August 2014, former Microsoft 
CEO Steve Ballmer purchased the Los Angeles Clippers franchise for an NBA record $2 
billion, far above the Forbes valuation at $575 million the previous January. He told ESPN’s 
Ramona Shelbourne, “It’s not a cheap price, but when you’re used to looking at tech 
companies with huge risk, no earnings and huge multiples, this doesn’t look like the craziest 
thing I’ve ever acquired… There’s much less risk. There’s real earnings in this business. 
There’s real upside opportunity.”54 Steve Ballmer was just the latest from the tech industry to 
see the business upside of the NBA—nearly half of all NBA teams now have majority 
owners with backgrounds in tech or investment management. These include Vivek Ranadive 
of the Sacramento Kings, Dan Gilbert of the Cleveland Cavaliers, Robert Pera of the 																																																								
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Memphis Grizzlies, and Joe Lacob of the Golden State Warriors.55  
The relationship between the tech industry and the NBA at the ownership level is not 
an altogether new phenomenon. Ted Turner’s purchase of the Atlanta Hawks in 1976 offered 
Turner content for his expanding “superstation” ambitions at WTCG, while offering the 
NBA an inside track on national television distribution. When Paul Allen bought the Portland 
Trail Blazers in 1988, Allen’s connections to Microsoft and later Starwave aided the NBA’s 
digital ambitions. Mark Cuban, who had built his career on internet-distributed sports radio, 
purchased the Dallas Mavericks in 2000 for its synergistic possibilities, not unlike a digital-
era Ted Turner. In turn, the NBA relied on Cuban’s streaming expertise when it live-
streamed its first game in 2001 and when it finally launched its own broadband platform in 
2006.56 
Yet it was in the aftermath of the NBA’s moment of “crisis” following the Pistons-
Pacers Brawl in late 2004, and the subsequent decline in TV ratings and merchandise sales, 
that the VCs of Silicon Valley were able to buy into the league en masse. The team owners’ 
assertions of declining revenues grew into contentious negotiations for a new collective 
bargaining agreement in the summer of 2011. David Stern declared that twenty-two of the 
league’s thirty teams were losing money, while the NBA itself was expected to lose $300 
million, after losing another $300 million the year before. The owners asked that the current 
revenue split, wherein players made 57 percent of the gross team revenue, be dropped to as 
low as 40 percent.57 These claims, however, conveniently ignored the NBA’s looming TV 
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extension with ABC/ESPN and TNT, which was to total $24 billion over nine years, an 
increase of $17 billion over the previous deal signed in 2007.58 
In the end, after a league labor lockout and nearly two months of the season lost, the 
owners won – the revenue split was lowered to 51-49 in their favor.59 This led to a massive 
scramble to buy any available franchise, largely by newly swayed venture capitalists. In 
2011, before the lockout, Michael Jordon had purchased a controlling stake in the Charlotte 
Bobcats for less than $200 million and the Philadelphia 76ers sold for only $280 million. 
Following the new CBA, the Memphis Grizzlies, in a much smaller market than 
Philadelphia, sold to Robert Pera for $377 million. Soon after, in May 2013, Vivek Ranadive 
purchased the Sacramento Kings for a then-record $534 million, before being trumped by the 
sale of the Milwaukee Bucks for $550 million to hedge fund managers Wesley Edens and 
Marc Lasry.60 
Valuations continued to skyrocket: in January 2014, Forbes valued the New York 
Knicks as the top team at $1.4 billion, followed closely by the Los Angeles Lakers at $1.35 
billion, with the average NBA franchise valued at $635 million.61 By 2016, following the 
latest TV contract, Forbes’s valuation of the New York Knicks more than doubled to $3 
billion, followed once again by the Los Angeles Lakers at $2.7 billion. The average NBA 
franchise was now estimated to be worth $1.25 billion.62 The NBA is a booming multi-
billion-dollar business. Per Steve Ballmer’s earlier assertion, an NBA franchise remains a 
low risk, high upside investment. Some investors saw this upside earlier on, when the NBA 																																																								
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was struggling in the early 2010s – Joe Lacob, for instance, bought the Golden State 
Warriors in 2010. Others, like Steve Ballmer and Robert Pera, entered the league later and at 
a much higher price. 
As the NBA has continued to expand globally, these are prices that prospective 
owners are more than happy to pay. In joining up with the National Basketball Association, 
Silicon Valley has found the ideal platform for global dissemination of its various 
technologies. Aside from the corporate sponsorships – Nike, Adidas, Under Armour – that 
get passed along in the visual information of the broadcast, we have also witnessed the 
display and deployment of specifically Silicon Valley products in heretofore unseen ways. In 
addition to the Sacramento Kings’ investment in, and use of, virtual reality platform VOKE, 
the Kings conducted a start-up pitch competition with a $10,000 grand prize and a $5,000 
investment by team owner Vivek Ranadive in all four finalists.63 Additionally, Steve 
Ballmer’s purchase of the Clippers became an outlet to deploy his Microsoft products. In an 
interview with Reuters after taking over the team, Ballmer expressed his displeasure that the 
personnel had been using Apple iPads at practice and made plans to switch them all over to 
Microsoft Surfaces.64 The interests of Silicon Valley executives and financiers are thus able 
to ‘piggy-back’ off of the NBA’s global broadcasts, benefitting from both direct investment 
in the NBA and from a now-expanded consumer base. The Warriors’ 2015 championship, 
and the glowing profiles that followed, represents the triumph of these interests. 
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Figure 4.6: Zoom signed a three-year deal with the Golden State Warriors in 2016, giving the team access to its 
video conferencing services in exchange for in-arena branding opportunities.65 
 
 
The NBA, of course, has its own capitalist intentions. In Playing for Keeps, John 
Goldlust addresses the relationship between sports and broadcast media: “The significance of 
a television contract for the potential profitability of sport as an entrepreneurial exercise has 
encouraged the growth of certain sports, and moved the ownership and administrative 
organizations further into the realm of big business operations.”66 This is certainly true of the 
NBA, which landed back-to-back multi-billion dollar television contracts. The NBA itself 
now functions as a clear corporation with multiple divisions and satellite offices – NBA 
Communications, NBA Global Strategy, NBA Basketball Operations, NBA Legal. As sports 
leagues shift into big business operations, Goldlust continues, they “become a profitable 
avenue for speculation and investment entered into primarily as an entrepreneurial and 
marketing venture in which the sport event itself is the saleable product, sportsmen and 
sportswomen highly paid laborers, and sports spectators paying customers.”67 The NBA, with 																																																								
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basketball as its saleable product, has enabled extensive entrepreneurial investment. 
This is how the relationship between the National Basketball Association and Silicon 
Valley functions – Silicon Valley offers capital and technological know-how and the NBA 
offers paying customers and a global distribution system. The NBA benefits from this influx 
of capital and the potential to expand their distribution range, while Silicon Valley benefits 
from greater access to a global sports-watching public. The relationship has only deepened. 
In July 2016, the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), the players’ labor union, 
announced a yearly Technology Summit in San Francisco to be led by Warriors forward 
Andre Iguodala. The Summit is intended to offer “networking opportunities with senior 
executives and influencers” and “workshops designed to identify opportunities for players to 
pursue both during and after their NBA careers.”68  Moreover, after longtime NBA 
commissioner David Stern retired in 2014, he did not stay in the world of sports, nor did he 
stay very retired. In an October 2016 interview with Sam Amick of USA Today, Stern noted 
that he has been serving as an advisor to a venture capital firm and three startup businesses.69 
The NBA and Silicon Valley have transformed each other, perhaps irrevocably, and become 
a combined titan of tech, media, and business. As the NBA continues to seek global market 
dominance – league commissioner Adam Silver once told Wired, “We look at the delta 
between basketball and soccer and see an enormous upside” – perhaps there is no partner 
more suited to aid the NBA than the executives and venture capitalists of Silicon Valley.70 
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NBA 3.0: The Sacramento Kings, Golden 1 Center, and the Global Sports Franchise 
Following the 2014-15 season, the Sacramento Kings sold the naming rights to their 
upcoming state-of-the-art arena to Golden 1 Credit Union for an estimated $120 million over 
twenty years.71 Golden 1 Center, which would officially open for the 2016-17 season, would 
feature its own data center, 900 miles of cabling, virtual reality capabilities, a 6,100 square 
foot 4k video display, and chatbots “to improve fan engagement” by using artificial 
intelligence to “understand what people need and want.”72 Comparably, Levi’s Stadium in 
Santa Clara, home of the NFL’s San Francisco 49ers, had arguably held the title of “highest-
tech sports stadium” before Golden 1 Center. Opened in September 2014, Levi’s Stadium 
features 400 miles of cabling, 1,200 distributed antennae systems, 2,000 Sony TVs, and one 
Wi-Fi router for every 100 seats.73 Golden 1 Center, in comparison, features a router for 
every seventeen seats.74 The case of the Kings, though exceptional in its extremity, 
demonstrates the further mediatization of sport, the possibilities for sports teams as global 
media brands, and the future of sports spectatorship, especially as Steve Ballmer’s Los 
Angeles Clippers are set to open a similar “state-of-the-art” venue in the Inglewood area of 
Los Angeles.75 
In focusing on the case of the Sacramento Kings, as a pace setter for the wider sports 
media world, we can better understand the modern spectatorial experience of sports and its 
implications for global sports fandom. The Kings, through their massive video display, 
mobile app, and use of virtual reality, offer a newfound level of mediation within the stadium 
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space itself, converging two formerly distinct forms of spectatorship in live viewing and 
home viewing. This was part of a larger plan by Kings majority owner Vivek Ranadive, 
dubbed “NBA 3.0,” which seeks to “use technology and data to reboot the Kings” and  
“remake the league.”76 Ranadive expands on NBA 3.0 in his own words, adding, “with 
technology you can expand social networks, you can give people an opportunity to 
participate and identify with [sports] in ways that haven’t been done before.”77 With its NBA 
3.0 directive, perhaps no franchise is more reflective of the Silicon Valley-ification of the 
NBA than the Sacramento Kings. 
In a video walkthrough of the Kings’ Golden 1 Center, courtesy of CBS Sacramento, 
the arena’s massive 6,100 square foot 4K video display, the largest in North America, hovers 
above the arena floor, visible from the moment one enters the arena and from nearly every 
corner and corridor.78 A similar feature, by KCRA, highlights the nearly one thousand miles 
of cable, operated on “enough electricity to power an entire city,” through a data center 
comparable to those owned by Amazon and Google.79 Perhaps most striking is “mission 
control,” in which staff monitor user data from the Kings’ dedicated mobile app, and can 
point out the shortest concession and restroom lines. Through the app, fans can check this 
information, check player and game statistics, order food to be delivered, and even request 
the temperature be adjusted near their seats.80 Golden 1 Center privileges its own highly 
mediatized environment above and beyond the live performance of basketball. 
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Figure 4.7: The Kings’ Golden 1 Center features its own Tier 4 data center, the only one housed inside a 
professional sports arena (Source: Sacramento Kings). 
 
Since the opening of Golden 1 Center, Ranadive and the Kings have also begun to 
experiment with virtual reality. For the start of the 2015-16 season, following an investment 
in VR company VOKE, which placed their “stereoscopic panoramic camera system” 
throughout the arena, the Kings began to offer virtual reality live-streams of select games.81 
This was part of a larger NBA trend, as the league itself partnered with NextVR in 2015, and 
began to broadcast one game per week in virtual reality by the 2016-17 season.82 The Kings’ 
plans for VR, however, have gone beyond broadcasting to the actual in-person audience. 
Team minority owner Paul Jacobs, former CEO of mobile chipmaker Qualcomm, described 
tentative plans to offer virtual replays for fans that are present but far from the court: 
“Whether they're way up in the high seats or they're in a box but not sitting courtside, you 
still want to give them that courtside experience.” Jacobs also noted the possibility of 
offering specially priced tickets for a “movie-theater-like space inside the stadium with high-
end VR headsets,” so that fans would “still be there to feel the roar of the crowd and be part 																																																								
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of it but be watching in a slightly different way.”83 While Golden 1 Center might offer an 
exceptional level of mediation of the spectatorial experience, it highlights increasingly viable 
paths for the deepening mediatization of sport. 
The NBA, though, has been somewhat more ambivalent on those arena technologies 
that emphasize personalization over communal address. “Seventeen-to-twenty-thousand 
customized, individualized experiences on your phone does not make a good in-arena 
experience,” explains Mike Chant, senior director of team programming at the NBA, who 
serves as the main point of contact for the league’s franchises on both game presentation and 
overall team content. “What kind of content are you creating in-arena so that fans aren’t 
necessarily looking down at their phones during breaks, but instead, they’re all looking at 
whatever is happening on-court, or they’re all looking at whatever programming you have on 
the video board.”84 
 This emphasis on community and a positive in-arena experience, at the local level, 
ultimately works to benefit the league on an international scale, as fans can more easily 
partake in the experience via NeuLion’s International League Pass, which uses team’s local 
broadcasts combined with various foreign-language commentary options. For the 2014-15 
season, moreover, the league began to include its game-break and halftime entertainment on 
NeuLion’s platform, as part of a “continuous feed,” giving fans unprecedented access to the 
arena experience. If fans are having fun in-arena, their enjoyment comes across on television, 
now more than ever before. At the same time, Chant cautions, “I wouldn’t ask a team to do 
something in-arena, for the sake of an international League Pass thing, that I know wouldn’t 
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make sense in-arena.” While the emphasis may not be on media to the detriment of the arena 
experience, often “the best experience in-arena will translate better on TV.”85 
 Since the opening of Golden 1 Center, as a highly mediatized environment, the 
Sacramento Kings have been among the most aggressive of the NBA’s thirty franchises in 
their awareness of the global media potential of in-arena efforts. Ahead of the 2017-18 
season, the team revealed two new alternative court designs, one in Hindi and one Mandarin, 
that would be used during select games aired in those nations.86 The “global court” also 
features a redesigned Kings logo, which uses a more traditional lion logo than the standard 
Kings basketball design, in order to be more recognizable in India and other overseas nations. 
For the 2017-18 season, Nike released “city edition” jerseys for every NBA franchise, and 
the Kings’ version featured a version of their lion logo as well as a white “soccer-style” chest 
stripe.87 While some Sacramento fans were critical of the look, the effort to better engage 
international Kings fans was evident.88 The courts and jersey are then combined with various 
“international theme nights,” including a “Lunar New Year Celebration” and “Bollywood 
Night.” Throughout these events, the Kings rely on multiple social media platforms to more 
effectively address those fans, including the Chinese platform Weibo.89 In 2014, when the 
Kings launched the first Hindi-language website in the NBA, the team’s president at the time, 
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Chris Granger, stated the organization’s goal “to become India’s home team.”90 Since then, 
their cultivation of a global media ecosystem has continued to reflect this mission. 
 
 
 
While the Kings serve as exemplars of the global NBA franchise, others have also 
pursued their own international audiences. In addition to the aforementioned example of 
Greek star Giannis Antetokounmpo and the Milwaukee Bucks, the “city edition” jerseys of 
the Houston Rockets and Golden State Warriors both feature Chinese characters.91 Like the 
Kings, many teams also feature various international “heritage” nights that are broadcast 
overseas in the country of note. The New York Knicks held their first “French Heritage 
Night” against the Charlotte Hornets, in order to feature their own French player in Frank 
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Figure 4.8: Former Kings center 
DeMarcus Cousins promotes a Hindi-
language ‘shooting shirt’ for sale in the 
Kings’ online store c. 2014 (left). The 
Kings debut a new court with a redesigned 
lion emblem and small Hindi logos c. 2017 
(below) (Source: Sacramento Kings). 
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Ntilikina and the Hornets’ Nicolas Batum and Tony Parker.92 While some teams have come 
along more slowly to the global media potential of live event programming, it is no surprise 
that the most aggressive teams, like the Kings, Bucks, and Warriors, all have ties to Silicon 
Valley and venture capital, and whose owners bought into the league specifically for its 
growing international value. 
 The Sacramento Kings, in privileging the globality of the in-arena experience, have 
been among the teams that have best taken advantage of this modern media ecosystem. Yet 
the Kings’ efforts, as well as the NBA’s, surpass media distribution alone. As one Kings 
executive explained to me, what helps them most overseas is actually being there. “We were 
the on the NBA China trip [in 2014]…We did the two back-to-back Mexico City games [in 
2015].” But the team has even grander plans, he continues: “[Kings owner] Vivek wants to 
be the first team to play in India and I guarantee you, knowing him, it’s going to happen.”93  
Indeed in December 2018, the “NBA India Games” were officially announced, featuring the 
Sacramento Kings and Indiana Pacers, for the following October.94 The Kings’ ambitions 
thus reflect the broader global ambitions of the NBA itself, which continues to build regional 
offices, sign national distribution agreements with television operators and social media 
platforms, and establish stronger physical footholds in various overseas locations. In 
cultivating their global presence, both in partnership with the NBA and separate from it, the 
Kings exhibit the potential for emergent media institutions in the post-network era. 
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Conclusion: The International House of Hoops 
In November 2010, only a few months ahead of the labor negotiations that would 
ultimately stall and lead to the 2011 NBA lockout, commissioner David Stern appeared on 
The Colbert Report. “[Basketball] is one of [the United States’] leading cultural exports,” he 
told host Stephen Colbert. Stern went on to compare basketball’s global appeal to that of 
other American sports, conceding that “football is the most popular sport in America and 
what you Americans call soccer is the most popular sport in the rest of the world,” which 
served to emphasize the NBA’s room for further growth. “When you say ‘you Americans,’ 
are you not an American?” asked Colbert with incredulity. “I’m an internationalist,” offered 
Stern with a smile.95 
A punch-line and yet one with far greater meaning in the context of the NBA’s global 
ambitions over the entirety of Stern’s tenure as commissioner, from 1984 through 2014. The 
NBA’s product, like Stern himself, has aspired to internationalism. In conjunction with 
digital distribution technologies, in-house production and control, and a global talent 
development infrastructure, the NBA brand has evolved into an inclusive and global one. 
“It’s the ultimate compliment to our players, the world has watched the American players 
and adopted their game,” Stern added later in his interview with Colbert, “but the rest of the 
world is catching up.”96 Which is true but incomplete, as the NBA either directly controls, or 
has a great deal of input, in the development of these players and their potential entry into the 
league. Passionate debate about American versus international play only helps the NBA 
overall, just like the rising popularity of college basketball in the 1980s helped to prepare 
audiences and market upcoming stars. Only in this case, the NBA has greater ownership over 																																																								
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the development pipeline, via its Junior NBA and Basketball without Borders initiatives. The 
modern internationalism of the NBA, which grew from its media ambitions as early as the 
1987 McDonald’s Open and the 1988 Atlanta Hawks tour of the Soviet Union, continues to 
propel the NBA’s international media distribution. 
 The “hub and spoke” model, in which the NBA’s Secaucus, New Jersey “hub” is 
connected by fiber-optic “spokes” to all twenty-nine arenas, to international streaming 
partner NeuLion, to domestic streaming partner Turner, and to its own colocation center in 
Newark, New Jersey, enables the NBA to maximize its control over a vast and instantaneous 
global media ecosystem. Combined with the in-house production of live events, television 
programming, and web content, as well as the league’s development of its ‘on-air talent,’ the 
NBA has emerged a genuine transnational media conglomerate. The contemporary post-
network distribution apparatus of the NBA, in service of an increasingly internationalist 
media product, has allowed the league to come closer than ever before to its ambition to 
overtake soccer as the most popular sport in the world. 
The NBA is often as secretive as Netflix in its metrics, with the league revealing only 
that the number of League Pass subscribers rose 40-percent during course of the 2014-15 
season.97 During the 2017-18 season, the number reportedly increased another 63-percent 
over the previous year.98 But the league has excelled on social media, where numbers are 
more easily visible. By August 2018, the NBA had reached 30 million followers, which 
exceed the UEFA Champions League at 25.4 million followers, the English Premier League 
at 18.5 million, WWE at 15 million, the NFL at 11.7 million, and MLB at merely 4.5 million. 
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On Twitter, too, the NBA’s 27.2 million followers pace the NFL’s 24 million, and on 
Facebook, the NBA’s 35.9 million followers are more than double the NFL’s 16 million.99  
The NBA’s success on social media is the result of its sustained investment in self-
distribution, as its internal Game Distribution Center edits and posts highlights to these 
platforms at a rapid pace, fulfilling the original role of NBA.com in directing viewers to 
telecasts. “Back then most of this [archival] stuff was for highlight packages the next day, or 
for video tapes that would be produced at the end of the season, or for features that would be 
on an NBC Game of the Week,” explains Steve Hellmuth, the NBA’s executive vice 
president of media operations and technology. “But now all the logging and all the work that 
we do here is focused on turning stuff around immediately into social media channels, into 
the NBA app.”100 The NBA’s success in the post-network era, as a post-network media 
conglomerate, is the result of a careful and sustained investment in digital platforms. Just as 
the NBA invested heavily in cable television in 2002, when the medium was ascending over 
broadcast television, the NBA’s early investment in internet distribution has well-positioned 
the league for the media industry’s transition towards a paradigm dominated by streaming 
video. While the league continues to benefit from both broadcast and cable, the NBA’s 
investment in an in-house digital pipeline has prepared the league to succeed as its own self-
sufficient media empire. 
In January 2019, ESPN basketball writer Zach Lowe appeared on The Full 48 
podcast, which is produced by Bleacher Report and hosted by their sportswriter Howard 
Beck. “I think at some point the NBA is going to have to look at itself in mirror and say, are 
we about basketball or are we about player movement and three screens and Twitter and all 																																																								
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this stuff, or do we care about the game – do we care about the actual on-court product and 
people understanding it?” Lowe posited, following a nighttime news cycle that saw viral 
video of Houston Rockets star James Harden being hit in the face by the ball. “It’s less about 
the game than ever before and it just trends more and more in that direction,” Lowe 
added.”101 
Lowe’s sentiment reflects the expansion of the league’s media ambitions above and 
beyond their interest in the sport of basketball. There is irony, however, in its airing on The 
Full 48 podcast, produced by Bleacher Report, which is owned by the NBA’s longtime cable 
and digital partner Turner Broadcasting System, one of the most significant contributors to 
the transformation of basketball into media content first and foremost. But these are not 
recent developments, as this dissertation has demonstrated. From the NBA’s early interest in 
cable and the medium’s opportunities for self-produced material, the league’s ambitions have 
exceeded that of sport alone. This was especially evident in their brief interest in expanding 
into professional football in collaboration with NBC and Turner, as noted in Chapter Two, 
and in the 2012 fines for the San Antonio Spurs resting their players during a nationally 
televised game. Basketball is not arbitrary, of course, but over time it has increasingly served 
primarily as fuel for the NBA’s broader global media ambitions. 
The various components chronicled in this chapter – NeuLion, Brazil, Silicon Valley, 
and the Sacramento Kings – come together to illustrate the pinnacle of the NBA as a global 
media empire, as well as the broader global state of the sports media industry, within the 
post-network era. The ascent of streaming over cable has enabled content owners to self-
distribute and become integrated media institutions in their own right, including the NBA’s 																																																								
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Sacramento Kings and Milwaukee Bucks, which have used digital distribution and social 
media to become global media properties. The league itself, ultimately, has benefited from 
this paradigm to become more global, more integrated, and more in control than ever before. 
NeuLion, in particular, demonstrates the essential role of intermediary firms within this 
streaming media ecosystem, by providing infrastructure and expertise without requiring 
direct control over branding or content. The institutions and individuals of Silicon Valley, 
meanwhile, have become increasingly embedded within the sports world to fuel their global 
commercial ambitions, as in the case of Brazil and other highly populated countries, which 
present new opportunities for the expansion of media markets. By the close of the 2014-15 
season, these elements offer the culmination of the NBA’s global media interests since the 
1980s, as well as the wider evolution of the sports-media industry, which has seen the 
acceleration of sports as media content and sports leagues as media conglomerates. Through 
the post-network era, no entity has embodied the mediatization and marketization of sport 
more than the National Basketball Association, the media empire that hoops built. 
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Conclusion: The Global Sports Media Industry 
 
“My job, and I think sometimes people misunderstand this… My job is to look at all the 
other competition outside of the NBA, and that’s where, my god, the world is changing so 
quickly… This notion that, sort of, the Pelicans are just competing against the Knicks or the 
Lakers or the Thunder, they’re competing against every other form of entertainment out there 
in the world. Especially for this young audience, they know that more than anyone, because 
they don’t even subscribe to pay-TV anymore or virtually where you have to go to find most 
of our games, so talk about the world changing quickly… That has to be my mind-set… It’s 
that we’re an entertainment product competing against an infinitesimal number of 
opportunities for people to do other things with their time.” – NBA Commissioner Adam 
Silver, in conversation with The Ringer’s Bill Simmons, May 2019.1 
 
---------------- 
 
This dissertation has sought to demonstrate the processes of mediatization and 
marketization, as the sports and media industries have become increasingly intertwined since 
the 1980s. As outlined in the introduction, there are quite a few scholars to theorize the 
historical relationship between sports and mass media, largely through the late 19th century 
and into the satellite television boom of the 1980s and 1990s. This dissertation has attempted 
to provide a richer understanding of the sports-media relationship as it has evolved globally 
and into the streaming era. While this symbiosis precedes 1982, the starting point of this 
dissertation, the period from 1982 through 2015 sees sport functioning as multiplatform 
media content above and beyond its status as a cultural pastime, largely through the efforts of 
the National Basketball Association, which used basketball to fuel a global media empire. 
The NBA has been especially effective as a global media producer and distributor, and as 
such, the organization is the ideal reflection of the sports industry’s evolution as the sports 
media industry.  
In his examination of Netflix, Ramon Lobato differentiates between global and 
multinational media institutions. While Netflix promotes itself as a genuinely “global” 																																																								
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service, the company’s platform remains more accurately “multinational,” in that “may best 
be understood as a series of national media services stitched together into a single platform.”2  
The streaming endeavors of sport, however, which most frequently rely on uniform 
international platforms across borders, indeed reflect the “wraparound” nature of a truly 
global enterprise. The NBA, the most aggressive and experimental sports organization in 
terms of global and multiplatform media distribution, thus provided the ideal object for 
examining the contemporary state of the sports-media relationship as well as its historical 
development.  
Following the emergence of sport as modern media content in the 1980s, the 1990s 
sees the ascent of sports leagues as global media conglomerates. By the 2000s, as cable 
expands and streaming distribution becomes more reliable, sports media institutions are able 
to favor untapped global audiences over an established domestic audience. By 2015, the 
continued success of streaming platforms and the development of a post-network media 
ecosystem enable a league such as the NBA to become a fully integrated and transnational 
media empire, while also opening up global opportunities for individual sports franchises like 
the Sacramento Kings.  
The NBA thus illuminates a fundamental dialectic between globalization and 
digitization, as new technologies facilitate a vaster distribution potential and in turn 
encourage a more substantial global address. In the early 2000s, the NBA more extensively 
turned to international audiences, with the aid of improved streaming video technologies, 
which allowed the league to reach new heights as an integrated media producer-distributor. 
Through its global success, the NBA also illuminates the relationship between sports 
programming and the broader media industries, in which the former has assisted the latter in 																																																								
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its global and digital investments. While this is clear in the global appeal of sport via over-
the-top platforms, it is also true that many of the most key historical players in streaming 
technology, such as Starwave and BAMTech, originated in sport before branching out to 
other media properties.  
 The first chapter demonstrates the inception of sports as modern media content, when 
future commissioner David Stern conceived of NBA Entertainment, an in-house production 
studio and archival outfit, through which basketball would become the content to fuel the 
league’s much vaster media ambitions. By the league’s producing its own dubbed edits of 
games for overseas distribution, NBAE alters the character of the relationship between sports 
leagues and television broadcasters. Ultimately, this chapter highlights the mediatization of 
sport, in conjunction with the broader interconnected forces of globalization and 
deregulation, as global opportunities in satellite and cable encourage the league to invest 
more heavily in their own media production and distribution. The NBA’s early adoption of 
these technologies, on an international scale, result in the establishment of NBA basketball as 
a media property above and beyond its status as a sport. 
 As chronicled in Chapter Two, the establishment of NBA Entertainment as well as 
the international success of the 1992 Olympic basketball team, which featured NBA stars for 
the first time, facilitates the league’s ascent as a full-fledged media conglomerate during the 
1990s. The NBA’s conglomeration, which saw the organization establish a number of 
corporate satellite offices around the world, was also aided by the development of the 
internet and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) as promising direct-to-consumer distribution 
technologies. The NBA was able to construct a transnational network of media circulation 
that maximized overseas market penetration and centralized league oversight. While the 
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NBA began to globalize in the 1980s, it is during the 1990s that the league establishes its on-
court product as a flexible “television format” that can be adapted and modified depending 
on local taste, through the assistance of those local NBA offices. This chapter thus examines 
how and why sports leagues were able to succeed as media conglomerates in the early period 
of internet distribution, while deepening our understanding of the TV format to incorporate 
the particularities of sports programming. 
 As the global possibilities for direct-to-consumer distribution were expanded, so too 
was media companies’ desire for a more inclusive and international audience address. 
Chapter Three demonstrates the privileging of a global audience over a domestic one. While 
the NBA faced declining viewership in the United States, the league accelerated the 
importation of foreign-born athletes to enhance their global cultural value and more 
effectively address those overseas fans as equally and simultaneously as possible. This 
occurs concurrent to the widespread advancement and adoption of streaming video, which 
offers the ideal conduit for the NBA’s global ambitions. The NBA format thus evolves from 
the 1990s, which more heavily marketed the league’s Americanness, to primarily emphasize 
an international audience. This strategy presents evidence for the further marketization and 
mediatization of sport, which was increasingly motivated by the particular commercial 
imperatives and possibilities of market dominance facilitated by a multiplatform media 
ecosystem.  Chapter Three provides further context, therefore, for the wider growth of 
streaming and OTT platforms and the interrelationship between direct-to-consumer 
distribution and the internationalization of media content. 
 Chapter Four offers a snapshot of the NBA and the sports media industry during the 
2014-15 season, as a post-network era of television has become more fully established. The 
	 241 
global ascent of streaming has enabled new entities, many of them with ties to sports and to 
the NBA specifically, to rise to prominence within the wider media industry. NeuLion, which 
oversees the NBA’s international-only iteration of its League Pass streaming platform, 
reflects the business’s continued reliance on expert intermediary firms to manage such 
services, as they did with Starwave in the early days of internet distribution. NeuLion and 
perhaps its top competitor, BAMTech, have become as essential to the operation of 
streaming platforms as the cable operators before them. This contemporary paradigm, which 
allows for the simultaneous and seemingly frictionless distribution of media around the 
world, has enabled various institutions to become global brands in their own right, similarly 
to how the NBA once used satellite television to do the same. Every single game of every 
single team can now be watched live across nearly every continent. The Sacramento Kings, 
for instance, can thus aspire to become India’s “home team,” as their various efforts have 
reflected.  
Silicon Valley capitalists and capital have played a key role in cultivating these 
possibilities, after investing the NBA en masse in the early 2010s following a labor lockout 
and a restructuring of player compensation that was more favorable to owners. Silicon Valley 
interests have pushed the globalization and digitization even further, as sports offers lucrative 
content to fuel their media platforms and technologies, while the NBA has benefited from the 
influx of capital. This partnership leads to uncomfortable questions, however, as the NBA 
expands deeper into markets in countries like Brazil, where it has also invested in local social 
programs and infrastructure. The altruism of these actions is complicated by the NBA’s 
primarily commercial goals as a global entertainment conglomerate. 
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 While the NBA originally served as an administrative organization that enacted the 
rules of American pro basketball and maintained the status quo of the game, it has grown 
considerably since 1982. As a result of the NBA’s early investment in self-production via 
NBA Entertainment, direct-to-consumer distribution technologies in NBA.com and NBA 
TV, and their efforts to globalize the performance and packaging of the sport itself, the NBA 
has since emerged as a fully integrated global media empire. The NBA is now firmly 
engaged in the same conversation as Netflix and Amazon in their international streaming 
ambitions and global value. The U.S. sports industry generated over $19 billion from media 
rights in 2017 alone, of which the NBA’s annual $2.67 billion is a significant proportion. As 
new competitors, like Amazon and DAZN, have entered the marketplace, this number is 
expected to rise to nearly $24 billion by 2022.3 Digital platforms and services, moreover, 
reportedly make up more than half of the $2 trillion in revenue for the entire global media 
industry.4 The sports leagues that have most aggressively pursued digital distribution, such as 
the NBA via League Pass and social media platforms, thus envision enormous room for 
growth over the coming years.  
While the NBA has not yet taken the step of promoting other sports or media 
properties within their institutional network, the notion continues to seem plausible. This had 
been the plan, after all, for their aborted partnership with Turner Entertainment on a CNN/SI 
channel.5 While the NBA continues to entrust Facebook, Twitter, Tencent, Turner, and 
NeuLion to administer the various properties that they have been provided, the league could 
very easily take on those distribution responsibilities themselves, should the benefits ever 																																																								
3 “At the Gate and Beyond: Outlook for the Sports Market in North America through 2022,” 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, November 2018. 
4 Ennel van Eeden and Wilson Chow, “Perspectives from the Global Entertainment & Media Outlook, 2018-
2022,” PricewaterhouseCoopers, June 2018. 
5 Rudy Martzke, “AOL, Turner Double-Team and Close In on NBA Deal,” USA Today, December 12, 2001.	
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outweigh the costs. As streaming revenues continue to rise while traditional linear television 
declines, it seems increasingly plausible that the NBA would intervene and take greater 
control over its own distribution. The NBA’s own commissioner, Adam Silver, has expressed 
concern in the long-term viability of cable and the NBA’s current approach: “From 2010 to 
2018, among 18-to-34-year-olds—and that’s our core audience, it’s an incredibly attractive 
young audience—their viewership on pay TV is down almost 50 percent,” he explained in 
May 2019 at the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics conference. “So I think we’re going to have to 
figure this out with ESPN, and with now our new partners at AT&T and WarnerMedia, how 
the new world looks.”6 As the league has come to function as a media empire in its right, 
with offices spanning the world and divisions with various responsibilities, the NBA is well-
positioned to take on even greater distribution responsibilities and expand their capabilities as 
a media company beyond the scope of basketball or sport altogether. 
 By examining the NBA, this dissertation thus charts a narrative of sport’s becoming 
media. The NBA accelerated and shaped this evolution, using basketball as TV programming 
to fuel its broader media ambitions. In doing so, the NBA illuminates the interrelationship 
between sports and media, as well as the dialectic between new media technologies and 
globalization. The NBA invested in satellite, cable, and internet distribution in order to 
expand their reach. Their expanded presence, and an altogether more global audience, 
ultimately altered how the NBA produced its content and to whom that content was primarily 
directed. The NBA evolved from an American sports league selling an American game, to a 
global media company selling an international television program. 
As more and more cultures are incorporated into the NBA’s product, however, they 
are flattened and modified in order to most effectively promote a particular corporate vision 																																																								
6 42 Analytics, “SSAC19: Who Says No?” 
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of the world. While this does not exclude the genuine dialogic possibilities between cultures, 
the NBA has demonstrated that the platform itself is fixed in favor of commercial gain. Some 
have argued that the persistence of language and local preferences, as in television formats, 
argue against the overwhelming force of homogenization. But as the NBA becomes 
imbricated in the fabric of local life, and increasingly defined and consumed as a local brand 
while remaining intimately tied to both the league’s own corporate aims and those of its 
sponsors, such a paradigm only accelerates the commercialization of culture. As part of 
basketball’s particular process of marketization, overseas basketball cultures have become 
transformed into the “NBA” and re-sold, like bacteria that absorb genetic material to become 
more resistant to antibiotics.7 Paul S.N. Lee has used the biological metaphor of the 
“amoeba” to describe the flexibility of imported and adapted media. Perhaps that moniker, 
ultimately, does not sufficiently capture the extent to which the drive for commercial gain is 
deeply ingrained in the entire enterprise, as Thomas Lamarre has noted in his examination of 
global television flows.8 The NBA has used its media distribution, in combination with local 
political influence, to install itself as one of the world’s sports media superpowers. 
Given the projected economic growth and deeper integration of the sports and media 
industries, scholars must remain attentive to the implications of their ongoing globalization 
and digitization, including the simultaneous address of streaming platforms, the effect of 
such possibilities on programming choices, the engagement with global media brands from 
local perspectives, and the growing interest of digital distributors such as Amazon and 
Twitter in sports programming. Sports-betting, too, appears primed to play a major role in the 
mutual growth of the sports and media industries, as the United States vacated the Supreme 																																																								
7 For more on the science of bacteria and gene transfer: Andrew F. Read and Robert J. Woods, “Antibiotic 
Resistance Management,” Evol Med Public Health 1 (2014): 147. 
8 Thomas Lamarre, “Regional TV: Affective Media Geographies.” Asiascape: Digital Asia 2 (2015): 93-126.	
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Court ruling that had kept it banned and enabled legalization on a state-by-state basis.9 While 
sports leagues hope to be paid some percentage of the wagers on their games, the precise 
economics have yet to be worked out. Either way, this new wave of gambling is thought to 
result in an increase in television ratings, given the higher financial stakes of otherwise 
meaningless regular-season games, thus benefitting sports leagues through higher media 
rights fees.10 
I hope that this dissertation demonstrates why scholars should approach these two 
businesses, sports and media, as part of a single integrated ecosystem with major 
transnational institutions that have stakes in both. Former NBA commissioner David Stern 
argued as much in early 2018, when he reflected on his responsibilities running the league 
from 1984 to 2014: “It’s really being the CEO of a far-flung entertainment and media 
conglomerate that has not just television relationships, for games and for other things, but for 
assisting the teams with respect to the sales of their tickets in their buildings and their game 
presentation, and presiding over a [consumer] products business that’s billions of dollars, and 
a sponsorship business…and all of that on a global basis.”11 In examining the NBA’s 
institutional evolution over a twenty-three year period, as it transforms into a media 
conglomerate that sees basketball as multiplatform media content, I hope to have established 
a history that provides a foundation for further research on the global sports media industry. 
 
 
 
																																																								
9 Adam Liptak and Kevin Draper, “Supreme Court Ruling Favors Sports Betting,” The New York Times, May 
14, 2018. 
10 David Bloom, “Broadcast TV is Betting Sports Gambling Will Revive Ratings,” Forbes, October 19, 2018. 
11 Stern, in discussion with the author, February 12, 2018.	
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Appendix 
 
 
 
List of Interviews 
 
Harvey Araton, New York Times sports reporter and columnist, August 4, 2017: 69 minutes. 
 
Manish Bahl, NeuLion Vice President of Service Delivery, July 21, 2017. Approx. 20 
minutes. 
 
Ira Berkow, former New York Times sports reporter and columnist, July 6, 2017: 21 minutes. 
 
Kim Bohuny, NBA Senior Vice President of International Basketball Operations, September 
22, 2017: 24 minutes.  
 
Ruben Carbajal, NBA writer and script supervisor, October 20, 2017: 61 minutes. 
 
Mike Chant, NBA Senior Director of Team Programming. November 13, 2017: 32 minutes. 
 
Mojie Crigler, NBA writer and script coordinator, June 15, 2017: 53 minutes. 
 
Ed Desser, former NBA President of Television & New Media Ventures, May 9, 2017: 49 
minutes. 
 
Robert Edelman, Professor of Russian History, UC San Diego, and translator for the 1988 
Atlanta Hawks Soviet Union tour, August 17, 2017: 45 minutes. 
 
Russ Granik, former NBA Deputy Commissioner, March 22, 2018: 44 minutes. 
 
Chris Halton, NBA Senior Vice President of Media Distribution and Technology, July 26, 
2017: 43 minutes. 
 
Steve Hellmuth, NBA Executive Vice President of Media Operations and Technology, June 
28, 2018: 40 minutes. 
 
Matt Helvick, NeuLion Senior Engineer, July 21, 2017: 49 minutes. 
 
Troy Justice, NBA Associate Vice President of International Basketball Operations, 
September 25, 2017: 30 minutes. 
 
John Kosner, former NBA Director of Broadcasting and former ESPN Executive Vice 
President of Digital and Print Media, July 20, 2017: 63 minutes. 
 
Craig Lazarus, ESPN Vice President of Original Content & Features, August 1, 2017: 90 
minutes 
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Mark Lazarus, NBCUniversal Chairman of Broadcast, Cable, Sports and News, April 18, 
2017: 24 minutes.  
 
---. April 6, 2018: 11 minutes. 
 
Terry Lyons, former NBA Vice President of International Public Relations, December 20, 
2017: 109 minutes. 
 
Danny Meiseles, NBA President and Executive Producer of Content. September 22, 2017: 30 
minutes. 
 
Andrew Nicholson, Sacramento Kings Vice President of Digital and Content, June 11, 2018: 
Email. 
 
Sacramento Kings Executive (name withheld by request), Public Relations, May 29, 2018: 
48 minutes. 
 
Matt Soldano, NeuLion Broadcast Operations Manager, July 21, 2017: 49 minutes. 
 
Mike Slade, former Starwave CEO and strategic advisor to Apple CEO Steve Jobs, 
September 12, 2017: 26 minutes. 
 
David Stern, former NBA Commissioner, February 12, 2018: 42 minutes. 
 
Ailene Voisin, former Sacramento Bee sports columnist, February 25, 2018: 43 minutes. 
 
Anne Wright, former NBA producer of live programming and entertainment, August 16, 
2017: 75 minutes. 
 
Joe Zappala, NBA Senior Manager of Digital Media Operations and Technical Services, July 
26, 2017: 71 minutes. 
 
 
 
Site Visits and Tours 
 
ESPN Campus. Bristol, Connecticut. August 1, 2017. 
 
Golden 1 Center. Sacramento, California. May 29, 2018. 
 
NBA Entertainment. Secaucus, New Jersey. July 26, 2017. 
 
NeuLion Technical Operations Center. Plainview, New York. July 21, 2017. 
 
